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iAbstract
The present research sought to describe and explain age related changes
to associative learning processes. Eleven experiments were conducted using a
human conditional learning paradigm. Background data on health, lifestyle, and
cognitive ability were collected and used as predictor variables in multiple
regression analyses.
Experiments 1 to 8 were formative, and found that older participants
showed an overall age related decline in learning ability exacerbated by the
number of stimuli and outcomes used, and the concurrent presentation of
different problem types. Configural models of learning (e.g. Pearce, 1994, 2002)
best predicted young participants’ learning whereas older people’s learning was
more consistent with elemental models (e.g. Rescorla-Wagner, 1972), suggesting
an age related change in generalisation processes. Those who learned problems
better were also more likely to be able to articulate a rule that had helped them
learn the problem. Age itself was the most predominant predictor of accuracy in
these experiments.
Experiments 9, 10, and 11 were multiple stage experiments that looked at
the extent of pro- and retro-active interference in learning. Experiments 9 and 10
used easy and hard HCL problems to examine the role of rule induction in
learning. Older participants who had learned initial discriminations better were
more prone to pro-active interference in both experiments, the extent of which
was predicted most reliably by fluid intelligence. Rule learning had a profound
effect on participants’ predictions during the unreinforced test stage. In
Experiment 9 (Easy-Hard) younger participants suffered from more retroactive
interference than older people. This pattern was far less pronounced in
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Experiment 10, (Hard-Easy) suggesting that problem order affected the way
participants generalised from rule-based knowledge. This observation is
inexplicable by associative learning theories, and explanation may require a
problem solving approach. Experiment 11 examined feature-based
generalisation. Again older participants suffered more proactive and retroactive
interference and elemental theories predicted their responses best, whereas
younger participants responses were consistent with configural models of
learning. In this instance, resistance to pro- and retro-active interference was
predicted by fluid intelligence.
Overall the research concluded that there is a demonstrable, complexity
dependent change in associative learning processes in later life. It appears that
humans have an increasing tendency to rely on elemental, rather than configural
processes of generalisation in later life, and this leads to overgeneralisation
between stimuli and an inability to resist pro- and retroactive interference in
learning. This may be as a result of an inhibitory or source monitoring failure as
a consequence of atrophy in the frontal lobes of the brain, although some of the
learning deficits are explicable through mnemonic decline.
1Chapter 1: Introduction to Associative Learning
1.1 Fundamentals
Associative learning in its broadest sense has a long history. Aristotle
(c.350 BC) suggested that ideas experienced together tend to be remembered
together through the principles of contiguity, similarity, and contrast. In this
conception associative learning is simply the strengthening of mnemonic
connections between subjective experiences that happen to be either very similar,
very different, or close together in time and space. Later Ebbinghaus (1913)
tested Aristotle’s conjectures through introspection, and agreed that these
fundamental principles held under more rigorous inspection. Obviously, though,
both men relied on subjective methodologies and this can be seen as a
fundamental flaw in their investigations on the subject.
Associative learning in the context of this thesis, however, involves
creating an association between a stimulus and a response such that when the
same stimulus is encountered again it will evoke the same response. Ivan Pavlov
(1927; see also Mackintosh, 2003, and Wasserman & Miller, 1997 for reviews)
was a Russian physiologist who researched the digestive systems of dogs and
pioneered the study of classical conditioning, a variant of associative learning.
Crucially, he devised an objective experimental approach to investigate the
formation of this kind of association. In his experiments a bell was rung each
time the dogs were brought food. The bell on its own had not provoked any
response prior to the experiment, but subsequently was enough to elicit salivation
by itself. The dogs had learned to associate the sound of a bell with food, and the
sound of a bell was enough to trigger the normal physiological reaction to the
2presence of food. Classical conditioning could therefore be said to be the
learning of associations between stimuli and physiological reflex responses.
Pavlov introduced new terminology to describe the different components of
classical conditioning. Food was the unconditioned stimulus (US), which needs
no conditioning to evoke the dogs’ salivation, or unconditioned response (UR).
Initially the bell was a neutral stimulus (NS), but after conditioning becomes the
conditioned stimulus  (CS), which may evoke salivation on its own: the
conditioned response (CR).  He also noted that subsequent repeated presentation
of the CS in the absence of the US led to the animal’s response to the bell alone
disappearing: a process he called extinction. Furthermore it was also recorded
that the animals made similar responses to similar stimuli, a phenomenon known
as generalisation.
Most theorists (e.g. Pavlov, 1927; Estes, 1959; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972;
Rescorla, 1979; Pearce, 1987; Wagner, 2003; LePelley, 2004) argue that the
conditioning process leads to the establishment of a connection, or association,
between internal representations of the CS and US. Furthermore the magnitude
of this association increases with repeated paired presentations (Dickinson,
1980), and is linearly reflected by the accuracy of CRs. One way of investigating
classical conditioning is to present participants with two CSs, one of which,
stimulus A, is followed by the US (A+), whilst the other, stimulus B, is not (B-;
note that ‘A’ and ‘B’ and ‘+’ and ‘-‘ are abstract labels that could signify any
stimulus or outcome type and that this kind of notation is commonly used in the
associative learning literature). Under these circumstances one would expect a
CR when A+ is presented, but not when B- is presented. This simple paradigm is
known as discrimination learning, and clearly one would surmise that an
3association had been formed between stimulus A+ and the US, but not between
B- and the US. Although much has been learned from discrimination learning
experiments this simple task is unable to test the relative accuracy of the
predictions of an abundance of theories seeking to explain fundamental learning
principles. There are several more complex paradigms currently in use, for
instance negative (NPP) and positive (PPP) patterning problems (see e.g. Jarrard,
1993; Kehoe, 1988; Shanks, Charles, Darby, & Azmi, 1998); and biconditional
problems (see e.g. Saavedra, 1975; Shanks, Charles, Darby, & Azmi, 1998). All
these experimental designs involve compound training, where two stimuli are
presented together to form a unique compound CS. NPPs, for example, require
participants to learn that a stimulus presented alone, or as an element, predicts
the US (e.g. A+, B+), but when presented as a compound (e.g. AB-) they do not.
Conversely in PPPs compound stimuli (e.g. CD+) predict the US, but their
elements (e.g. C-, D-) do not. Biconditional problems, on the other hand, consist
entirely of compound stimuli arranged such that each element in the problem is
associated with the presence and absence of the US equally (e.g. AB+, CD+,
AC-, BD-). One important observation concerning both these classes of problem
is that they require non-linear solutions: one cannot reliably predict associations
between the US and compound stimuli by summing the associative strengths of
elemental stimuli. As we shall see this property makes it possible for these
problems and others like them to distinguish between extant theories of
associative learning.
There are two broad classes of theory that seek to explain associative
learning. The first class has been referred to as ‘nonselective elemental’ theories,
and the second as ‘configural theories’ (Rudy & Sutherland, 1989). The former
4are elemental in that they assume that summing the associative strength of their
constituent elements, or components such as brightness, size, modality et cetera,
predicts responses to stimuli. They are nonselective in that all elements or
components within the stimulus have an equal chance of association with the US.
For the remainder of this thesis these theories (e.g. Spence, 1936; Estes, 1950;
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975; Wagner, 2003; LePelley, 2004)
will simply be referred to as elemental theories. Configural theories on the other
hand take a Gestalt approach and assume that each stimulus configuration
constitutes a separate exemplar: even if two elements are combined to form a
compound these are treated as separate stimuli (e.g. Pearce, 1987, 1994, 2002;
Kruschke, 1992). Yet other theories attempt to bridge the gap between elemental
and configural accounts by integrating aspects of both classes of model with
neuropsychological accounts (e.g. Gluck & Myers, 1993; Sutherland & Rudy,
1989; Rudy & Sutherland, 1995).
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an appraisal of elemental
theories, and Chapter 2 will examine configural theories, assess the relative
success of each class of theory in explaining fundamental learning processes, and
look at neuropsychological models of learning. Chapters 3 and 4 go on to explore
the effects of ageing on cognitive ability and to speculate on the likely effects of
the ageing process on people’s capacity for associative learning.
1.2 Elemental Theories
As stated before elemental theories make the assumption that each
element present on a trial is processed separately and acquires its own associative
strength.  Furthermore the separate associative values of all elements presented
together as a compound can be summed to predict a response: a principle known
5as ‘summation’. These assumptions were clearly made by researchers prior to the
development of computational models of learning. Spence (1936), for instance,
proposed that the total excitatory strength of a stimulus compound was a function
of the sum of the associative strengths of its elements. This obviously reflected
both of the assumptions inherent in elemental models; that firstly the elements in
compound stimuli are processed separately, and secondly that by summation the
associative strengths of compound elements can be added together to predict an
organism’s response.
Spence (1936, 1937) also developed the idea that inhibition contributed to
associative learning. As above he predicted that rewarding an animal for
responding to stimuli S+ would lead to an increased likelihood of responses on
subsequent presentations of the same stimuli. In addition he also proposed that
responses to unreinforced stimuli S- would be incrementally inhibited in the
same way, leading to an increasingly decreased likelihood of responses to that
stimulus. Spence (1937) also generated ideas about the nature of generalisation:
or the tendency to respond in similar ways to perceptually similar, but not
identical, stimuli. In this paper he reports the finding that animals could
discriminate between two light stimuli (S+; S-) varying on a single dimension of
brightness. Spence (1937) proposed that each stimulus would generate its own
generalisation gradient: a curve approximating the normal distribution that
predicted the strength of the animal’s responses. Furthermore he suggested that
the excitatory generalisation gradient corresponding to the stimulus S+ would be
larger than the inhibitory generalisation gradient surrounding the stimulus S- and
animals would therefore be more likely to respond to S+ than S-. Additionally
Spence’s theories made the prediction that any subsequent stimuli S’ with an
6intensity displaced from S+ in a direction away from S- will result in a stronger
response than to S+ alone, since the loss of associative strength incurred by a
move away from S+ is less than the reduction in inhibition resulting from the
move away from S-. This ‘peak shift’ phenomenon has been confirmed by a
number of studies (e.g. Honig, 1962; Sachs, 1969). One much cited example of
empirical support for both generalisation and the peak shift phenomenon is
Hanson (1959). In this study pigeons were trained to discriminate between lights
of various wavelengths: responding to lights of 550nm (S+) but not to lights of
560nm (S-). When tested without reinforcement the pigeons responded more
strongly to lights of 530nm and 540nm than to lights of 550nm, although the
original discrimination was preserved and the pigeons responded least to lights of
560nm and greater. The concepts of generalisation and inhibition are
fundamental to this thesis, and will be expanded on in Chapter Two in the
context of configural models, and in Chapter 4 in relation to cognitive ageing.
Spence’s contribution was seminal and parsimonious. His theories made
specific, testable predictions although there are some obvious drawbacks. His
view of inhibition was flawed since he assumed that this is merely the result of
non-reinforcement, whereas inhibition is clearly a more complex phenomenon
that this analysis implies (see e.g. LoLordo & Fairless, 1985). Furthermore the
theory fails to predict responses for even the simplest non-linear problems, such
as the feature positive problem AB+, B-. According to Spence’s theory this
discrimination should be insoluble since it is assumed that both elements enter
into an association with the US, and both elements A and B would be
completely, or asymptotically, associated with the US. Consequently an animal
would make a CR to the B- element when presented alone. A raft of empirical
7evidence exists to contradict this prediction: animals can learn an AB+, B-
feature positive discrimination (e.g. Wagner, 1969; Reberg & Leclerc, 1977).
Another more fundamental weakness of Spence’s theory is the assumption that
generalisation occurs only between stimulus elements that vary along a single
dimension, such as brightness or tone.
A slightly different approach that perhaps takes a more realistic view of
both generalisation and the effects of non-reinforcement was that of Stimulus
Sampling Theory (SST: Estes, 1950; Atkinson & Estes, 1963). SST proposes that
the background context of a CS was encoded along with the CS itself, and later
that the only effect of non-reinforcement was to weaken previously established
associations. The theory suggests that when stimuli A+, B- are presented the
context of that presentation, X, also acquires associative value, and an organism
responds to stimuli on the basis of the statistical probability of it predicting the
US. A simple discrimination now becomes an AX+, BX- problem, and one
consequence of this is that the theory predicts that either discriminations
shouldn’t be learned perfectly, or that context X should ultimately lose its
associative value, since B can do nothing other than lose acquired associative
value through non-reinforcement. The lack of clarity surrounding any
mechanism through which simple discriminations can be acquired is therefore a
definite downfall to this theory. Furthermore SST suffered from the same basic
problems as Spence’s theory in that it is unable to predict solution of the feature
positive problem. Given an AB+, B- discrimination the model predicts that since
element B has an equal probability of being present on both reinforced and
unreinforced trials it will be ‘sampled’ as having a positive valence on some B-
trials and a negative valence on some AB+ trials, rendering the discrimination
8impossible to acquire. Despite this prediction the empirical evidence suggests
that animals can learn feature positive problems (Reberg & Leclerc, 1977), as
well as the more difficult negative patterning (Jarrard, 1993) and biconditional
problems (Saavedra, 1975).
One of the fundamental weaknesses of both Spence’s theory and the SST
approach was that these theories predict that elements of a compound AB+
would both acquire an equally powerful, equally complete association with the
US. Another, more technical way to put this would be that an organism’s
learning would reach asymptote at an associative strength, λ, of 1 (usually
expressed as 1λ) for both elements of a compound, each of which alone would
therefore always predict an outcome. This leads to an inability to predict the
solution of a feature positive problem, as well as other problems such as blocking
(Kamin, 1969): a paradigm where an experimental condition consisting of Stage
1 A+, AB- trials leads to reduced US predictions to stimulus B at test relative to a
control condition of Stage 1 AB- trials. Clearly this is another situation where
neither Spence’s theory nor SST could predict the outcome. Both feature positive
problems and blocking are predictable, however, if one assumes a competitive
learning rule. According to models that assume cue competition the elements of a
compound compete with each other for an association of finite magnitude,
usually assumed to be 1λ. Given a feature positive problem AB+, B- stimulus
element A would acquire most of the associative strength, allowing a model to
predict B-. Similarly when applied to blocking a competitive rule allows stimulus
element A to once more gain the entire associative valence and allow the model
to predict retarded responding to element B at test. The fundamental assumptions
of cue competition were outlined by Konorski (1948, 1967) and have spawned
9many models of learning since (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh,
1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Wagner, 2003; LePelley, 2004). These models share
with Spence’s theories and SST the assumptions of summation and of elemental
processing, although all assume the key difference of cue competition.
Without question the most influential model of learning to have emerged
over the last fifty years is the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model. This model is
fundamentally based on Widrow & Hoff’s (1960) Delta rule, developed to
minimise errors in radio signals. The Rescorla Wagner (1972) theory uses the
assumption that the learning process is essentially an algorithm that minimises
the difference between what is predicted to happen, and what actually happens.
The theory incorporates several of Spence’s assumptions: that learning is an
incremental process leading to an increased likelihood of responding to a
reinforced stimulus involving the analysis of stimulus elements that can predict
responses to compound stimuli through summation. Furthermore the theory
assumes a finite strength of an association between the CS and US, which is said
to be at asymptote when at its maximum strength, usually represented as the
Greek letter
€ 
λ . As stated before the key difference is that Spence assumed each
element of a compound stimulus could reach asymptote, whereas the Rescorla-
Wagner model assumes that each element in a compound competes for a finite
level of association determined by the presence of the US. A consequence of this
is that the sum of a compound’s elements can equal no more than
€ 
λ , usually
assumed to be 1. Another feature of the theory is that novel, or surprising stimuli
result in a greater increase in associative strength than unsurprising or previously
seen stimuli, allowing the theory to predict a classic, negatively accelerating
‘learning curve’.
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Fundamentally the Rescorla-Wagner theory is an error correction
algorithm implemented in a two layer neural network. The equation representing
the change in associative strength for a single element between the CS and US,
€ 
ΔVn  for each trial is shown below in Equation 1.1.
Equation 1.1
€ 
ΔVn =αβ(λ −Vn)
The Rescorla-Wagner theory therefore predicts that the change in
associative strength on any trial is equal to the ceiling of associability for the US
€ 
λ  (
€ 
λ= 1 if the US is present, 
€ 
λ  = 0 if the US is absent) minus the existing
associative strength, thereby allowing novel stimuli to acquire greater increases
in associative value than existing stimuli. The model also incorporates two
further parameters 
€ 
α  and 
€ 
β , which denote the conditionability of the CS and US
respectively. These parameters represent the learning rate of the model.
Generally speaking 
€ 
β  is set at 1 whereas 
€ 
α  is set at around 0.1 to prevent the
model merely predicting a ‘stepwise’ alternation of the strength of association
between 0 and 1.
Things become slightly more complex when dealing with compounds.
Here, as stated before, the model assumes that elements in a compound stimulus
cannot accrue more associative strength than the ceiling of associability
€ 
λ . Hence
the increase in associative strength between the CS and US for each element in a
compound AB+ is determined by Equations 1.2 and 1.3, below.
Equation 1.2
€ 
ΔVA =αAβ(λ −VAB)
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Equation 1.3
€ 
ΔVB =αBβ(λ −VAB)
Consequently the change in associative strength between CS and US for
compound AB+ can be expressed as in Equation 1.4, below.
Equation 1.4
€ 
ΔVAB =αAβ(λ −VAB) +αBβ(λ −VAB)
The Rescorla-Wagner theory correctly predicts the solution of both
feature positive and blocking problems. Taking feature positive problems as an
example conditioning to the AB+ discrimination would follow the pattern
indicated by Equation 1.4. In the normal course of events this would lead each
element to have an associative value of 0.5, assuming 
€ 
λ= 1. Introduction of the
B- discrimination, however, would lead to stimulus B acquiring no associative
strength since here 
€ 
λ= 0, as the element is unreinforced. This leaves stimulus A
to gain an associative strength equal to 
€ 
λ  as the best predictor of the US, since
compound AB must have an associative strength equal to 
€ 
λ  and is the sum of the
associative strengths of elements A and B.
The Recorla-Wagner theory was, however, primarily developed to deal
with blocking (Kamin, 1969), a paradigm where an experimental condition
consisting of Stage 1 A+, AB- trials led to reduced US predictions to stimulus B
at test relative to a control condition of Stage 1 AB- trials. The model’s success
in predicting responses in blocking paradigms is partly due to the assumption
that the response to a compound is predicted by summation of the responses to
its elements, and that the ceiling of associability λ forces elements within
compound stimuli to compete directly for associative strength. This allows A+ to
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gain associative strength while B proportionately loses associative strength to
allow prediction of AB-. At test, therefore, responses to B will be reduced, or
‘blocked’.
The experiments Kamin (1969) conducted on blocking, in common with
most other researchers in the field of associative learning, used animals as
participants. One important development that has occurred relatively recently is
the application of associative models of learning to Human Conditional Learning
(HCL). Dickinson, Shanks & Evendon (1984) were the first to demonstrate that
cognitive responses to external events or stimuli may be equivalent to the
physiological responses seen in ‘pure’ classical conditioning or the behaviours
observed in operant conditioning. Their demonstration that human category
judgements are subject to the blocking phenomena has been reliably replicated
(e.g. Dickinson & Shanks, 1985; Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Mitchell &
Lovibond, 2002), suggesting that associative processes may underlie causal
judgements in humans. In the last twenty years HCL has been subject to much
investigation (see e.g. De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Dickinson, 1994, 2001 for
reviews), and the parallels between HCL and animal conditioning experiments
continue to receive experimental investigation. For instance Shanks, Charles,
Darby & Azmi (1998) used a ‘food allergy’ paradigm to investigate HCL. Here
participants are given repeated exposure to foods both on their own (elements) or
in pairs (compounds) and are asked to predict whether the food or foods will
cause an allergic reaction or not. Following each prediction participants are given
feedback telling them whether the food or foods caused an allergy, and their task
is to learn the contingencies between foods and allergies. For example Eggs or
Milk alone (i.e. as an element) may lead to an allergy, but when presented
13
together as a compound (i.e. Eggs and Milk together) they may not: forming a
Negative Patterning Problem and yielding similar results to animal studies of
classical conditioning (e.g. Jarrard, 1993). The findings of these experiments will
be discussed in more detail later on, but since this paradigm forms the focus of
the investigation contained in this thesis it is important to describe the broad
methodology and the comparisons between HCL and classical conditioning early
on.
Despite the obvious improvements in terms of prediction the Rescorla-
Wagner model made over theories such as Spence’s and SST there are still
problems with it, particularly in terms of its elemental assumptions. While
elemental assumptions may be considered a strength as far as blocking is
concerned; they can be a drawback in terms of non-linear problems.  Any
situation where the elemental assumptions of the model are violated will result in
inaccurate predictions. For instance in Positive Patterning Problems (PPP)
elements predict no outcome, whereas their compounds do (e.g. A-, B-, AB+).
The standard Rescorla-Wagner model cannot correctly predict responses here;
since all elements are present on both reinforced and non-reinforced trials they
each gain an associative value of 0.5. Assuming that an activation threshold of
the CR must be greater than 0.5 for the model to predict the presence of a US,
however, allows solution of a PPP. In this case neither element alone would
suffice to predict a CR, but the sum of the elements would equal 
€ 
λ , and thereby
predict the arrival of a US. This solution, however, would not hold for a Negative
Patterning Problem (NPP), where elements predict the US, but compounds do
not (e.g. A+, B+, AB-). Despite this there are extant empirical data
demonstrating the ability of humans (e.g. Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi,
14
1998), and animals (e.g. Rudy & Sutherland, 1995; Jarrard, 1993) to solve these
discriminations (even concurrent NPP and PPP in the case of Shanks et al.).
Equally problematic are biconditional discriminations where each element is
associated with the US (+) or No US (-), depending on configuration of elements
(e.g. AB+, CD+, AC-, BD-). Clearly no rule of summation or response threshold
can predict responses here, yet empirical data suggest both humans (Shanks et al.
1998) and animals (e.g. Rudy et al. 1995, Saavedra, 1975) can learn these
discriminations.
One way of dealing with these data while retaining the parsimony of an
elemental approach is the unique cue theory (Rescorla, 1973). Here compounds
are assumed to acquire an extra element, or ‘unique cue’ when amalgamated. A
unique cue can acquire its own valence to allow for the kind of anomalies
inherent in non-linear problems. In a negative patterning problem the elements
have a positive valence (i.e. A+, B+) while the compound has negative, or no
valence (AB-). By adding the negatively valued unique cue X to the compound
AB, making ABX, the positive valence of its elements can be counteracted,
rendering non-linear problems such as negative and positive patterning problems
soluble. There are some problems, however, with unique cue theory, since firstly
there is no specification of how, when, or why unique cues would form.
Moreover under certain conditions unique cue theory erroneously predicts
retroactive interference in learning. This is where subsequent learning effects
original learning. Unique cue theories predict, for instance, that learning Stage 2
B+ discriminations following Stage 1 A+, AB- trials should result in increased
responding to the AB compound at test, albeit to a lesser extent than ‘simple’
elemental theories. Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi (1998) found little
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evidence to support these predictions in an undergraduate population using a
food allergy task. Participants were asked to remember which food or pair of
foods led to an allergy, and which to no allergy. Shanks, Charles, Darby, and
Azmi (1998) conducted further experiments specifically designed to induce
elemental processing and found no evidence that elemental processing interfered
with subsequent configural learning. They then gave four groups of participants
different pre-treatments designed to induce different styles of processing, or
cognitive set, before giving them an interference experiment. One group received
a biconditional pre-treatment (WX+, XY-, YZ+, WZ-), another a conditional pre-
treatment (WX+, WY+, XZ-, YZ-), another group a double element
discrimination (W+, WX-, X-, Y-), and lastly a further ‘explicit’ group a linearly
soluble discrimination (W+, WX+, X-, Y-). Clearly the ‘explicit’ pre-treatment
group was designed to promote elemental processing, and was expected to
influence later processing. Following this all groups received Stage 1 A+, AB-,
AC+ discriminations and subsequently a Stage 2 discrimination of the form B+,
DE-. Afterwards, participants received ten test trials of the form A+, AB-, AC+.
Despite an admirable attempt to induce interference of the sort predicted by
elemental models of learning Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi (1998) failed to
find any differences between the pre-treatment groups at test: all groups had
preserved the Stage 1 discrimination.
A more recent variation on the elemental theme was proposed by
LePelley (2004) on the assumption that a cue’s associative history dictates the
extent to which it is attended to as well as the saliency of that cue. In this
conception attention is viewed as the weight which is given to a particular
stimulus relative to other potential stimuli and determines which stimuli have
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access to the learning process and which do not. This part of the model is based
on an extended version of the Mackintosh (1975) model developed by LePelley
(2004) to account for empirical phenomena such as learned irrelevance, where
stimuli that are good predictors acquire associative strength at the expense of
stimuli that are not, whilst preserving its ability to predict other empirical
phenomena such as blocking. Sometimes, however, learning is faster when
stimuli are poor predictors of external events (e.g. Wilson, Boumphrey & Pearce,
1992) so the model proposes, after Pearce and Hall (1980), that saliency dictates
the rate at which stimuli should be learned about.
This model represents an improvement over the Rescorla-Wagner (1972)
version in terms of its ability to predict a wider range of empirical phenomena
and takes into account the way conditional as well as unconditional stimuli are
processed. It does, however, contain more parameters that need to be dictated by
the experimenter and is therefore more arbitrary. Another point is that, despite its
relative complexity, the model remains fundamentally elemental in its
assumptions. This means that the model cannot predict empirical observations
such as the solution of biconditional problems by animals (Saavedra, 1975) and
humans, or the resistance to retroactive interference found in human participants
(Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi, 1998).
It is clear from this brief review that elemental theories describe some learning
phenomena well. Blocking paradigms demonstrate that people and animals can
make elemental assumptions. Non-linear paradigms insoluble by elemental
means, however, show that when these elemental assumptions are contradicted
young people and animals have little difficulty in learning a solution that allows
them to predict the presence of a US, and for this learning to be preserved in the
17
face of concerted experimental effort to disrupt it. Another class of theory has
been developed to account for these situations that assume that elements and
their compounds are distinct entities. These theories are known as Configural, or
exemplar based, theories since they suggest that any configuration of stimuli, or
exemplar, is a unique combination that develops its own separate relationship
with the US. The next chapter will continue by looking first at exemplar based
models, before going on to examine other models of learning and a closer look at
the applicability of these models to human contingency learning.
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Chapter 2: Configural and Neuropsychological Theories
2.1        Configural Theories
Given the failure of elemental theories to predict observed responses to
non-linear problems in animals and humans it is unsurprising that researchers
have derived alternative models based on different assumptions. Configural, or
exemplar-based, theories (e.g. Pearce, 1987, 1994, 2002; Kruschke, 1992)
assume that elements and compounds constitute distinct entities, or exemplars,
capable of acquiring associative strength independently. This approach is clearly
superior to elemental models when predicting responses to non-linear problems.
Consider the biconditional problem AB+, CD+, AD-, BC-. Assuming that each
compound accrues associative strength independently, regardless of the
associative value of its elements, enables a model based on strict configural
assumptions to correctly anticipate the solution to this problem. A major flaw
with this assumption is, however, that without some generalisation between
similar stimuli, empirical phenomena such as blocking remain inexplicable.
Furthermore, it is unrealistic given the well-documented empirical
demonstrations of generalisation according to perceptual similarity detailed in
the preceding chapter (e.g. Spence, 1937; Hanson, 1959). The correct prediction
of blocking requires the generalisation of associative strength between an
element A+ and a compound AB-, such that the compound element A acquires
all the associative strength. This allows a model to foresee the response of
animals or humans to the problem: that later responses to element B are retarded
in comparison to groups that only receive AB- discrimination training earlier on.
It is clear from this that blocking requires an assumption of almost complete
generalisation between similar stimuli. At the same time other empirical
phenomena, such as the solution of PPP, NPP, and biconditional problems (e.g.
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Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi, 1998) require a suspension of generalisation
between similar stimuli. Therein lies a contradiction, and one of the major
problems for all learning theories: when, how, and under what circumstances are
responses to stimuli generalised between elements or not, and how can a
computational model learn to discriminate between these circumstances?
Generalisation is a difficult problem for associative learning theories to address,
for reasons that should become increasingly apparent.
Theoretical definitions of the concept of generalisation are equivocal,
although it is clear that it is an important idea. Some of the empirical bases for
generalisation, such as Spence (1937), and Hanson (1959) have already been
described. For another example consider Guttman & Kalish (1956), who found
that pigeons trained to respond to a yellow light subsequently responded most
strongly to yellow light, next most strongly to yellow-green and yellow orange
light, and least strongly to green or orange lights. It is not unreasonable to
suppose the observation that frequencies of responses increase as stimuli become
more similar to the conditioned stimulus can be explained by automatic
spreading activity between representations of similar stimuli. For some,
therefore, (e.g. Pavlov, 1927; Mackintosh, 1974, 1975, 2003) generalisation
means the automatic spread of activation to adjacent cortical areas, and therefore
to representations of similar stimuli. This is close to Hebb’s (1949) idea of
spreading activation through the strengthening of connections, or synapses,
between neurons, although Hebb’s theory is based on correlation of activity
between neurons rather than their physical proximity. Others (e.g. Lashley &
Wade, 1946), however, suggest that generalisation occurs as the result of an
inability to discriminate between stimuli, rather than an automatic spread of
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activation. Lashley and Wade (1946) would argue that the pigeons in Guttman et
al.’s (1956) experiment responded to similar lights not because of the prediction
that a response would be automatically expected because of a superficial
similarity between stimuli, but because the stimuli may be difficult to tell apart,
or consciously discriminate between. Generalisation in this view is a matter of
making the same response to a stimulus that is effectively indistinguishable from
an earlier CS. Whichever view one accepts; the practical implications are the
same in that generalisation appears contingent on perceptual similarity.
Some configural models, such as Pearce (1987, 1994, 2002) deal with
generalisation by suggesting that some of the associative strength of a stimulus is
generalised to all other stimuli with non-zero perceptual similarity. Pearce’s
model assumes that any perceived change to a trained CS will result in a change
to the evoked CR of a magnitude equal to the extent of change to the perceptual
attributes of that CS. Certainly this view is consonant with Guttman and Kalish’s
(1956) data described earlier: a change in the wavelength of the CS resulted in a
decrement in the CR equal to the difference between stimuli. In addition
Mednick & Friedman (1960) demonstrated an equivalent effect using auditory
tones: responses to stimuli in both cases seem to be dictated, at least in part, by a
superficial similarity between the present stimulus and those seen before. It
seems reasonable; therefore, to make the assumption that novel stimuli are
responded to in terms of their perceptual similarity to existing stimuli through
generalisation. Pearce’s (1994) connectionist model assumes that CS input units
feed activation forward to internal layer output units, and thence to a configural
layer, which enters into associations with the US. Input layer activations have
values of 0 and 1 for stimulus presence or absence. Output layer activity 
€ 
οi  is,
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assuming an input pattern of 0 or 1, calculated using Equation 2.1 below, where
η  is the number of input units active on each trial.
Equation 2.1
€ 
οi = 1
η
This has the effect of making the activation of output units for each
element contingent on the number of elements active at the time. In essence the
model gives a single element input a value of 1 at output, but less than 1 if it is
part of a compound. For instance each element of the compound AB would give
an output of 1 to the configural layer if present alone, but a value of 0.71 if
presented as part of a compound. The calculation of the activation of the
configural unit representing individual elements or compounds 
€ 
αj  is given in
Equation 2.2.
Equation 2.2
€ 
αj = Σwij ⋅ οi
Pearce (1994) assumes that the strength of the connection wij from the
output to configural nodes is equal to the output activation of the output unit.
Thus if the element A was presented alone the output to node j representing the
element would equal 1, and the sum of all the weights multiplied by outputs
would also equal 1. If compound AB was presented, however, the activation of
the configural unit for each element would only equal 0.5, but the activation of
the node representing AB would equal 1. The strength of the association between
the configural node A and the US is dealt with using a modified form of the
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Rescorla Wagner (1972) rule (c.f. equations 1.1, and 1.2). Equation 2.3 shows
how the change in the weight of the connection between a configural unit A and
US EA is calculated.
Equation 2.3
€ 
ΔEA =αβ(λ −VA)
The US prediction for configural unit A, VA, is shown in Equation 2.4,
below. Here EA is the existing weight of the connection between configural unit
A and the US. ΣAS,i is the sum of the measures of similarity between pattern A
and other configural units i activated by pattern A (i.e. which share elements with
pattern A). Here Ei is the associative strength of each of the configural units
activated by pattern A.
Equation 2.4
€ 
VA = EA +ΣA Si⋅Ei
Equation 2.5, below, shows the critical calculation of similarity between
pattern A and pattern B, ASB. This is calculated as a ratio of the number of
elements pattern A and B share, nC, and the product of the number of elements
present in pattern A, nA, and the number of elements in pattern B, nB.
Equation 2.5     
€ 
A SB =
nc2
nA ⋅ nB
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In this way Pearce (1994) suggests that US prediction is partly a function
of the direct association between a pattern of activation A in the configural layer
of the model and the US, and partly the result of generalisation of associative
strength from other perceptually similar stimuli. Although other configural units i
will not change the weights of their connection to the US during presentation of
stimulus pattern A the associative value of their existing relationship to the US is
considered in Equations 2.4 and 2.5, and the value of VA limits the extent of any
change of associability between pattern A and the US. Critically, Pearce (1994)
gives results of simulations demonstrating the model’s ability to predict
blocking, where pre-exposure to A+ prior to AB+ contingencies leads to reduced
responses to B at test relative to pre-exposure to only AB+ contingencies, feature
negative (A+, AB-), and feature positive (AB+, A-) discriminations. Consider the
feature positive problem as a simple example. The net associative strength of
AB, 
€ 
VAB  needs to reach a value of 1λ, and the net associative value of A, 
€ 
VA
should equal 0λ, before learning reaches asymptote and changes to associative
strengths cease. To achieve this the model assumes that 
€ 
VA  will reach a value of
less than 0λ to counteract the positive associative strength generalised from AB,
and 
€ 
VAB  a value greater than 1λ to oppose the negative associative strength of A.
The similarity of AB to A and of A to AB is 0.5 in both cases so, after
accounting for this generalisation, the associative strength of AB would be 1.33λ
and the value of A would be –0.66λ since 
€ 
VAB =1.33+ (0.5 ⋅ −0.66) = 1, and
€ 
VA = −0.66 + (0.5 ⋅1.33) = 0. Consider, too, blocking. Here Stage 1 A+
contingencies would result in A gaining an associative strength of 1λ. In Stage 2
AB would only need to acquire an associative valence of 0.5λ to reach a net
activation level of 1λ since it would generalise half of its associative strength
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(i.e. 0.5λ) from A. At test the unreinforced element B would generalise half of
the associative strength from AB+ and, since
€ 
VB = 0 + (0.5 ⋅ 0.5), would have an
associative strength of 0.25λ. Compare this to no A+ pre-exposure. Here AB+
would acquire an associative strength of 1λ, which means that at test B would,
again, generalise half its associative strength from AB, which in this instance
would lead to B having an associative strength of 0.5λ. The model, therefore,
correctly anticipates that responses to unreinforced element B would be retarded
following A+ pre-exposure training relative to no A+ pre-exposure. Pearce’s
model therefore overcomes some of the disadvantages of strictly elemental
associative theories by allowing only a proportion of the associative strength of
stimuli not actually present to generalise to present stimuli, whilst still being able
to predict many of the empirical phenomena that elemental cue-competition
models were developed to account for. One could argue that unique-cue theories
may better explain learning phenomena, since they are able to learn any
discrimination by the mere addition of a unique cue to a stimulus configuration.
On the other hand, Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002) theory has the benefit of
parsimony and of being able to make unambiguous predictions. One of the
problems of unique-cue theories is the question of when or if unique cues are
added to stimuli. Should a unique cue be added to all stimuli, to just compound
stimuli, or merely to compound stimuli in the event of a linearly insoluble
problem? As we shall see in later chapters this is a real drawback to unique-cue
theory since it renders many predictions equivocal and therefore difficult to test.
On the other hand Rescorla (2003) points out that Pearce’s model cannot,
as it stands, deal with summation, or the observation that responses to an AB
compound is stronger than are responses to its elements following A and B
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preconditioning. The model, however, can deal with summation in a similar way
to unique cue theory: by assuming that the experimental context constitutes a
common unreinforced element in all stimuli (see Pearce, 1994, also Pearce,
Adam, Wilson, & Darby, 1992, and Rescorla, 2003). Similarly the model cannot,
as it stands, predict Latent Inhibition, or the relatively slow conditioning of a
previously presented, but unreinforced CS. Pearce (1994) suggests that the
saliency parameter 
€ 
α  be reduced for stimuli in the absence of reinforcement,
which achieves the desired prediction of slower conditioning for previously
unreinforced stimuli and thereby allows the model to correctly anticipate latent
inhibition.
Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002) theory, therefore, tackles some of the
problems associated with elemental theories. There are, however, still problems
concerning the extent of generalisation between stimuli. Shanks, Darby, and
Charles (1998), for instance, conducted a series of experiments aimed at testing
the theory’s predictions of retroactive interference using the same type of food
allergy task as Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi (1998) and outlined in Chapter
One. In experiment 2, for instance, participants received AB+, and CD- trials in
Stage 1. In Stage 2 the elements of these compounds were revalued to give A-,
B-, C+, and D+. In a test stage participants were given unreinforced AB and CD
trials. Pearce’s theory predicts that, because of generalisation from elements to
compounds, at test participants should give more allergy predictions to CD than
to AB. What Shanks et al. found, however, was that participants preserved the
discrimination between AB+ and CD- at test, showing a resistance to
interference beyond that predicted by either elemental or configural theories
alone. This suggests an ability to suspend generalisation when necessary that is
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seemingly irreconcilable with associative learning theory. Rescorla (2003) came
to much the same conclusions following experiments with rats and pigeons. In a
series of experiments Rescorla (2003) tested the predictions of both elemental
and configural models on a two-stage biconditional discrimination of stage 1
AB+, CD+, followed by test stage AD and BC compounds. His results showed
that responses at test were greater for the conditioned AB and CD compounds
than for test compounds, thus conforming to the predictions of configural
theories, as generalisation between elements was clearly not perfect. However
responses to test compounds AD and BC were greater than for their elements, as
predicted by elemental theories. Rescorla’s results therefore give support to both
elemental and configural theories; indeed he ends this paper by calling for a
‘principled description of their relative contributions’ (Rescorla, 2003, p. 175).
The inescapable conclusion is, however, that it is difficult to see how associative
learning theories can be adapted to provide consistently accurate a priori
predictions without the modeller’s intervention. Wagner (2003) has recently
proposed one solution as ‘context sensitive elemental theory’. Fundamentally
this view suggests that if two stimuli are from different modalities (e.g. light,
tone) they will be treated configurally in that generalisation will be computed on
the basis of an algorithm similar to Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002). On the other
hand, if stimuli are from the same modality, they will be treated elementally and
generalisation is computed on the basis of summation in a similar way to the
Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model. Wagner (2003) demonstrates the ability of this
theory to explain animal conditioning data but in the present context of human
conditional learning one has to be sceptical, since the stimuli of Shanks, Charles,
Darby, and Azmi (1998) can clearly be viewed as being from the same modality
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in that they are all foods and yet these data suggest that people solve Human
Conditional Learning (HCL) problems configurally.
It seems that responses to stimuli may be mediated by both elemental and
configural processes, and that organisms are flexible enough in their approaches
to deploy either strategy in order to predict what will happen in their
environment. Some theorists take a slightly different approach to modelling
learning in that their models incorporate algorithms that generate elemental and
configural strategies in parallel, and are grounded in the notion that different
types of processing occur in physiologically distinct areas of the brain.
2.2        Neuropsychological Models
Ultimately, all neural network models are neuropsychological in that they
are assumed to reflect the way in which connections, or associations, between
neurons strengthen and weaken with experience. The models discussed so far,
however, do not differentiate between the contributions of discrete neural areas,
and therein lies the distinction. This section will discuss what one might term
modular models of learning, first describing the models and then reviewing the
research evidence that underlies them.
 Although by no means the first to promulgate such a notion (for a
comprehensive discussion of the history of neural network models see Ellis &
Humphreys, 1999), David Marr (1970, 1971) made a seminal contribution in
laying the foundations for the models discussed below. He proposed that
physiologically distinct brain areas underlay different cognitive processes.
Broadly he suggested that the hippocampal region was a fast, but temporary store
for memory based on the establishment of associations between coactive
neurons. He also suggested that the hippocampal area was an intermediate store
between short and long term memories, and that memories stored in the
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hippocampal region were passed to cortical areas for long-term storage and
integration with existing memories. The hippocampus was also, according to
Marr, an autoassociator; meaning that the structure could recreate prior patterns
of activation following input of a partial stimulus configuration. This allows the
structure to contribute to retrieval processes by recreating previously seen
stimulus configurations based on partial input. Although the details of Marr’s
theory may be questioned his broad assertions concerning the function of
hippocampal and cortical areas in learning and memory have been largely
accepted (c.f. Treves & Rolls, 1992; Hasselmo, 1995). Eichenbaum, Otto, and
Cohen (1994) came to similar conclusions: that cortical regions maintain specific
representations in the short term, that the parahippocampal region holds
individual items in the intermediate term, and that the hippocampus itself forms
associations between individual items in different sensory modalities to form a
synthesised whole and that eventually these synthesised representations are
stored as long term memories in the cortex. Effectively the hippocampus forms a
distinct representation that draws together individual details of a memory into a
whole. For instance the sight, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches involved in two
different memories may be similar, but their conjunction or context makes them
unique and separable from one another.
In applying these ideas to associative learning Rudy and Sutherland
(1989, 1995; Sutherland & Rudy, 1989) suggested that learning new associations
is contingent upon two processes taking place in two physiologically distinct
brain areas. Elemental, or simple, associations may be formed in cortical areas
whereas configural associations are dependent on the hippocampal and medial
temporal lobe areas, although these representations are ultimately available to
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cortical areas and are stored there long term. Simple associations, in this view,
are formed on the basis of error correction rules, such as that specified in the
Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model. When circumstances make a linear solution
impossible the hippocampal system differentiates representations of similar
stimuli leading to different outcomes, allowing the solution of such tasks as the
NPP or biconditional problem (Rudy et al. 1995). This differentiation of similar
stimuli is proposed to be the result of hippocampal ‘binding’ of complex stimuli
to form an integrated and unique stimulus representation. This is similar to
configural theory, but without the assumption that generalisation between
elements and compounds is inevitable, since organisms can learn to differentiate
between times when generalisation is helpful, and when it is not. Gluck and
Myers (1993; 1996; 2001) proposed a similar model, which, since the models
make comparable predictions, will be examined in more depth.
In the Gluck et al. (1993) model associative learning is again split
between two modules representing cortical and hippocampal function. The
model formalises the idea that cortical areas, such as the frontal lobes in
contingency learning, cannot create configural representations, but make
behavioural predictions on the basis of simple elemental, or stored configural,
stimuli. According to both Gluck et al. (1993) and Rudy et al. (1995) the
hippocampal area is vital for the formation of internal representations of new
configurations of elements, or stimulus-stimulus learning. Put more prosaically,
cortical areas are seen to be responsible for stimulus-response learning whereas
the hippocampal region is responsible for stimulus-stimulus learning.  Both
models make the broad suggestion that learning reliant on elemental assumptions
is spared following hippocampal damage, since learning to respond to existing or
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elemental stimuli is the province of frontal areas. The formation of associations
between CS and US is therefore postulated as frontally mediated, whereas the
configuration and representation of CSs is envisaged as a hippocampally
mediated function.
The Gluck and Myers (1993) model comprises two separate modules
intended to represent the functioning of the frontal and hippocampal areas. This
is reflected in the model’s architecture. The frontal module converges to a single
outcome, and generates predictions of US presence. The hippocampal module
recreates the input at its output nodes, and takes account of the presence or
absence of the US. Both modules are based on three layer connectionist
architectures and update their weights according to an error backpropagation
algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986). The inner layer of the
hippocampal module contains fewer nodes than the input layer. This allows the
hippocampal layer to perform redundancy compression based on feedback
concerning the presence or absence of the US. If two stimuli both predict similar
outcomes then the model will compress their representations. This reflects the
internal architecture of the brain since the medial temporal region receives
multimodal sensory input into the entorhinal cortex, which has far fewer outputs
than inputs. If, however, two inputs lead to different outcomes their
representations will be separated, a process Gluck and Myers (1993) call
predictive differentiation. The major difference between the two modules is that
the hippocampal module can perform redundancy compression and predictive
differentiation, whereas the frontal module cannot. Representations can,
however, be transferred from the hippocampal to the frontal module where they
can be stored in the long term used to predict the presence or absence of the US.
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The model predicts, therefore, that hippocampal region damage results in an
inability to form new configural representations, since the frontal module alone
works on elemental assumptions and cannot distinguish between similar stimuli
with different outcomes.
These assumptions are specified according to the following set of
equations. Both modules first calculate their output before updating their
weights, as illustrated by Equation 2.6.
Equation 2.6:     
€ 
Vj = Σοi ⋅ wij + θj
Here the activation of internal layer node j (Vj) on any given trial equals
the sum of the outputs of the input layer (
€ 
Σοi ) multiplied by the weight of the
connection between the input layer and the inner layer (wij) plus a bias term (
€ 
θj ),
representing the tendency of that node to become active. The output of the inner
layer (oj) is then calculated with Equation 2.7, a sigmoid function that reduces
the overall activation of node j (Vj) to a number between 0 and 1. The activation
of output node k is then calculated according to Equation 2.6. This constitutes the
model’s predictions for the presence of the US for both frontal and hippocampal
modules, and the recreation of inputs for the hippocampal module alone.
Equation 2.7:
€ 
οj =
1
1+ e -Vj
Having calculated the output for both modules the next step is to
calculate the error (
€ 
δj) between the model’s predictions and the US or input
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recreation at the output layer. This is achieved using Equation 2.8, where the
desired outcome (or US: dj) is compared with the model’s prediction (or actual
output:
€ 
οj ) and multiplied by a function of the activation of node j
(
€ 
′ f (Vj) = Vj − (1−Vj) ).
Equation 2.8:
€ 
δj = (dj −οj) ′ f (Vj)
The next stage represents one of the glaring assumptions of the error
backpropagation model. The model proposes that internal layer error (
€ 
δi) is a
function of the outer layer error (
€ 
δj), as Equation 2.9 shows. Theoretically the
internal layer is meant to reflect internal representations of stimuli, although this
view is hardly universally accepted. Although the idea that error can be
‘backpropagated’ from the internal layer to the input layer provides a neat
engineering solution to the problem of differentiating the representations and
outcome of similar stimuli there are no real physical correlates of this process
and this is a major drawback, along with the fact that the backpropagation
process takes many more trials to acquire even simple discriminations than more
straightforward elemental or configural models of learning.
Equation 2.9:
€ 
δi = (Σδj ⋅ wij) ′ f (Vi)
€ 
Having calculated the error for both internal and output layer nodes the
weights for both sets of connections between nodes are updated according to
Equation 2.10, which is simply a variant of the competitive error correction rule
used in the Rescorla-Wagner model.
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Equation 2.10:
€ 
Δwij = βδj ⋅ οj
So, how accurately does the model reflect both physiological and
behavioural data? To assess this it will be necessary to examine what is known
about the cognitive function of frontal and hippocampal areas, and to relate this
evidence to the Gluck et al. (1993, 1996, 2001) model to build a picture of which
processes may be involved in associative learning, and their likely neural bases.
2.3: The Hippocampal Region
That the hippocampal region is involved in learning and memory is not in
doubt, rather the debate surrounding this area concerns the precise details of
mapping specific structures to particular functions. Physically the hippocampus
is subsumed into the larger region of the medial temporal lobe, but the function
of this broad area is often attributed to the hippocampus alone. Signals flow,
roughly unidirectionally, towards the structure from all modalities, converging
on the entorhinal cortex, which is recurrently connected to cortical areas. Some
signals are then transmitted straight to the hippocampus proper, whereas others
enter via sparse but strong activation from the dentate gyrus. Signals then pass
through the hippocampus before being transferred back to cortical areas via the
subiculum and entorhinal cortex. Many authors use the term ‘hippocampus’ to
describe the general area and surrounding structures. Gluck et al. (1993) are no
different in this regard: the theory explicitly states that the model describes broad
hippocampal region processing, rather than the hippocampus per se. One
problem this creates is sometimes contradictory observations in the literature
contingent on specific sites of damage. For example Jarrard (1993), found no
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decrement for negative patterning problems in rats with lesions confined to the
hippocampus proper, compared to Sutherland et al. (1989), who found disruption
to rat’s negative patterning learning following broad hippocampal region lesions.
Scoville and Milner (1957) used the term ‘hippocampal region’ to
describe the extent of damage to the patient HM who had undergone bilateral
surgery to remove the hippocampus, subiculum, and the amygdala. In addition
HM’s surgery, intended to ameliorate severe epilepsy, damaged the entorhinal,
and perirhinal cortices (collectively referred to here as parahippocampal areas).
HM’s short-term memory was intact, as were details of his past in long-term
memory. What his case, and those of others with medial temporal lobe damage,
has shown is that the region is involved in the formation of new episodic
memories, or explicit memories for events integrating information from several
sensory modalities. Put another way Scoville and Milner (1957) came to the
conclusion that damage to the hippocampal region resulted in anterograde
amnesia, or the inability to form new memories. Some researchers pointed out,
however, that surgical procedures were imprecise, and that damage extended
beyond the hippocampal region. For instance Mishkin (1978) found that damage
to both the hippocampal area and the amygdala was necessary to produce
episodic learning difficulties in monkeys. Subsequent research (e.g. Squire &
Zola-Morgan, 1985) showed that hippocampal lesions alone in monkeys could
produce statistically significant memory deficiencies, although damage to the
amygdala exacerbated these differences. Another distinction was formed as a
result of HM and other patients’ abilities to learn new sensori-motor skills and
perform normally in implicit memory tasks, such as word fragment or pattern
completion (Eichenbaum et al. 1994; Squire, 1992). Hippocampal region damage
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seems to disrupt only episodic, conscious memory. Importantly, for Gluck et al.
(1993), the formation of a Conditioned Response (CR) is unimpaired following
hippocampal damage (Gabrielli, McGlinchey-Berroth, Carillo, Gluck, Cermack,
& Disterhoft, 1995), as is simple category learning (Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck,
1994). This fits in with the idea of CS-US associations being independent of
hippocampal processing and suggests that contingencies may be processed in
cortical areas.
Zola-Morgan, Squire, and Amaral (1986) reported the case of RB, a
patient who experienced severe memory dysfunction following a difficult heart
bypass operation. Histological examination revealed that RB’s damage was
restricted to bilateral lesions of the hippocampi. Functionally RB was, along with
three amnesics, and a group with Korsakoff’s syndrome, compromised relative to
healthy and alcoholic control groups on the Wechsler Memory Scale, paired
associates learning, story recall, and diagram recall, suggesting again a problem
with relationships between elements in memory. Additionally there was little
evidence for any retrograde amnesia, or forgetting of past events for R.B., and he
performed above normally on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, apart from
the Digit Symbol Substitution Test that requires the explicit association of
numbers with symbols in memory for success. Despite this RB still outperformed
HM, who had more broad bilateral lesions to the whole medial temporal lobe,
again suggesting that the extent of damage has some relation to the extent of
impairment.
Studies using fMRI and PET scans yield comparable conclusions. Cohen,
Ryan, Hunt, Romine, Wszalek, & Nash (1999) suggest that the hippocampal
region processes the relations between multimodal memory elements
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automatically, although strategic intervention can influence this process. The
idea that stimulus elements can be bound together and that further strategic,
presumably frontally mediated, processing can influence the process is analogous
to Gluck and Myer’s (1993) compression and differentiation processes,
respectively. Cohen et al. (1999) also suggested that the hippocampal region is
implicated in both encoding and retrieval. In a review of research on sufferers of
medial temporal lobe epilepsy Baxendale (1995) compares MRI assessed
hippocampal volumes to performance on various neuropsychological tests. Again
she came to the conclusion that the hippocampal formation is implicated in
binding memories, and emphasises the laterality of function in that right
hippocampi tend to be involved in spatial tasks, whereas left hippocampi tend to
be involved in verbal tasks, such as paired associate learning. Additionally
Henke, Weber, Kneifel, Wiesler, & Buck (1999) found hippocampal
involvement in establishing semantic relations between words by PET scan,
again both assessments suggest the area’s involvement in establishing
relationships between concepts, objects, or stimuli.
Recall that the hippocampal region forms new representations, according
to Gluck and Myers (1993), by performing two functions: redundancy
compression and predictive differentiation. Redundancy compression refers to an
increase in generalisation between reliably co-occurring or similar stimuli. This
function results in a compressed representation of input stimuli and facilitates the
learning process by ensuring that processing resources are not wasted on non-
salient stimuli. Myers, Gluck & Granger (1995) suggested that this function is
performed in the parahippocampal, entorhinal, and perirhinal cortices on the
basis of stimulus-stimulus regularity. This hypothesis is biologically plausible as
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there are many more inputs into the entorhinal cortex than outputs to the
hippocampus (Myers et al. 1995), implying that more information enters this
region from the cortex than is outputted to the hippocampus. Predictive
differentiation refers to a decrease in generalisation between stimuli that reliably
predict different outcomes and is suggested to occur in the hippocampus proper
(Myers et al. 1995). Hopkins, Myers, Shohamy, Grossman, and Gluck (2004)
have advanced more recent evidence that participants with MRI verified
hippocampal damage are compromised in terms of probabilistic category
learning tasks. In this instance a weather prediction and ‘ice cream’ task was
used where participants had to predict if the weather would be rainy or sunny in
the former instance, or whether a customer wanted vanilla or chocolate ice cream
in the latter instance. In the weather prediction task, stimuli were one of four
types of cards that predicted sunny weather with a probability of 0.8, 0.6, 0.4,
and 0.2. The ice cream task was identical in logical structure, but used four
different faces made from a Mr. Potatohead™ set (for those unfamiliar with Mr.
Potatohead, ‘he’ is a patented child’s toy comprising a potato shaped ‘body’ to
which various body parts can be attached. Hopkins et al. (2004) provide pictures
of stimuli). In both cases stimuli could be presented alone or in combination.
Hopkins et al. (2004) found that patients’ learning was compromised relative to
controls in both tasks. Furthermore, it was found that hippocampal damaged
participants used simple strategies involving single cues whereas controls used
more complex multi-cue strategies. Again, this fits well with the idea that the
hippocampal region does not mediate simple stimulus-response learning but
becomes involved when multiple cues are present and may be involved in
stimulus-stimulus compression or predictive differentiation. While the
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suggestion that the hippocampus mediates these two functions is therefore an
admirable account, there are problems here, however, in accounting for Jarrard’s
(1993) results for preserved negative patterning learning in restricted
hippocampal damaged rats. Presumably solution of this problem would require
both functions, and while this account has many advantages it is probably
prudent at the present time to restrict any assessment to broad hippocampal or
medial temporal lobe region rather than looking at specific anatomical functions.
Notable in its absence thus far is any mention of the influence of
neurotransmitters. Myers, Ermita, Harris, Hasselmo, Solomon, & Gluck, (1996)
suggest cholinergic modulation of hippocampal function through the medial
septum. Acetycholine has been characterised as a ‘neuromodulator’ that has
several important effects, including suppression of synaptic transmission
(Hasselmo, & Schnell, 1994). When acetylcholine is absent the hippocampal
structure’s recurrent collateral cells are activated. These cells have a high degree
of internal connectivity: the property that allows pattern completion and
autoassociative functions on the basis of correlation of activity (c.f. Marr, 1970,
1971; Treves & Rolls, 1992; Hasselmo, 1995). During this type of activation
hippocampal EEG shows the sharp, non-rhythmic bursting activity (Fox,
Wolfson & Ranck, 1983) associated with consummatory behaviours such as
eating and drinking (Vanderwolf & Leung, 1983) and analogous to a recall or
consolidation mode. In this case the hippocampal region may be performing
pattern completion: retrieving a whole memory, or stimulus, from partial input.
By contrast an increase in hippocampal acetylcholine via connections in the
medial septum results in selective suppression of internal recurrent collateral
cells (Hasselmo, Schnell, & Barkai, 1995). This suppresses the autoassociative
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function of the hippocampus by preventing activation spreading to other
potentially co-active cells. Suppression of autoassociation may also be a means
of preventing catastrophic interference (c.f. Marr, 1970, 1971): the confusion
resulting from a partial input activating too many different configural
representations. This regular activity allows new representations to be stored
(Buszaki, 1989), and is associated with regular theta wave (4-8Hz.) activation
(Fox et al. 1983), and exploratory behaviours (Vanderwolf et al. 1983).
Cholinergic disruption could account for evidence that medial septal lesion
results in disrupted hippocampal function in rabbit eyeblink studies (e.g.
Salvatierra & Berry, 1989). On the other hand studies using scopolamine (a
cholinergic antagonist) on rabbits (Solomon & Gottfried, 1981; Solomon,
Groccia-Ellison, Flynn, Mirak, Edwards, Dunehew, & Stanton, 1983) and
humans (Solomon, Solomon, Van der Schaff, & Perry, 1993) have shown similar
disruption to hippocampal function. These latter studies are more specific to
cholinergic, rather than medial septal function and suggest that acetylcholine
may have a role in modulating storage and recall functions in the hippocampus.
To summarise: there is good evidence of hippocampal region, or medial
temporal lobe, involvement in learning and memory, although there is too little
evidence to be able to say with any certainty what the specific functions of
particular components of the system are. As a whole the region seems to be
responsible for encoding and retrieval of relationships between multimodal
components, or stimuli, within episodic memory. This fits well within Gluck and
Myer’s (1993) conception of a system that compresses stimuli that predict
similar outcomes. Interactions with strategic processing centres in the frontal
lobes may produce the suggested predictive differentiation function. Storage and
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retrieval functions may be mediated by acetylcholine via projections from the
medial septum and a lack of the neurotransmitter may result in reduced ability to
store new memories and to inhibit autoassociative functions, perhaps leading to
interference in memory.
2.4: The Frontal Lobes
Gluck et al. (1993) suggest that frontal regions mediate the stimulus-
response relationship, whereas the hippocampal region mediates stimulus-
stimulus relationships. So far we have seen the theory offers a reasonable
account of the contribution of the medial temporal lobe region to associative
learning. The question remains as to whether their theory offers a reasonably
compelling account of the contribution of the frontal cortex. To assess this it will
be necessary to examine what other researchers and theorists suggest the function
of this area is.
There are a number of cognitive functions associated with the frontal
lobes.  For instance Goldberg and Bilder (1987) suggest that the prefrontal lobes
are implicated in the formation and execution of internally generated plans and
strategies, the executive direction and control of cognitive processes, attention,
memory, and planning.
Certainly this view is consistent with the evidence gathered by Shallice
and Burgess (1991). They asked FL patients to buy specific items and obtain
particular information from particular shops in a shopping centre in a pre-
determined sequence at specified times. Their problems completing the task were
unrelated to simple memory for actions, but rather reflected difficulties
formulating a plan of action on their own initiative and completing a complex
sequence of behaviour. Furthermore patients with frontal lobe damage seem
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unable to learn from past experience and use this information to plan future
actions (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). It is clear that a decrement in the
ability to use past experience to guide future behaviour may be related to
associative learning abilities, and to the error correction mechanism proposed by
Gluck.
In addition many researchers (e.g. Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witski,
Howerter, & Wager, 2000; Damasio, 1994) have found that patients with frontal
lobe damage are impaired at laboratory tasks that involve planning and executing
a series of cognitive operations, such as the Tower of Hanoi task in which a set
of disks must be moved from one configuration to another on a pegboard
according to a set of rules. Similarly FL patients tend to become confused
between task relevant and irrelevant stimuli and have difficulty in consciously
differentiating between stimuli with different outcomes (Henkel, Johnson, & De
Leonardis, 1998; West, 1996; Dimitrov, Granetz, Peterson, Hollnagel,
Alexander, & Grafman, 1999), and the appropriate allocation of processing
resources in WM (Hartman, Pickering & Wilson, 1992).
Another task that seems sensitive to frontal lobe damage is the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task (WCST: Shallice et al. 1991; Dempster & Corkhill, 1999;
Miyake et al. 2000).  Here participants must sort cards into groups according to
an unnamed rule that is periodically changed.  Frontal lobe damage is indicated
by participants’ initial difficulty in acquiring rules as well as in their
perseverance with old rules that no longer apply: this type of mistake is called a
perseverative error.  Furthermore Gunning-Dixon and Raz (2003) found that
prefrontal cortex volumes predicted the number of WCST errors, that age-related
shrinkage of the pre-frontal cortex has been associated with an increase in
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perseverative errors (Raz, Gunning-Dixon, Head, Dupuis, & Acker, 1998). These
data suggest that patients with frontal lobe lesions seem to have some difficulty
in discriminating between valid and invalid responses, and responding flexibly to
environmental changes. This certainly seems consonant with Gluck’s view of the
role of the frontal lobes as an error correction centre involved in the conscious
prediction of the consequences of stimuli.
A further task associated with the frontal lobes is the Stroop (1935) task:
participants must name the ink colour of a series of colour words printed in either
colour congruent or colour incongruent ink.  Typically all participants show a
performance decrement when naming the ink colour of words printed in colour
incongruent ink relative to naming the ink colour of words printed in colour
congruent ink; but participants with frontal lobe damage show a greater deficit
(e.g. Perret, 1974; Damasio, 1994). The standard interpretation of Stroop task
deficits is the inability to withhold, or inhibit, inappropriate responses. Certainly
this is consonant with the inappropriate affect and social responses exhibited by
frontal lobe patients (Damasio, 1994). It may also be consistent with Gluck’s
suggestion that the frontal lobes mediate stimulus response formation in that the
solution of a learning task requires the suppression of inappropriate responses to
stimuli. There are, therefore, some compelling data from analogous tasks to
suggest that Gluck’s hypothesis of frontal lobe involvement in the acquisition of
stimulus response associations may be a reasonable assumption.
There are neuropsychological, animal lesion, psychopharmacological,
and imaging studies that support Gluck’s hypothesis. Rolls (2000, 2004)
suggested that the orbitofrontal cortex is implicated in representing the reward
value of a stimulus and clearly this is related to learning about outcomes.
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Furthermore this area is reciprocally connected to the entorhinal cortex, which is
in turn reciprocally connected to hippocampus, forming a physiological basis for
Gluck’s theory that similarity between stimuli is attenuated by feedback about
the presence or absence of the US.  Evidence for this comes from human fMRI
studies that show an increase in activation within this area by pleasant or painful,
rather than neutral, stimuli regardless of stimulus intensity (Francis, Rolls,
Bowtell, McGlone, O’Doherty, Browning, Clare & Smith, 1999), suggesting that
frontal areas are implicated in assessing the consequences, or reinforcement
value, of environmental stimuli. Similarly Rolls (1999) found a hunger
dependent increase in electrical stimulation within this region on presentation of
food reward in primates.
Furthermore there is evidence that orbitofrontal regions are implicated in
learning associations between stimulus and reinforcer representations: primates
with lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex continue to respond to no longer
reinforced stimuli in extinction studies (Thorpe, Rolls, & Maddisson, 1983). This
deficit is consistent with the idea that frontal regions have a part to play in
mediating appropriate responses to stimuli.
Another paradigm used to investigate the role of frontal areas is the
discrimination reversal task in which the consequences of two stimuli are
reversed.  Here both monkeys (e.g. Thorpe et al. 1983) and humans
(Kringelbach, O’Doherty, Rolls & Andrews, 2003) showed orbitofrontal
activation in response to contingency reversals.  In the former study specific
neurons in monkeys’ orbitofrontal cortex responded to a blue stimulus when
rewarded with a glucose compound but not to a green stimulus associated with a
saline drink.  Following reversal to a green stimulus associated with the reward
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and to a blue stimulus associated with a saline drink inhibited response of
formerly active neurons.  In the latter case a human face discrimination task was
employed in which two faces were displayed at the same time and participants
had to choose between them.  A correct response resulted in a happy face,
whereas an incorrect response resulted in an angry face: part of the orbitofrontal
cortex was activated more during a discrimination reversal relative to a control
condition.  These data seem to indicate that learning about the consequences of
actions and responding quickly and accurately to changes in the environment
may well be the result of processing occurring within frontal areas of cortex.
One further strand of evidence comes from neuropsychological studies of
paired associate learning.  For instance when participants are given an
experimental paired associates test for recognition, free and cued recall of
semantically related and unrelated pictures and words it is those with frontal
lesions that are impaired relative to a normal control group (Dimitrov, Granetz,
Peterson, Hollnagel, Alexander, & Grafman, 1999). This pattern of deficits is
greater for free recall than cued recall, and least for tasks involving recognition
recall. There is also a bigger deficit for unrelated relative to related words. This
implies again that the frontal lobes may be involved in associative learning,
although in this particular study deficits in paired associate tasks were
exacerbated by atrophy of the temporal lobe. This is hardly surprising since
paired associate tasks presumably tap into both stimulus-stimulus and stimulus
response learning.
In the context of Rolls’ (2000, 2004) work and Gluck’s theory, however,
it is clear that a standard paired associate task does not easily fit into a
framework of stimulus associations with outcomes or contingencies, since there
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are no clearly identifiable outcomes in paired associates studies. It is very
difficult, therefore, to identify separable stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-response
associations in paired associate tasks, and these tasks may involve both processes
and therefore both frontal and medial temporal areas.
The neuropsychological evidence points, therefore, to a reasonable
amount of support for the Gluck and Myers (1993) cortico-hippocampal model.
The medial temporal lobe generally, and the hippocampus in particular, does
seem to play a part in mediating stimulus-stimulus associations, whereas cortical
areas in general, and frontal areas specifically, do seem to be involved in creating
stimulus-response associations. This model, however, makes very broad
assumptions about the relative contributions of each area, whereas the evidence
suggests a more complex picture in which the notions of ‘hippocampal’ and
‘frontal lobe’ contributions constitute gross overgeneralisations.
In reality it is likely that explanations of the function of both these
regions will have to be subdivided into more detailed descriptions of the
individual and combined contributions of smaller groups of neurons.
Furthermore, the involvement of frontal areas of the brain seems, given the
evidence, to be more extensive than Gluck’s theory assumes in that Gluck merely
supposes that cortical areas learn stimulus-response associations, whereas the
evidence suggests that the frontal lobes are also involved in the inhibition of
automatic responses and therefore should be capable of modulating learning. 
Gluck et al. (1993) assume that the hippocampus is the only structure that
modulates learning through predictive differentiation and stimulus-stimulus
compression, and while this may be it is clear that cortical areas have a part to
play here too. One further major caveat to the Gluck model in particular, and any
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models similarly based on the error backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart et al.
1986) in general: the inability to predict one trial overshadowing. The error
backpropagation algorithm generally takes hundreds, or sometimes thousands of
trials to learn even simple discriminations, but empirical observation shows
behavioural changes after only a single trial (Pearce, 1994).
The modular nature of Gluck et al.’s (1993) model can also be regarded
as inelegant, unparsimonious and rather unwieldy in comparison to configural or
elemental models of learning, and the model itself makes assumptions about
representation and the neural bases of generalisation that may be described as
tenuous at best. It may, therefore, be more prudent to focus on the distinction
between elemental and configural models in determining how participants
generalise between stimuli in contingency learning. Although the sections on the
hippocampus and frontal lobes may now seem irrelevant it was important to
consider the role of these areas in associative learning since, as shall be seen in
subsequent chapters, these two brain areas seem particularly prone to the adverse
effects of the ageing process.
Clearly, though, none of the models of learning discussed so far are the
‘last word’ in learning theory. All of the extant models have weaknesses and
strengths but there are some empirical phenomena that remain unpredictable.
One such observation concerns rule induction in NPPs and PPPs. Shanks and
Darby (1998) reasoned that it was possible to solve both of these problems
concurrently by adopting a rule of conjunction: elements and compounds predict
opposing outcomes. Using the same food allergy paradigm described earlier they
found that participants who learned contingencies quickly and thoroughly gave
responses consistent with rule induction. For instance in experiment 1
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participants were given A+, C-, E+, G-, and I+ trials in stage 1, followed by B+,
D-, F+, H-, and J+ contingencies in stage two followed by AB-, CD+, EF-, GH+,
and KL- discriminations in stage three. At test participants were tested on all
seen elements and compounds, and, critically, the novel compound IJ and unseen
elements K and L. They found that participants who learned the initial
discriminations more slowly tended to respond to the critical IJ, K, and L trials
by summation: giving IJ+, K-, and L- as solutions. Participants who learned the
initial discriminations quickly, however, exhibited a very different pattern of
responses. They seemed to generalise a rule of conjunction and gave IJ-, K+, and
L+ responses at test.
Whilst it is a comparatively simple matter to state that people who learn
problems well may abstract generalisable rules to aid future solution of similar
problems, specifying this rule mathematically in a model of learning is a far from
trivial matter. It is difficult to see how rule induction can be incorporated into
computational models of learning since it is almost impossible to predict a priori
what rules will be induced when, or how far they will be generalised to which
other situations.
Another problem is that of the precise nature of the rules induced in
Shanks and Darby’s (1998) studies, although parallels with the problem solving
literature that may help to illuminate this area. In associative learning there is a
phenomenon known as Easy-Hard transfer in that learning an easy discrimination
can aid a harder discrimination between similar stimuli. Lawrence (1952) first
demonstrated that pigeons trained on an easy discrimination between a dark and
light grey later mastered a more difficult discrimination between two mid greys
quicker than pigeons that had been exposed to the harder discrimination all
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along. This phenomenon has been replicated in rats (Gluck & Myers, 1993,
1995) and in humans with a face discrimination task (Suret & McLaren, 2003).
Furthermore pre-training with an easy problem prior to discrimination reversal
also facilitated learning in a subsequent hard problem relative to trials involving
the hard problem itself in pigeons (Mackintosh & Little, 1970) and humans
(Suret et al., 2003). Curiously enough there have, although few, been empirical
demonstrations of Easy-Hard transfer in the solution of insight problems. These
can be characterised as involving a sudden restructuring of the way participants
conceive of a problem and its solution (Weisberg, 1996), based on a gradual
accumulation of knowledge involving effortful, directed thought (Novick &
Sherman, 2003) and it is certainly a possibility that the rules induced by Shanks
and Darby’s (1998) participants may follow this pattern.
Weisberg and Alba (1981), for instance, found that presenting
participants with easier analogues of the nine dot and triangle problems
facilitated performance on the tasks themselves whereas verbal hints did not,
suggesting that direct experience of a problem within the same domain resulted
in transfer of a solution. Novick and Holyoak (1991) demonstrated that solving
analogical, easier mathematical problems resulted in better performance than if
participants were simply allowed to attempt the more difficult problems alone.
More pertinently Luo and Niki (2003) recently demonstrated that the solution of
Japanese riddles led to greater right hippocampal activation in young participants
together with broad neocortical activity, including within the frontal regions. All
of which suggests that obtaining an insight into the solution of a problem may be
contingent on knowledge of how to solve the problem itself, or similar problems,
and is contingent on an interaction between hippocampal and cortical regions.
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There is no reason to suppose that rules induced during an HCL experiment
should be any different since they, too, seem to be contingent on initial learning
involving an interaction between hippocampal and cortical areas.
In conclusion the models of learning discussed in the previous two
chapters have developed in sophistication and accuracy considerably over the
last eighty years or so, and much progress has been made in terms of our ability
to predict learnt responses in both animals and humans. In parallel with this
effort many of the neural bases of learning have been identified and some of this
understanding has been expressed in neuropsychological models of learning.
While this progress has been considerable, there is much work to be done before
we can truly say that that we actually understand and can predict how learning
occurs and what the neural bases are, even in relatively simple species such as
rats.
The focus of the present research is not, however, in developing new
models of learning but on the effects of ageing on our contingency learning
ability, although the data may illuminate some theoretical aspects of learning. To
be able to make predictions from existing learning theories in the absence of
extant data specifically concerning age effects on conditional learning it will be
necessary to look at both general and specific theories of cognitive ageing and to
extrapolate our predictions from what is known about learning and what is
known about cognitive ageing.
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Chapter 3: Introduction to Cognitive Ageing
3.1: Rationale
Research into the cognitive abilities of older people has become
increasingly important in recent years. Older people now constitute a large and
rising proportion of the populations of developed countries. The 2001 census
found a greater number of over 60's (21%) than under 16's (20%), and the trend
for an increasing proportion of elderly and a diminishing proportion of young
people is predicted to continue (Office for National Statistics, 2002). This has
resulted in an increasing focus on research into the effects of ageing on cognitive
ability. Among the questions this raises is what and how much can we expect
older people to adapt to change and learn new skills?
3.2: Early Ideas
Early studies were somewhat pessimistic in their findings and
conclusions concerning cognitive ability in old age. For instance Yerkes (1921)
found a marked and monotonic age related decline in participants' performance
in Army Alpha I.Q. test scores, beginning in their thirties and continuing
progressively and systematically through the rest of the lifespan. Similarly
Wechsler (1955, 1958) found a comparable pattern in the overall standardisation
data for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (WAIS), and most early research
seemed to reflect this (see Salthouse, 1991; Birren & Schroots, 2001 for
reviews). This rather bleak outlook may, however, be misleading for
methodological, empirical, and theoretical reasons.
3.3 Methodological Considerations
One major problem with the data from these studies is that they are all
derived from cross-sectional research. This effectively means that one is
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comparing two separate age groups, or cohorts, of people born and brought up in
different times according to their current capabilities. A major problem with this
methodology is that different cohorts will have been exposed to different
educational opportunities, quality of health care and diets, parenting styles,
amount of physical exercise, social activities and any number of other factors and
experiences that may affect intellectual ability in later life. One important factor,
for instance, in nearly all cross-sectional research carried out in the last half
century is the fact that every member of an ageing sample had lived through the
Second World War, whereas younger participants had not. The privations of war,
rationing, and an interrupted education may have had effects on the physical and
cognitive development of those who experienced them that are almost impossible
to quantify or control for. Indeed Flynn (1984, 1987) found that average I.Q.
scores had increased generation-by-generation, birth year on birth year,
suggesting a systematic increase in cognitive ability for exogenous, rather than
endogenous reasons. The implication of this is that cross-sectional differences in
general intellectual ability are nothing to do with ageing per se but rather reflect
improvements in the living conditions, education, diet, and healthcare
experienced by succeeding generations. On the other hand, even if one accepts
the view that cross-sectional research is fundamentally flawed and inaccurate as
a result of cohort effects one could argue that it may still be useful in describing
differences in cognitive ability between existing cohorts, although any observed
differences could potentially be exaggerated.
The obvious answer to these problems is to compare ability
longitudinally: taking measures from the same cohort of people at different
points in their life. Typically results from these studies suggest that general
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intellectual ability, as measured by IQ tests, tends to be preserved until late
middle age at least (e.g. Cunningham & Owens, 1983). Despite this there are still
methodological problems with longitudinal studies. For instance, those who
drop-out of longitudinal studies tend to be those who do less well on the tests,
suggesting that longitudinal studies may minimise age differences (Riegal &
Riegal, 1972; Rabbitt, McInnes, Diggle, Holland, Bent, Abson, Pendleton &
Horan, 2004). Another problem is that practice may aid older people when they
retake tests at subsequent intervals (Salthouse, 1991; Rabbitt et al. 2004): here
the inference is that data collected using a longitudinal methodology may
underestimate the extent of cognitive decline with age.
Schaie (e.g. 1983, 1986; Schaie & Hertzog, 1983, 1986) adopted a more
sophisticated methodology: the cross-sequential method. This involves not only
testing the same cohort, or group, of individuals at different points across their
lifespan but also recruiting new cohorts at regular intervals. By combining a
cross section and longitudinal methodologies Schaie was able to compare both
cross-sectionally and longitudinally, and also make time-lag comparisons. Time
lag comparisons are made between different cohorts of the same age at different
points in time. The assumption is that any differences between two groups of
people of the same age at different times must be due to cohort membership,
presumably as a result of exogenous factors. His research indicated that cognitive
decline in general intellectual ability, as measured by the Primary Mental
Abilities battery (PMA: Thurstone, 1958) may be delayed until one's mid-sixties.
Furthermore his data appear to confirm the observation that cross-sectional
studies exaggerate age differences whereas longitudinal studies minimise them.
In a re-analysis of Schaie's (1983) data Salthouse (1991) calculated the extent of
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time-lag effects on the data. He found that if one controlled for time-lag the
differences between longitudinal, cross-sectional, and same cohort data were
virtually eliminated. It could be argued, therefore, that cohort effects may be
negligible since subsequent generations should still show a qualitatively similar
pattern of age differences in cognitive ability. Recall that Flynn (1984, 1987)
found a monotonic year-on-year rise in average IQ scores. This too suggests that,
since cognitive ability seems to rise systematically cohort by cohort, one can
expect to see little difference in the pattern of differences between older and
younger people in subsequent generations, and that any specific changes in data
will be quantitatively, rather than qualitatively different.
It would be a mistake, however, to ignore cohort effects altogether. The
data under consideration were derived from relatively narrow batteries of tests
designed to test general ability (Schaie used the PMA, and Flynn analysed WAIS
data) and there is no guarantee that when one considers specific cognitive
abilities that there will be a similarly monotonic 'Flynn effect'. It does, however,
legitimise the use of cross-sectional comparisons in the absence of extant data for
longitudinal and cross sequential comparisons, and indicate that such a
methodology may provide a good idea of the nature of age differences both now
and in the future.
Another methodological consideration concerns the nature of the
comparisons being made. Salthouse (2000, 2001) suggested that researchers have
taken one of two broad approaches to investigating age differences in cognition.
He has labelled these the micro and macro approaches. In this conception micro
approaches deal with the investigation of processes underlying specific cognitive
tasks that may be impaired with age. Researchers carrying out these types of
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investigations suggest that decrements in these underlying processes are
responsible for any observed age-related differences in the task under
consideration. In the case of associative learning, for instance, Pearce’s (1987,
1994, 2002) theory, discussed in Chapter Two, suggests that generalisation
between stimuli is mediated by perceptual similarity, and that generalisation is a
discrete process that underlies the broader ability of associative learning. Any
age-related changes in generalisation processes may therefore be responsible for
any observed differences between age groups in terms of associative learning
performance. Salthouse (2000, 2001) suggests that these kinds of studies and
theories can be informative in identifying age-related differences, but that such
research does not answer the question of why these processes may decline with
age. Such research tends to ignore performance on other tasks and makes the
potentially serious mistake of assuming task independence when there is a
distinct possibility that age related differences in a range of cognitive tasks could
be explained by more general factors. Salthouse himself advocates the use of
what he terms macro approaches. This approach takes the view that age-related
cognitive decline may be due to more fundamental, general factors reflecting
processing resources underlying performance on a range of tasks. For instance,
Wechsler (1955, 1958) suggested the standardisation data from the WAIS
reflected an overall cognitive decline in general intelligence that underlay age-
related cognitive decline in many other tasks. By way of another example,
Salthouse (1996) has proposed that poor performance in tests of cognitive ability
may be attributed to the general factor of ‘processing speed’ (this theory will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). Again, the suggestion is that cognitive
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abilities are not independent and can be explained by more general factors that
co-vary with age.
3.4: Is ‘General Intelligence’ an Adequate Conception?
The next issue to consider is that so far only measures of general
cognitive ability have been taken into account. This conforms to the idea that a
single general factor, or g, underlies all intellectual ability (Spearman, 1927) and
that this ability declines monotonically with age, perhaps reflecting an age
related physical decline within the nervous system. One major problem with this
approach is that some cognitive abilities seem to decline whereas others do not.
This appears to be a consistent finding, even in early research. Foster and Taylor
(1920), for example, found age differences favouring younger people in
rearranging words to make sentences, visual memory, and word fluency whereas
older people were superior in verbal abilities. Similarly Flynn (1984, 1987)
found greater age-related decline in abstract problem solving than for verbal
tasks in his WAIS data. Schaie (1985) found comparable results in his cross-
sequential study: age declines were more apparent in reasoning and spatial tasks
than the verbal meaning, word fluency, and number tests in the PMA. Earlier
theories that suggested an overall and monotonic decline in general cognitive
ability with age would therefore seem to be overly simplistic and therefore
flawed. Rabbitt (1993; Rabbitt et al. 2004) in an exhaustive review of his and
others' data, found much the same pattern of results: participants' scores on the
Alice Heim 4 (AH4) group test of general intelligence (Heim, 1968) declined
with age, whereas scores on the Mill Hill Vocabulary scale (MHV: Raven, 1982)
became better with age. Interestingly Rabbitt (1993; Rabbitt et al. 2004) also
observes that while the distribution of scores on the MHV remained constant
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over the life span the distribution of scores on the AH4 changed over the life
span such that with increased age the proportion of participants attaining low
scores increased whilst the range of scores remained the same. Put together these
data indicate that age-related cognitive decline is not a unitary or global
phenomenon, nor is it inevitable for all ageing people, even of the same cohort.
3.5: Cattell & Horn's Model
Due to the difficulties in explaining data suggesting differential rates of
decline in diverse cognitive domains with age subsequent researchers have
sought to identify, describe, and explain the kinds of abilities compromised with
age and those that are preserved. Cattell (1963; Horn and Cattell, 1967)
suggested that there are two broad categories of cognitive ability subsumed
hierarchically by g, or general intelligence. These abilities were called
crystallised and fluid intelligence. Crystallised intelligence, according to Horn
and Cattell (1967), represents an individual’s accumulated knowledge, education,
and expertise, for instance vocabulary and semantic knowledge. They suggested
that crystallised abilities showed no age-related loss and in some cases improved
with age. On the other hand fluid intelligence, reflecting abstract reasoning skills
and the ability to acquire new knowledge, skills, and abilities, comprised those
abilities subsumed by g that exhibit an age-related decline. Furthermore Horn &
Cattell (1967), in common with many theorists, suggested that the decline of
fluid abilities reflected the decline of the physiological bases of cognition: the
brain, nervous system and the physical body and vital organs that support them.
Clearly this theory has intuitive appeal since it describes a solution to the
problem of differential decline in cognitive ability with age. Subsequent data
have corroborated the idea that there are some abilities, reflected by fluid
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intelligence, that are likely to decrease with age while others, represented by
crystallised abilities, showed no decline or even improvement. For instance,
Schaie (1979) and Rabbitt (1993; Rabbitt et al. 2004) provided data suggesting
that abilities described as fluid decline with age, but not appreciably until the
mid-sixties. On the other hand both these large-scale longitudinal studies showed
that abilities described as crystallised showed no decline.
3.6 Experience and Disuse Theories
One question this raises is whether or not this decline is inevitable.
Consider Rabbitt's (1993) assertion that for some old people cognitive ability
remains unimpaired in old age. Indeed some researchers have found that older
participants can improve their fluid intelligence through practice and training
(e.g. Willis and Schaie, 1986). This suggests that for many old people cognitive
decline in fluid abilities may be preventable or avoidable, at least until one’s
seventies. This clearly militates against any explanation that suggests that a
broad set of fluid abilities will inevitably and monotonically decline with age. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain that a decline in fluid intelligence has the
same kind of impact on older people’s cognition that it has on younger people’s
cognition. Stuart-Hamilton, Nayak, and Priest (2006), for example, followed
work by Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) that had suggested that low fluid
intelligence in younger participants may underlie an inability to reason
probabilistically and a belief in the paranormal. Despite this, an equivalent
relationship was not found for older participants, suggesting that fluid
intelligence may not be as important in later life as in earlier life.
Another consideration is that expertise can ameliorate cognitive decline
in well-practised areas, even in those tasks considered to reflect fluid abilities.
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For instance Charness (1981, 1991) found that elderly expert chess players could
compensate for their lack of fluid abilities through the use of well-practised
strategies: using heuristics to reduce the processing load associated with
developing novel solutions. Additionally Winder (unpublished, cited in Rabbitt,
1993, p. 398) found that experts’ crossword solution ability was dissociated from
fluid intelligence and that their ability showed a weak positive correlation with
age (r = 0.24). In contrast both young and old novices' crossword solution
abilities were positively associated with fluid intelligence and negatively
associated with age. This implies that practice within a particular domain can
more than compensate for any loss of fluid intelligence ability but that processes
subsumed by fluid intelligence mediate performance in novel tasks. Furthermore
Bosman (1993) found that younger typists had faster finger movements and
reaction times than experienced older typists but could type no more quickly,
although older but less experienced typists were more likely to make errors than
any other group.
Taken together this evidence suggests that experience may have a vital
part to play in attenuating age-related cognitive decline in specific, well-practised
domains. Indeed Horn and Mazanuga (2000) suggest that one of the major
weaknesses of the fluid intelligence theory of age-related cognitive decline is that
IQ tests do not reflect expertise based on experience. They suggest that what is
needed is a more complete taxonomy of cognitive ability: encapsulated in Horn's
(1989) extended theory of fluid intelligence (see Horn et al. 2000 for a review).
Having said that, the theory that age-related cognitive decline is best explained
by a set of correlated abilities under the umbrella term of fluid intelligence and
that this decline reflects, in turn, an underlying physiological decline still has its
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adherents. Certainly it makes sense to consider the possibility that when
problems or tasks are completely novel that this may well be the case.
Furthermore within the context of acquiring new stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-
response associations a decline in fluid abilities may have more explanatory
power than an expertise based explanation since, by definition, the ability to
adapt to and act on novel information is considered a fluid ability.
Having said that, a note of caution is still justified when considering the
impact of a decline in fluid intelligence and its relationship to disuse theories.
One aspect that is difficult to quantify in this regard is older people’s motivation
towards complex cognition. Stuart-Hamilton and McDonald (2001) found that
performance in concrete Piagetian tasks was related to age, fluid and crystallised
intelligence, and Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) scores.
This suggests that more everyday reasoning is mediated by multiple factors,
among them motivation for, and orientation toward cognitive effort as well as
acquired knowledge. This means that fluid intelligence, whilst being a good
predictor of performance in highly controlled laboratory tasks, may not be the
only factor important in more everyday, concrete reasoning.
Another factor to consider in this regard, as well as for other reasons, is
participants’ level of education. Clearly it is a possibility that the greater the level
of education the more likely participants are to be able to understand and
complete experimental and psychometric tasks. Indeed it is certainly the case that
simply controlling for years of education can attenuate the negative relationship
between age and general fluid abilities (e.g. Ardila, Ostrosky-Solis, Rosselli, &
Gomez, 2001; McCarthy, Sellers, Burns, Smith, Ivnik, & Malec, 2003; McCurry,
Gibbons, Uomoto, Thomson, Graves, Edland, Bowen, McCormick, & Larson,
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2001; see also Salthouse, 1991), and, for instance, list and name-face memory in
older adults (Plude, Benaderet, Herrmann, 2001).
Several caveats must be born in mind, however. Firstly it is perhaps
unsurprising that psychometric tests of fluid intelligence originally developed to
predict educational achievement should be related to quantity of education.
Secondly there is no possibility of knowing whether it is education per se that is
instrumental in attenuating cognitive decline. It may well be, for instance, that
education ‘primes’ people with practice at complex cognitive tasks and that
although this ability may decline with age those with higher levels of educational
attainment are still superior to less well educated members of their cohort in
cognitive ability. It is equally possible, however, that a better education may lead
to employment that is more cognitively demanding and that this promotes the use
and development of complex cognitive abilities. Parallels can be drawn here to
the observations alluded to in Chapter 2 concerning Easy-Hard transfer in
discrimination learning and problem solving. It is possible that either education
itself, or the consequent lifetime of cognitively demanding employment, may
constitute the background learning that facilitates the solution of more abstruse
problems or discriminations in the same way as Lawrence’s (1952) pigeons or
Weisberg’s (1996) human problem solvers benefited from gaining experience
from solving easy problems that led to an increased ability to address hard
problems.
Another caveat to the education argument, however, is the point that
higher levels of education are associated with higher socio-economic status and
social support (e.g. Ross & Mirowsky, 1989; Rabbitt et al. 2004). This
observation suggests that the elevated living standards of higher socio-economic
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groupings may attenuate the relationship between education and cognitive ability
(c.f. Antonucci, 2001). On the other hand early education remains a good
predictor of cognitive ability if socio-economic status is controlled for when
lifelong level of intellectual activity is entered as a co-predictor (Kliegal,
Zimprich, & Rott, 2004). Again, though, this suggests that cognitive preservation
may be aided by more early education only if intellectual activity is sustained
throughout the lifetime.
The previous paragraphs also relate to a further attempt to explain both
age differences in cognitive ability and the observed increase in variability
alluded to by Rabbitt (1993; Rabbitt et al. 2004). Clearly the suggestion that at
least some age related decline may be attenuated by either expert knowledge and
practice, or the long term results of higher levels of education leads one to
speculate that simply using one’s cognitive abilities may help to preserve them.
Certainly it may be the case, as some theorists (e.g. Willis & Schaie, 1986)
argue, that most older people’s lives are fairly stable and that there is less need
for what are considered fluid abilities, and instead a reliance on experience and
knowledge. As a consequence cognitive skills that are little needed or practised
decline because of lack of use rather than any inevitable age related decline. This
view is consistent with disuse theory, more prosaically known as the ‘use it or
lose it’ hypothesis.
Beyond the long term effects of education and practice there are some
further strands of evidence that suggest the strength of a disuse explanation. For
instance Pushkar, Arbuckle, Conway, Chaikelson, and Maag (1997) found that
participant scores on the Everyday Activities Questionnaire (EAQ) accounted for
some age related variance in cognitive ability. Similarly Shimamura, Berry,
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Mangels, Rusting, and Jurica (1995) found the cognitive abilities of university
professors in their sixties comparable to those of university professors in their
thirties. Likewise Schaie (1994) found favourable environmental conditions such
as high income, cognitively complex employment lacking routine, activities such
as reading, travel, club membership, and being married to someone of high
cognitive ability attenuated age related cognitive decline. Again these
observations suggest that keeping active and using one’s cognitive abilities in
hobbies and social and professional interactions may help preserve them. 
Furthermore an enriched environment may lead to a quantitative increase
in the number of synaptic connections per neuron in the brain. Hebb (1949), for
instance, took an early and idiosyncratic approach to this question. He took some
laboratory rats home and allowed them to roam his house and become pets for
his children. Subsequently he found that these rats adapted more quickly and
flexibly to new learning situations than the rats kept in his laboratory. This
suggests that enriched environments may lead to an increase in ‘plasticity’, or
cognitive flexibility: the ability to deal adaptively with new situations and
challenges and to change one’s thinking accordingly, a concept clearly allied to
that of ‘fluid intelligence’.
Subsequent studies have confirmed Hebb’s (1949) hypothesis of use-
induced plasticity. For instance Turner and Greenough (1985) found an increase
in the number of synapses in rats housed in an enriched environment compared
to caged rats, while Beaulieu and Colonnier (1988) procured similar results in
cats. In humans histological studies such as Jacobs, Schall, and Scheibel (1993)
have found an increased density of synaptic connections in Wernicke’s area (a
cortical language area) in those who had received a university level education.
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Furthermore other researchers have found that brain plasticity is evident in
ageing rats (Riege, 1971; Diamond, Johnson, Protti, Ott & Kajisa, 1985). 
Consequently, the observed increase in experience contingent brain
plasticity seems to be a robust finding that extends to several species, and
continued use of cognitive ability may well attenuate or eradicate any age-related
decline. Having said this it is equally possible that the apparent cognitive benefits
of activity and use reflect the ability of the individual to carry out such activities.
In other words activity may be constrained by, rather than facilitate, cognitive
ability. The direction of causality is evidently unclear here, although it seems
likely that continued activity on the part of those who are capable of such may be
extremely beneficial. Certainly age related differences and individual differences
in tasks deemed to require fluid intelligence are explicable by invoking the idea
of experience induced plasticity, although it is unclear whether fluid abilities are
determined by experience, or whether an individual’s capacity to carry out
activities is determined by existing or inherent cognitive ability.
3.7: Sensori-Motor Deficits
One further interpretation of the differences in results between fluid and
crystallised intelligence tests concerns the observation that most of the former
require time-limited tests whereas most of the latter have no time limits. For
instance the AH4 and WAIS performance tests are both timed and are considered
to reflect fluid intelligence (Salthouse, 1991; Horn et al. 2000). Most tests of
crystallised intelligence concern vocabulary tests (e.g. MHV) and are untimed.
This leads to the possibility that age differences in fluid intelligence are purely
and simply due to an inability to perceive the questions and write down the
answers as quickly as younger people.
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To investigate this Storandt (1976) gave older people and younger people
the digit symbol substitution task (DSST), a sub task of the WAIS involving the
matching of digits to printed symbols according to a code (e.g. square = 2,
triangle = 3, oblong = 4). Storandt found that much of the differences between
age groups in DSST performance could be explained by a simple measure of
how many symbols they could copy in 90 seconds. Furthermore Storandt (1977)
found that some of the age-related variance in performance I.Q. was removed
when time restrictions on the tests themselves were not imposed. Note, however,
that by no means all age differences in performance are removed when sensori-
motor speed is controlled for, or time limits removed. Thus, although sensori-
motor speed may be a factor to consider when assessing the results of timed tests
such as the AH4 this explanation is by no means able to account for all the
observed age related differences in timed tests of fluid intelligence.
Other researchers consider the possibility that age differences in fluid
intelligence may be due to performance deficits associated with poor eyesight
and hearing. Granick, Kleban, and Weiss (1976) found a positive relationship
between eyesight, hearing, and cognitive ability. In a more recent exhaustive
review, Fozard and Gordon-Salant (2001) refer to relationships between both
vision and hearing and cognitive performance. Furthermore visual and auditory
acuity have been found to relate to a range of cognitive tasks in a six-year
longitudinal comparison among 418 older adults (Valentijn, van Boxtel, van
Hooren, Bosma, Beckers, Ponds, & Jolles, 2005). Certainly it is possible that
poor sensory acuity may adversely affect participants’ ability to apprehend and
follow instructions, whether written or verbal. One question they raise, however,
is that any relationship between hearing or vision and cognition may be due to
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perceptual processes rather than sensory acuity per se. Poor visual or auditory
acuity may, for instance, lead to problems in distinguishing between stimuli and
a consequent deficit in observed cognitive ability.
3.8: Health Status
Another factor that may be causal with regard to age related cognitive
decline is that cognitive decline reflects a parallel decline in health. It seems
reasonable to argue that any physical illness may well have an impact on the
brain and central nervous system, and consequently upon cognition. Indeed
Jelicic and Kempen (1999) found that poor self-rated health adversely affected
cognitive performance. Although one could argue that self-rated health is a poor
measure of general, overall health there appears to be a robust relationship
between this measure and medical ratings of general health (e.g. Maddox and
Douglas, 1973); and between self rated health and diagnosed medical conditions
(e.g. Pilpel, Carmel, and Galinsky, 1988).
Despite this the relationship between general health and cognition
remains unclear since studies screening participants for medical problems show
the same patterns of age related decline in cognition as those that do not (e.g.
Botwinick & Birren, 1963; Albert, Wolfe, & LaFleche, 1990), implying that poor
general health, although related, may not be a reliable predictor of cognitive
decline in old age. Furthermore ill health has been associated with basic
perceptual speed measures but not higher order processes such as attention and
episodic memory (Rosnick, Small, Graves, & Mortimer, 2004), suggesting that
health status may differentially affect a range of cognitive abilities.
There is, however, an abundance of evidence to suggest that specific
serious illness may have a profoundly negative impact on cognitive ability. For
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example Zelinski, Crimmins, Reynolds, and Seeman (1998) found that diabetes,
high blood pressure or stroke had a negative impact on basic cognitive abilities.
Van Boxtel, Buntinx, Houx, Metsemakers, Knottnerus, and Jolles (1998) found
cognitive decline in older people exacerbated by heart disease, circulatory
disorder, and bronchitis or other respiratory disorder while Streisand, Rodrigue,
and Sears (1999) found evidence relating liver and kidney disease to cognitive
decline. Finally Ebert and Heckerling (1998) related cancer and Parkinson’s
disease with cognitive deficits, as well as highlighting glaucoma or cataracts’
negative impact on participants’ ability to communicate and understand
instructions: important in an experimental context.
More recently, however, Hebert, Scherr, Bennett, Bienias, Wilson,
Morris, and Evans (2004) found that blood pressure was not a significant
predictor of cognitive ability in later life in a sample of 4284 individuals living in
communities where medical treatment of blood pressure was common. This
raises the possibility that medical intervention may ameliorate the effects of poor
health on cognitive decline. Furthermore Barusch, Rogers, & Abu-Bader (1999)
found a relationship between depression and cognitive decline, and in a more
recent study anxiety and depression were found to be related to cognitive decline
over six years whereas general physical health was not (van Hooren, Valentijn,
Bosma, Ponds, van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2005).
This, again, demonstrates the ambiguity of the relationship between
health and cognitive decline. It is unclear whether the two are intimately related
or clearly separable, although it makes more sense to assume the former since
cognition relies upon the brain, which is merely another part of the physical body
and just as subject to decay over time.
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Indeed some researchers (e.g. Kleemeir, 1962; Riegal & Riegal, 1972)
suggested that a sudden loss of cognitive ability was a predictor of imminent
death. This idea was formalised as the somewhat pessimistic ‘terminal decline’
theory that explains individual variability in cognitive ability as reflecting the
impending failure of the body. There are, however, problems with this
conception since there is no agreement on which particular skills predicted the
approach of death, and furthermore this effect seems to be restricted to the under
seventies (White & Cunningham, 1988). More recent evidence, on the other
hand, suggests that cognitive decline is a good predictor of an increased risk of
hospitalisation (Chodosh, Seeman, Keeler, Sewall, Hirsch, Guralnik, & Reuben,
2004).
If this is the case then it may lead to a reassessment of the terminal drop
hypothesis, and it may be that decline does not predict death but can forewarn of
impending illness serious enough to require inpatient attention. This conclusion
is in accord with Bosworth and Sieglar’s (2002) meta-analysis of terminal
decline studies: rapid cognitive decline is more likely to be associated with
physical decline and the aetiology of Alzheimer’s disease than with impending
death.
Another possibility is that since illness almost inevitably means more
medication then it may be that prescription drugs, rather than illness as such, may
cause cognitive decline. A recent study found that neuroactive drugs and
multiple drugs were associated with cognitive decline, although Statins, used to
treat cardiovascular disorders, seemed to ameliorate the adverse effects of age in
this respect (Starr, McGurn, Whiteman, Pattie, Whalley, & Deary, 2004). The
latter effect is, however, more often associated with the prevention or delay of
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the symptoms of dementia. Specifically Statins’ role in reducing cholesterol may
help prevent the cardiovascular problems and amyloid plaques associated with a
predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia (Naidu, Xu,
Catalano, & Cordell, 2002).
Whilst differential physiological decline for exogenous reasons may be a
reasonable explanation of individual variation in cognitive ability in the later
years one cannot ignore the alternative, or complementary, explanation that
cognitive decline with age may be equally well explained by endogenous factors.
For instance McClearn and Vogler (2001, McClearn, 2002) review evidence to
suggest that the rate of physical and cognitive decline with age may be linked to
genetic factors.  Other reports suggest that genetic variations may dictate the rate
of cognitive decline and risk of dementia, cardiovascular function and disease,
vulnerability to stress, longevity, memory, and intelligence (Deary, Wright,
Harris, Whalley, & Starr, 2004). Most interest in this area has been directed at
the epsilon 4 allelle of the apolipoprotein 4 gene, and a meta-analysis of 38
studies revealed the epsilon 4 allelle was associated with declines in general
cognitive ability, episodic memory, and executive ability (Small, Rosnick,
Fratiglioni, & Backman, 2004).
However even they would not suggest that one can explain all
physiologically linked age-related cognitive decline purely through genetic
factors, and a recent study reported that epsilon 4 allelle was not associated with
AH4 test scores in a sample of 767 older adults (Rabbitt et al. 2004). Certainly it
is unlikely that individual differences in rate and extent of decline are entirely the
result of our genes, particularly since it is probable that having lived longer
almost undoubtedly leads to greater exposure to and influence from the
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environment. Even this seemingly simple assumption, however, may ultimately
be proved wrong since recent estimates put the level of genetic influence on
cognitive ability in later life at over 50% (Plomin & Spinath, 2002). Of course it
is notoriously difficult to separate genetic from environmental influences and the
means to do so are beyond most researchers. Hence the task of most
psychological research has been to determine the nature and extent of the
interaction between ageing and the environment.
3.9: The Age by Complexity Effect
One further consideration with regard to age-related declines in cognitive
tasks is the age by complexity effect. Put simply this concerns the common
observation that a systematic increase in task complexity brings about a
comparable increase in any observed age-related deficits. For instance
Bottwinick, Robbin, and Brinley (1960) found that, in a card sorting task age
differences increased systematically with the number of sets participants were
required to sort the cards into. Furthermore Salthouse, Mitchell, Skovronek, and
Babcock (1989) gave verbal reasoning and paper folding tasks requiring
visualisation and transformation that varied in terms of the number of premises
or folds required to complete the task. They found statistically significant
correlations between age and task complexity of 0.43 and 0.45 respectively,
demonstrating that as task complexity grows so too do age-related differences. 
This is just one of a plethora of studies that have demonstrated an age by
complexity effect (e.g. Clay, 1954; Welford, 1958; Kinsbourne, 1980; Wingfield,
Poon, Lombardi & Lowe, 1985; Klatsky, 1988) and it seems to be a robust
empirical phenomenon. There are, however, several caveats to this view. Firstly
what is termed complexity is a relatively vague concept and there is no clearly
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agreed way of operationalising this variable. Secondly, as Salthouse (1991)
points out, researchers have tended to emphasise data that support the predictions
of the age by complexity theory and ignore those that refute it. There is certainly
a case for more research that systematically varies complexity.
3.10: Brinley Plots
One way of looking at systematic variations in task complexity and their
effects on performance in cognitive ageing studies has been to use what are
termed Brinley plots, named after their originator, James Brinley. Brinley (1965)
took mean error scores from a range of reaction time studies of varying
complexity and plotted old and young scores against each other in a scatterplot,
with older participants’ scores on the abscissa and young on the asymptote. He
found that the resulting figure showed a linear relationship between the task
performances of the two age groups that could be described using a regression
equation. Furthermore, the slope of the line was greater than 1 and had a negative
intercept with the abscissa, suggesting that the performance deficit of older
participants increased systematically with task complexity and that the
performance deficit was caused by a general underlying factor. This observation
lay dormant for a number of years, principally because Brinley (1965) made few
theoretical claims for the relationship. Cerella (1985) used the technique in a
meta-analysis of 35 studies of response latencies, finding that two factors were
necessary to predict older participants’ performance from younger participants’
performance: a general sensori-motor, or peripheral slowing factor, and an
estimate of the extent that central processes were involved in the task. Cerella
(1985) concluded that a large proportion of the age differences in reaction time
were probably due to a general slowing factor. Other researchers took the
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concept still further. Salthouse (1991, pps. 313-317) cites such studies in support
of the notion that age differences in cognitive abilities are due to a reduction in
processing resources, since observed age differences increase systematically as
resource requirements increase. Indeed, such observations laid some, but by no
means all, of the foundations for Salthouse’s (1996) processing speed theory of
cognitive ageing, discussed in the next chapter. Whilst it seems compelling that
one can predict older from younger people’s task performance in a range of tasks
with reasonable accuracy using a simple linear regression model there are real
concerns with the interpretation of Brinley plots. Perfect (1994; Perfect &
Maylor, 2000) reminds us of that simple truism; correlation does not imply
causation, in his questioning of the method. Simply because task performance is
predictable in this way does not mean that task performance in all of the studies
analysed by, for instance, Cerella (1985) was caused by the same factor. Indeed,
Cerella (1985) found that better predictions were derived from treating each
study individually, but put this down to a variation in the proportion of central
and peripheral processes engaged in the different reaction time tasks. Perfect and
Maylor (2000) suggest that the use of group means inflates the predictive power
of the regression equations, citing an example (Fienberg, 1971, cited in Perfect &
Maylor, 2000, p.13) that the probability of being selected for the US draft
decreased the later one’s birth date was, but that analysis by birth month
increased this correlation from rho = -0.226 to a staggering rho = -0.839. This
demonstrates a huge difference between individual and group mean analysis and
reinforces the point that such analyses may overestimate the extent to which age
differences can be predicted by a general factor. Even if one assumes the Brinley
plot analyses are valid in this sense, there are other criticisms of the
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methodology. Ratcliff, Spieler, and McKoon (2000; Ratcliff, Thapar, &
McKoon, 2001; Ratcliff, Spieler, & McKoon, 2004) are equally vocal in their
criticism of Brinley plots. Their argument rests on the assertion that Brinley plots
are what is termed by statisticians quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plots. Q-Q plots are
constructed by rank ordering the scores arbitrarily on each axis, and are generally
held to reflect the ratio of standard deviations in each population. Thus, Ratcliff
et al.’s argument is that all that the slopes of Brinley plots tell us is that
variability in performance increases with age, an uncontroversial and common
observation that tells us little of what causes age related cognitive decline.
Furthermore, they argue that much of the observed age differences in reaction
times can be attributable to the fact that older people are more cautious in tasks
and emphasise accuracy over speed. Myerson, Adams, Hale, and Jenkins (2003),
however, argue that Brinley plots are not Q-Q plots since the data are unranked:
the appearance of ranking is an artefact of systematic task differences, and that
older people are not more cautious in their approach to reaction time tasks. This,
however, is inconsistent with results reported by Ratcliff et al. (2001, Experiment
2). In a study where participants had to make decisions about whether distances
between dots displayed on a computer screen were ‘short’ or ‘long’ old and
young groups were given alternating instructions emphasising speed or accuracy.
Ratcliff et al. (2001) found that both types of instruction produced typical
Brinley plots when mean old and young response latencies for progressively
more difficult discriminations were plotted against each other, but that the slope
of the Brinley plot for accuracy was greater than that for speed instructions. If
one then plots the speed condition data for older participants against accuracy
data for younger participants, however, the slope becomes less than 1, implying
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that older people are faster than younger people at responding to stimuli and that
their general cognitive processes were faster, not slower. Ratcliff et al (2000,
2001, 2004) have argued that there is no way of telling whether participants tend
towards speed or accuracy in any experiment, and it is possible that all Brinley
plots that plot old and young response latencies are telling us is that older people
are more likely to emphasise accuracy than speed. Certainly, a lifetime’s
experience of the inadvisability of hasty decisions as opposed to the stereotypical
impetuousness of youth makes this interpretation intuitively plausible.
Furthermore, Cerella (1985) explicitly stated that the Brinley plots he analysed
emphasised speed rather than accuracy, and were thus only half the story, and
concurred with Perfect and Maylor’s (2000) assertion that analyses based on
group data would not necessarily hold true for individuals. Overall, Brinley plots
tell an interesting story about the consistency of age related declines in reaction
times and point to the possibility of a single or limited range of factors that may
determine cognitive decline with age, but are flawed as a means of analysis.
3.11: Conclusions and Directions
Of course, one may recognise the observation that age-related declines in
most cognitive tasks are related to, and predicted by a co-occurring decline in
fluid intelligence. In addition one needs to explain why more complex tasks
exacerbate age-related differences in a variety of cognitive tasks. Furthermore
invoking a ‘fluid intelligence’ explanation cannot explain Rabbitt’s (1993;
Rabbitt et al. 2004) observations concerning the individual differences in rate
and extent of decline for fluid intelligence tasks. This obviously begs another
question: why should fluid intelligence decline with and interact with task
complexity and individual differences? This question can broadly be addressed
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with disuse theories and explanations based on greater prevalence of somatic
illness or sensori-motor deficits. This is, however, insufficient since these
theories simply predict an overall age-related deficit. In order to generate novel
predictions concerning associative learning it is necessary to look more deeply
into specific age-related cognitive and neuropsychological deficits. Consequently
the following chapter will examine specific and general process deficits that have
been postulated to underlie cognitive decline, as well as look at
neuropsychological evidence for cognitive decline that can be related to the
physiological bases of learning discussed in Chapter 2. This will make it possible
to integrate what is known about associative learning with knowledge concerning
age related cognitive decline and suggest predictions concerning the nature of
any putative decline in associative learning abilities with age.
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Chapter 4: Theories of Cognitive Ageing
4.1 Introduction
So far we have established that age-related cognitive decline applies
neither to every individual nor to all cognitive domains. Instead variability in
cognitive ability seems to increase with age, seems to be confined to a set of
cognitive abilities related to working flexibly with new information known as
fluid intelligence, and that the extent of any decline is exacerbated by task
complexity.  We have also looked into general factors that may underlie
individual differences in age-related cognitive decline, such as health, fitness,
expertise, disuse, reduced brain plasticity, methodological confounds, and
sensori-motor deficits. While these factors may be of interest in their own right
in the context of the present study it is desirable to take into account more
detailed, largely process specific theories of cognitive ageing. This is important
since theories of associative learning are postulated in terms of cognitive and
neuropsychological resources.
There are several theories of cognitive ageing that are relevant to learning
and memory, and therefore to the present investigation. One theory of memory
decline with age has already been described: the suggestion that memory
declines monotonically with an underlying fluid intelligence factor. As we have
already seen this may be a less than convincing explanation for that decline,
since fluid intelligence may reflect many basic processes requiring multiple
resources. Other theories have been developed to account for memory changes in
later life.  These include the processing speed theory of cognitive ageing
(Salthouse, 1996); inhibitory failure (Hasher & Zacks, 1988); source monitoring
failures (Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay, 1993); the frontal lobe theory (West,
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1996); and the associative deficit hypothesis (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Naveh-
Benjamin, Craik, & Ben-Shaul, 2002; Naveh-Benjamin, Hussain, Guez and Bar-
On, 2003; Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, Kilb & Reedy, 2004). There are, in addition,
a great many data describing neuropsychological changes with age that may be
directly relevant to the theories of learning discussed in chapter two.
4.2 The Processing Speed Theory
Salthouse (1996) proposed a theory suggesting that broad age-related
declines in fluid cognitive abilities were related to a systematic decline in the
speed at which older people process information. Salthouse’s (1996) theory
hinges on extensive empirical observations in multiple cognitive domains related
to fluid intelligence and mnemonic abilities (e.g. Salthouse, 1991; 1992; 1993;
1994; 2000 Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Salthouse observed that generalised
age related changes in cognitive ability could be minimised or even eliminated
by statistical control of measures of processing speed. Furthermore he proposed
that speed of processing mediated cognitive ability through two separable
mechanisms: the limited time mechanism and the simultaneity mechanism.
Fundamentally the limited time mechanism means that slowed processing
of information leads to a cumulative decrement in performance, since each
process takes longer to complete. This effectively means that older people will
perform subsequent cognitive operations later than younger people, and that this
difference will increase as time progresses causing operations to be processed too
slowly to be completed. This, as it stands, may be a reasonable explanation of
age differences in simple serial tasks. The cumulative effect of slowed
processing on more complex tasks contingent on multiple sub-tasks creates a
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further disparity between old and young, since each sub-component of a complex
cognitive task must be completed within a limited time.
Salthouse’s proposed simultaneity mechanism concerns the limitations
associated with time based loss of the products of earlier processing in complex
tasks through decay or displacement. The assumption here is that information
deteriorates over time and the products of earlier processes available for later
processing are degraded or even lost if ensuing cognitive operations are too slow.
Put more simply Salthouse suggests that much of the observed age related
decline in cognitive ability is caused by slower processing of information leading
to fewer operations per time period and a compromised ability to maintain and
use the products of previous processes. This conception is not an unreasonable
one, and can also account for empirical observations such as the age by
complexity effect and decrements in time based tests.
Salthouse’s (1996; 2000) evidence is based on the macro approach
introduced in the previous chapter. The processing speed theory assumes that
cognitive ageing is characterised by a general and monotonic decline in ability,
and is therefore a natural successor to the psychometric approaches that
explained cognitive ageing by invoking a general or fluid intelligence
explanation. Furthermore, it assumes that declines in various cognitive domains
are not independent, but are related to and therefore explicable in terms of a
general factor, in this instance processing speed. Salthouse (1996) presents a
plethora of evidence to support the hypotheses that firstly there is a general
‘speed’ factor that predicts and mediates much of the relationship between age
and most specific cognitive abilities, and secondly that this mediation can be
largely explained through limited time and simultaneity mechanisms.
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For instance Salthouse and Coon (1993) found that relationships between
age and arithmetic ability were rendered non-significant after controlling for
perceptual speed and reaction time. Similarly Salthouse and Meinz (1995;
Salthouse, 1996) found that comparable controls mediated age differences in a
Stroop (1935) colour-word task. Equivalent results have been found for long
term memory for activities (Earles & Coon, 1994), paired associate learning and
free recall (Salthouse, 1993), working memory (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) and
many other cognitive tasks (see Salthouse, 1991; 1996; 2000; Madden, 2001 for
reviews). The relationships between measures of perceptual speed and reaction
times with age related cognitive decline seem to be a robust phenomenon, and
Salthouse’s claim that this underlies much observed age related cognitive decline
still attracts support from many corners as a parsimonious and tractable theory.
The specific mechanisms Salthouse suggests have some empirical
support too. Salthouse (1996, p. 422-423) cites unpublished evidence from
Kersten and Salthouse (1993) in support of the limited time mechanism.
Participants were given a continuous associative memory task requiring them to
view letter-digit pairs, and then tested by deciding whether subsequent probe
pairs had been presented together. Probe pairs were presented either immediately
afterwards, or after presentation of another letter-digit pair. Results indicated that
accuracy improved as a function of presentation time for all stimuli in a classic
negatively accelerated ‘learning curve’. Participants overall performed worse on
trials where alternative pairs were presented between stimulus exposure and
recall, and this is interpreted as demonstrating that greater time was needed for
processing in this condition. Younger participants’ performance in this condition
was also superior to older adults’ performance in the immediate recall condition,
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and Salthouse infers that this suggests older adults complete less processing per
time unit than younger people. Although this interpretation seems reasonable all
these data really tell us is that older people perform far worse when recognising
previously seen letter-digit pairs and that although they are worse at this task
when alternative pairs are placed between stimuli and probe they suffer no worse
a decrement than younger people. Furthermore, although this suggests the kind
of monotonic decline with age associated with general factor theories of ageing it
doesn’t necessarily follow that this general factor has to be processing speed per
se since it is equally possible that older people may have had difficulty learning
the letter-digit associations, or that their memory for them has degraded.
Similarly, Salthouse cites evidence in support of the simultaneity
mechanism by comparing this to the concept of working memory. It is suggested
that the two are synonymous since both concern the amount of information that
can be ‘worked on’ at any one time. Salthouse (1994; see also Craik, 1986;
Light, 1991) reviewed studies of working memory and age and found,
unsurprisingly, age related decline. Importantly for his theory these declines
were largely attenuated by statistical control of processing speed parameters
where these measures were available. For instance Salthouse and Babcock
(1991) tested 233 older adults on a composite reading and computation span task
and found that age explained 21% of the variance in these measures. Once
perceptual speed was accounted for, however, age only accounted for 0.7% of
the variance. Again although this account seems compelling it merely shows an
association between measures of working memory and measures of what
Salthouse calls ‘perceptual speed’. Suggesting this shows that processing speed
causes working memory decline with age, or that working memory is analogous
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to the putative simultaneity mechanism underlying a general speed related deficit
isn’t necessarily the only interpretation available. The concomitant decline in
reaction time, perceptual speed and general measures of cognitive decline with
age may be coincidental; hence the attenuation of age deficits by measures of
speed of processing. Equally, it may be that working memory deficits constrain
processing speed. Whatever the interpretation all these data show us is that
working memory abilities and processing speed decline with age, which merely
confirms what Perfect and Maylor (2000) call ‘the dull hypothesis’;  that
cognitive abilities decline with age.
Other criticisms of the processing speed hypothesis suggest that the
measures of perceptual speed may not be as basic as Salthouse claims. For
instance Parkin and Java (1999; 2000) suggest that the Digit Symbol Substitution
Task (DSST; Wechsler, 1958) requires more than simple perceptual processes
for successful completion. Since this task is suggested by Salthouse and other
proponents of the processing speed theory to reflect perceptual speed it should be
so simple that it does not engage higher cognitive abilities. Parkin and Java
(1999; 2000) pointed out several reasons why this may not be the case. They
suggest that since the DSST is a performance subtask of the WAIS R (Wechsler,
1987) and correlated with other measures in this battery it is entirely
understandable that it should attenuate age related cognitive decline in a broad
range of ‘fluid’ tasks. Further they analyse the assumptions of the DSST itself,
which involves a code table with the digits one to nine placed above a
corresponding row of symbols.  The task requires participants to place as many
of the appropriate symbols in boxes below a series of random single figure digits
from one to nine as they can in 90 seconds.  Parkin and Java suggest that this
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task has a substantial memory component since participants are required to learn
associations between digits and symbols and maintain them in memory as they
complete the task.
Furthermore Parkin and Java (1999; 2000) carried out a series of
regression analyses demonstrating that DSST scores predicted performance on
the AH4 group test of general intelligence and vice-versa. Additionally DSST
and AH4 scores also predicted performance in other recognition and recall
memory tasks.  Entering DSST scores first in a hierarchical regression analysis
resulted in the AH4 predicting little of the variance beyond this. Likewise
entering AH4 scores first in the analysis attenuated the DSST’s power to predict
memory ability, although not to the extent that DSST scores attenuate the
predictive value of AH4 scores.
As pointed out earlier, it should be no surprise that a sub task from a
general test of intelligence should predict performance on another test of general
intellectual ability. Recall, too, that Storandt (1976) found that much of the age
difference in DSST performance could be explained by the number of symbols
participants could copy in a specified time, suggesting that the task may involve
a considerable sensori-motor component. It is therefore possible that the
processing speed theory is predicated on the basis of a combination of general
intellectual ability and sensori-motor, rather than perceptual, speed. Although
this criticism is valid for the DSST it is only fair to point out that Salthouse’s
theory is not solely based on DSST performance, but includes evidence from
many much simpler measures of perceptual speed such as the digit copying task.
This simply requires participants to copy as many digits as they can in a
specified time, although this may also involve a considerable sensori-motor
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component, and similarly the letter and pattern comparison tasks simply ask
participants to state whether two letters or patterns are the same or different.
Again the dependent variable here is how many items correct participants score
in a specified time, usually 30 seconds. Other researchers (e.g. Zimprich, 2002)
have solely used the DSST as an index of perceptual speed and the results of
such studies should be viewed with some caution. The matter of how to quantify
perceptual speed does, however, raise a serious question: just what is it?
Salthouse himself admits that this is a difficult question to answer,
although he contends that because the various measures of perceptual speed that
he uses are highly correlated and able to predict performance on a number of
other cognitive tasks that the theory has some validity. In addition at least one
recent study (Walhovd, Fjell, Reinvang, Lundervold, Fischl, Salat, Quinn,
Makris, & Dale, 2005) has used physiological Event Related Potential (ERP)
latencies as a measure of processing speed in conjunction with MRI estimates of
cortical volume. This study found that ERP latencies increased with age and was
a significant predictor of WAIS performance, suggesting that Salthouse’s theory
may have some physiological basis. The same study, however, also found that
cortical volumes decreased with age and were a better predictor of WAIS scores.
Additionally Walhovd et al. (2005) found that ERP latencies and cortical volume
were not significantly related in the final analysis, suggesting that although
processing speed may predict some age related cognitive decline cortical atrophy
may play a bigger and complementary part. Furthermore many misinterpret
Salthouse’s theory as suggesting that processing speed, however measured, is a
fundamental cause of all age related cognitive decline. Salthouse himself is far
more reticent, and goes to great lengths to make it clear that processing speed is a
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major, but not by any means the only determinant of cognitive decline. One
further criticism is, however, that it is unclear precisely what causes reductions in
processing speed with age, particularly in the light of the observation that
processing speed seems dissociated from cortical volume (Walhovd et al. 2005).
It is fairly simple to suggest what processing speed theory might predict
for associative learning tasks. Since the theory predicts a monotonic decline for
all cognitive abilities mediated by task complexity this is what one should find,
in addition to the prediction that much of the age related variance should be
attenuated by controlling for perceptual speed. Therefore PPPs and NPPs should
be equally challenging, and there should be no differences between solving a
biconditional problem AB+, CD+, AD-, BC- and a conditional problem EG+,
EF+, HG-, HF- since the loads for processing stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-
response associations are equally demanding.
Note, however, that one could suggest that nonlinear problems are more
demanding and therefore ‘complex’ than linear ones, and consequently subject to
age related decline. This leads to another problem for the processing speed
theory. Although Salthouse (1996; 2000) suggests that ‘more demanding’ or
‘complex’ processing leads to a greater age related cognitive deficit there is little
in the theory that makes firm predictions about these observations or explicitly
states exactly what constitutes complexity. Furthermore, evidence suggests that
memory processes may be dissociable and show differential decline. Salthouse
dismisses these findings as reflecting an invalid ‘micro’ approach, instead
emphasising the general nature of cognitive decline for cognitive abilities he
suggests are based on fluid intelligence. Although it is certainly more succinct to
suggest this it does mean that details are lost in the quest for parsimony. The
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following sections review the evidence on ageing and memory, and some of the
‘micro’ approaches that have sought to explain them.
4.3: Ageing and Memory
One of the major findings concerning age related deficits in memory is
that conscious, episodic memories are more greatly affected than implicit,
unconscious and semantic ones and that encoding and retrieval processes are
disproportionately subject to the effects of ageing relative to storage (Cohen,
1986; Light, 1991; Wechsler, 1997; Backman, Small & Wahlin, 2001; Ronnlund,
Nyberg, Backman & Nilsson, 2005), suggesting that operations requiring
effortful processing are disproportionately compromised with age. This is
certainly consistent with the view of fluid decline with age, since fluid processes
by definition require conscious, effortful processing. It is also consistent with the
greater decline older people suffer in terms of free-recall memory relative to
cued-recall which is in turn poorly preserved compared to recognition memory.
Semantic memory is generally spared with age, unsurprising since this is
undoubtedly involved in crystallised intelligence as assessed by such instruments
as the MHV. This suggests that older adults tend to have little problem with
isolated pieces of knowledge and is consistent with the suggestion that storage is
relatively preserved in age. Similarly procedural memories and the acquisition of
motor skills usually show no age related decline (Light & LaVoie, 1993), and
neither does implicit memory as measured by repetition priming tasks such as
word fragment completion or fact completion (Backman et al. 2001).
Prime among candidates for memory decline, as Salthouse observed, is
working memory and the attentional and inhibitory processes associated with it.
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Other areas of interest in the ageing and memory literature are prospective
memory, source memory, and associative memory.
4.4 Working Memory
Working Memory (WM) is a powerful and widely accepted explanation
for short term, or immediate memory (STM). Baddeley and Hitch (1974;
Baddeley, 1986) first suggested that STM was more than just a passive store that
memories passed through to get to long term memory (LTM), as Atkinson and
Shiffrin (1968) had initially proposed. Instead they promulgated the notion that
WM involved effortful, deliberate processing that required conscious attention
and the control and management of limited resources, such as attention and
capacity. The major function of the WM system is postulated to be the allocation
of these limited resources to salient stimuli while inhibiting their allotment to
non-salient stimuli, thus ensuring efficient processing (e.g. Miyake & Shah,
1999).
A prototypical measure of WM illustrates this point. In Daneman and
Carpenter’s (1980) listening span task participants are required not only to
determine the truth or falsehood of a sentence, but also to remember the last
word of each. Clearly this task and others like it require two different processes
to be executed in parallel, verifying the sentence’s truth and remembering the
final word in each block of sentences. Again Salthouse’s (1991, 1994, 1996,
2000; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) extensive observations give us data strongly
suggesting that WM declines with age. Since the capacity of short term memory,
as assessed by digit span and similar measures (see Backman et al. 2001), shows
only small declines, if any, it seems reasonable to suggest that other, more
complex processes mediate age-related WM decline. Salthouse’s interpretation is
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that WM declines are due to reduced processing speed. Indeed he suggests that
his simultaneity mechanism is synonymous with working memory and that this
works in parallel with a limited time mechanism to produce age related cognitive
decline.
Others point to attentional deficits especially when participants are asked
to switch focus during a WM task and in divided attention tasks related to higher
order executive abilities rather than basic perceptual speed (Verhaeghen &
Cerella, 2002; Verhaeghen & Basak, 2005). Furthermore it is equally compelling
to argue that reductions in processing speed are due to WM limitations, so
Salthouse’s admirably comprehensive analysis may border on the tautological in
this instance. Other researchers have, however, found comparable declines in
WM with age and similar relationships with measures of processing speed (de
Ribaupierre, 2002; Backman et al. 2001; Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecombe,
2004; Waters & Caplan, 2005). Doubtless WM does decrease with age, but it is a
broad concept, and to generate predictions concerning associative learning it
would be better to look at the specific processes underlying WM.
4.5 Inhibitory Processes
Hasher and Zacks (1988; Zacks & Hasher, 1994) proposed that an
inhibitory deficit may be responsible for age related differences in WM tasks and
episodic memory in particular, and also for cognitive decline in general. They
suggest that older people’s inability to actively suppress, or inhibit, irrelevant
information means that WM capacity is wasted on unnecessary items and renders
older people more prone to interference, causing the observed pattern of age
related deficits in fluid intelligence.
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There certainly is evidence that inhibitory processes are compromised
with age. Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, and Rypma (1991), for instance, found that
younger people inhibited responses to irrelevant stimuli in a letter naming task
more than older participants. Here letter targets were indicated by colour, and
half of trial blocks were sequential in that the previous trial’s irrelevant letter
served as the following trial’s target whereas control blocks were made up of
random two letter pairings. Older adults made more errors and took longer to
react to stimuli overall, and equally long for both trial types. Younger adults
were quicker overall and took significantly longer to respond to sequential than
to control trials. This implies a degree of conscious contemplation in sequential
trials not present in control trials. Furthermore younger people were far more
likely to notice the pattern in sequential trial blocks, indicating they were better
able to distinguish between trial types and to make predictions based on
consciously known environmental consistencies. This is analogous to the rule
learning effect found by Shanks and Darby (1998), and does nothing to
disconfirm their hypothesis that learning of initial contingencies is a necessary
precursor of rule induction. The results described above suggest that younger
people seem to allocate more effortful processing and conscious resources in
inhibiting irrelevant stimuli, and that their superior performance allows them to
induce rules to help them predict outcomes.
In a similar task Kane, Hasher, and Stoltzfus (1994), using familiar words
(e.g. cat, pot) instead of letters, demonstrated that older adults were more likely
to process irrelevant stimuli and were less able to suppress their later activation.
Mani, Bedwell and Miller (2005) found that age differences were greater for
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false alarms in a continuous performance task than for omission errors,
suggesting an inability to inhibit inappropriate responses.
Hedden and Park (2001) used manipulations of an AB-CD retroactive
interference task to explore inhibitory processes. In this task paired associates
(e.g. door, lock; AB) are learned in stage 1, followed by either a rest condition or
further read paired associates (e.g. region, place; CD) and a recall stage where
participants were asked to say whether test pairs had appeared in stage 1 or not.
Stimuli were presented on a computer monitor and duration of both presentation
and read or rest stages held constant for all participants. They found older adults
were more prone to errors and false alarms than younger participants in the read
as opposed to the control condition at test, as well as slower to respond. Reaction
time in this task did not mediate the increased retroactive interference found with
age, suggesting that simple reaction time may not be a good predictor of
resistance to interference in this instance. Rather, this suggests that resistance to
interference is associated with higher cognitive functions, and is consistent with
inhibitory failure since here older people are unable to suppress activation of
paired associates learned in stage 2 when asked to ignore these and simply
identify stage 1 word-pairs.
Certainly this is applicable to associative learning, since this could lead to
an inability to differentiate between similar stimuli, and whether a stimulus led to
a response or not. Recall that Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi (1998) and
Shanks, Darby, and Charles (1998) found resistance to retroactive interference in
a contingency task beyond that predicted by either elemental or configural
models of associative learning. This implies, in younger people at least, a greater
ability to inhibit inappropriate responses to stimuli resulting from generalisation
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of perceptual similarity than Pearce’s (1987, 1994, & 2002) model suggests. This
generates the prediction that effortful inhibitory processes can be engaged by
younger people to facilitate retention of learned discriminations. Clearly,
therefore, older participants should suffer greater retroactive interference, or the
disruption of old learning by new learning, than younger participants. Given the
evidence discussed above this seems a more than reasonable prediction.
Furthermore, studies have demonstrated that older participants are also
more prone to proactive interference in working memory tasks as well. Bowles
and Salthouse (2003), for instance, used computation and reading span tasks to
look for evidence of proactive interference. They found that later trials were
more difficult for older participants than younger participants, and that the
differences in performance attributable to this proactive interference accounted
for about half of the age related differences in performance for both working
memory tasks. Again, this suggests a vulnerability to interference as a result of
an inability to suppress activation of redundant memories.
Similarly, Andres, Van der Linden, and Parmentier (2004) used a directed
forgetting paradigm to investigate age differences in interference in working
memory. Participants had to remember letter trigrams in a single trigram
condition, an interference condition where two trigrams were presented and both
had to be remembered, and a directed forgetting condition where they received
instructions that the second trigram was to be forgotten. There were no age
differences in the single trigram condition; presumably this was low in terms of
complexity and working memory load. In the interference condition both young
and old participants performed worse, but older people’s performance decline
was greater, suggesting they are more prone to interference in memory. In this
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condition errors were characterised by omission of letters from the trigrams
rather than intrusion or contamination from other stimuli, or errors in the position
of letters within the trigrams. A similar pattern of results emerged in the directed
forgetting condition in that older participants made significantly more errors and
there was a significant difference in terms of omission errors. There were,
however, significant age differences in terms of intrusion errors in that older
participants were more likely to recall letters from trigrams that they had been
directed to forget. This demonstrates a further susceptibility to retroactive
interference since the later to be forgotten trigrams were confused with the
earlier to be remembered trigrams, but provides an explicit explanation for this
observation in that older participants were less able to inhibit irrelevant
information in working memory. Despite this, an inhibitory explanation of the
interference condition is difficult, since participants are not specifically directed
to ignore any information although this does not rule out the possibility that
inhibitory processes were necessary for successful task completion. The authors
suggest that the omission errors seen in both the interference and directed
forgetting conditions could simply be due to diminished capacity in working
memory. Although age differences are not generally apparent in simple span
tasks for short-term memory (e.g. Salthouse, 1991; Backman et al. 2001) it is
possible that a reduction in processing speed, and in particular deficits associated
with a simultaneity mechanism, could explain these observations. In any event it
does seem plausible that inhibitory processes weaken with age and may lead to
increased errors and overgeneralisation in associative learning tasks, especially
when similar stimuli lead to different outcomes and when stimuli are re-valued in
different stages of an experiment.
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Hedden and Park (2001, 2003), however, suggested that interference
related deficits in WM with age might be equally well explained by source
memory deficits, that is, an inability to remember the context in which memories
were formed, or where a specific piece of information was learned. This
explanation could be equally compelling in explaining the above results:
intrusion errors could have occurred simply because older participants could not
remember the context in which they learned the particular elements within the
trigrams
4.6 Source Monitoring Deficits
Source monitoring can be defined as the conscious awareness of where
one learnt a particular piece of information, or indeed where one experienced a
particular episode in one’s life. An everyday example could be an inability to
remember where something was put despite recollection of what is being looked
for, or who told you something despite remembering what was said. In effect this
viewpoint suggests that older people’s item, or content, memory is relatively well
preserved, the difficulty comes when the context that items were encountered in
becomes important.
For instance, in the Hedden et al. (2001; 2003) experiments it may well
be that older people suffer deficits simply because they can’t remember which
stage they learned the paired associates in. Indeed, Hedden and Park (2003)
concluded that most of the variance in retroactive interference could be attributed
to source monitoring errors rather than inhibitory failure since most of the
interference associated with ageing could be explained by older participants’
confusion between studied target word pairs and interfering word pairs read
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aloud. This interpretation is consistent with observed age-related deficits in
context as opposed to item, or content, memories.
In an extensive meta-analysis Spencer and Raz (1995, see also Zacks,
Hasher & Li, 2000), for instance, found a consistent age related deficit for
contextual details relative to content memory. Furthermore, they found a greater
age-related deficit for contextual details unrelated to stimuli, such as spatial
location, time of day or position in a sequence, although this was less for
stimulus attributes directly related to targets, such as their size and colour. In
addition they found that age related deficits were markedly exacerbated for more
effortful modes of retrieval (cued and free recall) than for recognition, and that
more effortful encoding instructions led to a small but consistent increase in age
differences for content memory.
Later research by Glisky, Rubin and Davidson (2001) showed that older
people failed to initiate the processes that bind context with target stimuli during
encoding. They found that older people could differentiate between a voice they
had heard at study and a novel voice when oriented towards the voice by asking
them to judge whether stimulus voices were likely to be heard on the radio. They
could not, however, remember the sentences the voices had spoken in an
identical forced choice task completed fifteen minutes later. A subsequent
manipulation found, however, that older participants could not only remember
the voice as in the first experiment, but could also recognise the sentences in the
subsequent block when asked in this stage to rate how likely it was that the
sentences would be spoken on radio.
A further consideration concerns whether older adults are
disproportionately affected by the requirement to recall specific (e.g. particular
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person) or partial (e.g. person’s gender) source information. Simons, Dodson,
Bell and Schacter (2004) found age differences in both specific and partial
source memory when participants were matched for recognition memory but no
age differences in specific source memory when groups were matched for partial
source memory. This implies a global deficit in the ability to bind context to
memory irrespective of the level of detail required.
A note of caution, however, emerges from research conducted by
Siedlecki, Salthouse and Berish (2005), who suggest that differences between
content and context memory arise from the relative importance of remembering
information rather than its source. Furthermore, they found a strong relationship
between content and source memory in that those individuals who performed
strongly on one measure were good at the other and that correlations between
source memory tests were relatively weak. Lastly they report that relationships
between source memory and measures of fluid intelligence, processing speed,
and episodic memory were high. Taken together this implies that perhaps source
memory may not be an independent construct that is particularly prone to the
effects of ageing, although these data cannot deny that context memory is age
sensitive and another interpretation could be that it is not surprising that source
memory correlates with other age sensitive measures if this ability underlies
much of the observed age related decline in cognitive abilities. Yet another
interpretation could be that there may be a failure to inhibit inappropriate
contextual details that leads to poor source memory, so Hasher and Zacks’
(1988) theory cannot be ruled out entirely here.
Certainly it seems likely that the ageing process adversely affects
memory for context, and this may have a bearing on associative learning.
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Consider again a biconditional problem (AB+, CD+, AD-, BC-). Here responses
to stimuli are contingent on the configuration of the elements. Another way to
think about this is to suppose that each compound represents a separate context
in which elements are found. If this is the case then older people may have
special difficulties on problems with non-linear solutions, as opposed to linearly
soluble ones such as the conditional problem, over and above the observed
difficulties of younger participants. This may be because older participants may
not initiate the necessary processes at encoding to enable them to differentiate
the context in which elements had been presented in terms of both the presence
of other stimuli and response associations. Alternatively, an inhibitory failure
could still explain these data equally well since participants may be unable to
inhibit inappropriate responses relating to similar stimuli.
Another demonstration of memory difficulties for older participants
concerns prospective memory, or remembering to remember something. Since
this is postulated to require considerable conscious effort it is no surprise that age
related decline is found in this domain as well.
4.7: Prospective Memory
Prospective memory (PM) is a relatively recent area of investigation.
Most paradigms ask participants to perform a distracter task during which they
are required to remember to perform another relatively simple task (PM task),
such as press a button, tick a box, or ask for something, either after a specified
time (time based PM), or after a particular event (event based PM), or in a
particular place (place based PM). Clearly this task requires WM since
participants must remember to carry out the PM task at the same time as
performing another task. Although it may be that remembering what the task was
95
may require retrospective memory resources researchers have typically tried to
minimise these requirements in PM tasks by making them as simple as possible
(Maylor, 1998).
Other researchers (e.g. Kliegal, McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) have found
no differences between older and younger participants in terms of retaining task
instructions or task execution. Presumably PM also requires inhibition in that
tasks must be maintained in WM whilst the distracter task is being performed yet
not acted upon and vice-versa. Indeed West and Craik (2001) found that
performance in PM tasks was mediated by measures of processing speed,
working memory, and inhibition, although note that the DSST was used as the
processing speed task and may therefore reflect higher cognitive processes
(Parkin & Java, 1999, 2000).
Evidence suggests that time based PM tasks are more difficult than place
or event based tasks, and that age differences are exaggerated in these types of
PM tasks (Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell & Mayhorn, 1997). This is consistent
with Craik’s (1986) hypothesis that those memory processes that require greater
self initiated processing should suffer the greatest age-related deficits since both
events or places could act as cues to retrieve the PM task, whereas simply having
to remember to complete the PM task at a pre-specified time surely requires self
initiated processing.
Further evidence is summarised by Maylor, Darby, Logie, Della Sala and
Smith (2002). They review evidence gathered by Darby and Maylor (1998) that
suggests that increasing task demands by switching the level of stimulus analysis
between background and PM tasks exacerbated age differences. This study gave
participants a target word and six possible responses for the background task,
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which was either structural or semantic. The structural background task required
participants to write down the response word that followed the target word
alphabetically, whereas the semantic task asked for the response word closest in
meaning to the target word. Concurrent PM tasks were similarly semantic or
structural. Here participants had to circle the trial number either if the target
word was a colour word for the semantic task, or if the target word had a double
letter for the structural PM task. Older people completed the semantic
background task better than younger participants regardless of PM task, possibly
because of their greater crystallised intelligence, although they were worse at the
structural background task, presumably as this involved fluid abilities. Younger
participants were overall better at PM tasks even when those who did not
remember the PM task instructions were excluded. This superiority was
particularly marked in conditions when there was a disparity between
background and PM tasks, that is, when there was a semantic background task
followed by a structural PM task or vice-versa.
Lastly, a more recent meta-analysis by Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, and
Crawford (2004) illuminates a problem with laboratory based PM research. In
this analysis laboratory based studies followed the pattern of results outlined
above: older participants perform worse than their younger counterparts for both
event and time based PM tasks, although a greater age related decline was found
for free recall memory than PM. This is perhaps because free recall involves
‘executive’ processes in the form of purposeful behaviour, as demonstrated by
Crawford, Bryan, Luszcz, Obonsawin, and Stewart (2000). It is also possible that
older participants’ poor performance was the result of a failure to inhibit similar
stimuli or confusion over the sources of memories. Despite the mild surprise of
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the latter finding it is relatively standard compared to the observation that older
participants perform better at naturalistic PM tasks than younger people. This
finding may reflect the greater use of mnemonic strategies and prompts by older
people only too aware of the fallibility of memory whereas the lack of aide
memoirs such as calendars and notes in a laboratory situation demonstrates what
happens when these aids are denied.
For PM overall, therefore, older people’s difficulties are exacerbated by
the lack of environmental support or cues in time based paradigms in particular
and laboratory situations in general, suggesting that the deficit may be the result
of problems with self initiated processing. Similarly the relative difficulty of task
shifting deficits (Darby et al. 1998) may be the result of cognitive inflexibility, or
a failure to change strategies when appropriate. Overall this seems to reflect
Craik’s (1986) hypothesis that performance in tasks low in environmental
support and high in self initiated processing requirements will exhibit greater age
related declines. Presumably this means that changes in any rules induced by
participants in Shanks and Darby’s (1998) studies should result in age related
deficits, just as older participants should be more prone to retroactive and
proactive interference in experiments similar to those conducted by Shanks et al.
(Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi, 1998; Shanks, Darby, and Charles, 1998).
One explanation of age related cognitive decline that links processing
speed, WM, inhibition, attention, and prospective memory is the prefrontal
cortex theory of cognitive ageing (West, 1996). This theory, as the name
suggests, postulates that much observed age related cognitive decline can be
explained by a deficit in processes associated with the prefrontal cortex.
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4.8: The Frontal Cortex Theory of Cognitive Ageing
The view that the mnemonic deficits discussed so far may be associated
with a physiological decline in the function of the frontal cortex is contingent on
several strands of evidence. Firstly there is a need to establish whether the frontal
cortex suffers a marked physical age related decline. Secondly one would
presume that deficits in neuropsychological tasks associated with a loss of frontal
function would also be suffered by an ageing sample of participants and the
results of neuropsychological assessments to predict or be associated with
performance on target tasks such as PM, WM, inhibition and source monitoring
tasks.
In terms of the first point there is a plethora of evidence from histological
and imaging studies to suggest that the prefrontal cortex suffers disproportionate
physiological decline during normal ageing. Raz (2000) presents an exhaustive
review of extant data, as does Woodruff-Pak (1997). Both authors point to global
changes in the ageing brain in terms of decreased overall volume, cerebral blood
flow, and an accumulation of lipofuscin (the ‘wear and tear’ pigment) and note
that evidence for this is as equivocal as the notion of monotonic and universal
age related cognitive decline in that individual differences seem to increase with
age. Despite this both reviews conclude that frontal areas are selectively
impaired with age, as are concentrations of dopamine within the prefrontal area.
Indeed Raz (2000, p.37) described the prefrontal cortex as “highly vulnerable” to
the adverse effects of ageing, and Woodruff-Pak (1997, p.92) concludes that “the
prefrontal cortex is smaller in volume and less activated in older adults”.
Other researchers have quantified whole brain atrophy in old age at 15%,
whereas frontal areas exhibit an average 22% decline in volume (Shan, Liu,
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Sahgal, Wang & Yue, 2005). It seems, therefore, that the frontal lobe theory may
be correct in assuming that there are structural differences between older and
younger people’s frontal cortices.
We now turn to the second question: do the patterns of deficits suffered
by patients with frontal lobe damage and ageing participants converge? The
Frontal Lobe is generally associated with the executive direction and control of
cognitive processes, attention, memory, and planning. Recall that in Chapter 2
some of the deficits associated with Frontal Lobe (FL) damage were discussed.
These included difficulties with planning sequences of actions, making decisions
and using experience to guide future behaviour in everyday tasks (Shallice &
Burgess, 1991; Bechara et al. 2000). Furthermore there are extant data
demonstrating that FL patients were impaired in a range of laboratory tasks that
imply a specific set of deficits.
Specifically difficulties have been found in the Towers of Hanoi problem,
implying a deficit in the ability to formulate and execute plans involving multiple
prospective and retrospective cognitive operations (Miyake et al. 2000). Further
deficits are apparent in the WCST (Dempster et al. 1999), suggesting a
vulnerability to perseverative errors or the failure to inhibit previously successful
but no longer applicable strategies (Gunning-Dixon et al. 2003); the Stroop
(1935) paradigm (e.g. Damasio, 1994), implying a problem with inhibition of
task irrelevant stimuli, despite an ability to report a conscious knowledge of their
redundancy (Duncan, 1995). Similarly FL patients tend to become confused
between task relevant and irrelevant stimuli and have difficulty in consciously
differentiating between stimuli with different outcomes (Henkel, Johnson, & De
Leonardis, 1998; West, 1996; Dimitrov, Granetz, Peterson, Hollnagel,
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Alexander, & Grafman, 1999), and the appropriate allocation of processing
resources in WM (Hartman, Pickering & Wilson, 1992). FL patients also have
difficulties using a distinctiveness heuristic in that being asked or given the
opportunity to encode extra details about stimuli does not facilitate episodic
memory for this group relative to normal controls who benefit from extra
information (Budson, Dodson, Vatner, Daffner, Black & Schachter, 2005). In
terms of basic memory processes prefrontal areas are also involved in encoding
and retrieval processes in episodic memory (Desgranges, Baron & Eustache,
1998; Gabrielli, 1998; Tulving, 2002) and FL patients have greater difficulty
with free than cued recall and least problem with recognition memory (Gabrielli,
1998; Tulving, 2002).
In terms of similarities between age related and FL related cognitive
deficits, measures based on perserverative errors, inhibition, content and context
memory and source monitoring, WM, and PM have all been statistically
associated with both age and frontal lobe function as assessed by
neuropsychological instruments such as the WCST or in vivo scanning
procedures.
Ridderinkhof, Span, and van der Molen (2002; see also Rhodes, 2004),
for instance, demonstrated that older adults were prone to perserverative errors in
WCST like tasks and that they were less able than younger adults to make use of
cues that denoted a rule shift, suggesting inflexibility when dealing with new
situations or ideas. Not only is this observation consistent with a frontal lobe
explanation for cognitive ageing but also with declines in fluid, rather than
crystallised intelligence.
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Note, however, that perseveration is not synonymous with perseverance:
Stuart-Hamilton and McDonald (1998) found that older adults persevered just as
long as younger participants did in trying to solve the insoluble ‘Bridges of
Konigsberg’ problem. Milham, Erickson, Banich, Kramer, Webb, Wszalek and
Cohen (2002) found that decreased dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity in older
participants in an fMRI study of the Stroop task reflected their inability to
implement attentional control through the inhibition of irrelevant stimuli relative
to younger people. This was especially marked when conflicting colour
information was present (i.e. the colour word name conflicted with the ink
colour) relative to colour congruent (i.e. the colour word’s name and ink colour
were the same) and was least noticeable for neutral conditions (neutral word).
Clearly these data not only suggest that prefrontal areas are recruited for
selective attention and the inhibition of prepotent responses but that greater task
demands led to greater age related deficits, a familiar pattern of results associated
with ageing.
Henkel, Johnson and de Leonardis (1998) investigated age differences in
source monitoring. Participants were presented with either line drawings of
objects or names of objects they were asked to imagine as a line drawing. They
found that older adults’ scores on batteries of neuropsychological tests for frontal
and medial temporal lobe function both correlated with source accuracy, or
context memory, for whether objects had been seen or imagined, but not for
recognition accuracy, or item memory, following a two day delay. After a fifteen
minute delay results showed a correlation between source accuracy and the
medial temporal lobe battery, interpreted as demonstrating that the longer 2 day
delay led to increased task demands that recruited frontally mediated reflective
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processes. All participants tended to report having seen rather than imagined
non-presented stimuli if they were perceptually or conceptually similar to seen
items, thus demonstrating a confusion between similar items, and that older
adults sustained a greater deficit even after performance on an old-new
recognition task was controlled for, despite the fact that they were more likely to
guess they had imagined an object. They suggest the data demonstrate
dissociation between binding of feature and context, suggested to be medial
temporal lobe dependent, and strategic, effortful retrieval involving evaluative
judgements, suggested to be mediated by the frontal lobes.
Similarly Mather and Johnson (2003) present data to suggest that older
people’s story recall was more affected by schemas than younger participants’.
Correlations between a frontal lobe battery and schema reliance and a medial
temporal lobe battery and corrected recognition (items correct – false alarms)
scores were statistically significant after partialling age out. Again this suggests
dissociation between frontally mediated reflective evaluations of stimuli and
medial temporally mediated binding of stimuli and story context.
Rhodes and Kelley (2005) found that scores on a battery of executive
function test and age itself were better predictors of memory accuracy than
scores on a speed of processing battery, suggesting that frontal lobe dysfunction
is a better predictor of cognitive decline than speed of processing. Glisky et al.
(2001) found that only older adults with below average frontal lobe function
showed a source memory deficit, concordant with individual differences in
cognitive decline with age (e.g. Rabbitt, 1993; Rabbitt et al. 2004) and consistent
with their suggestion, alluded to earlier, that older adults fail to recruit contextual
binding of stimuli due to impaired executive processes rather than, or in addition
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to, a deficit in contextual binding as such. The lack of medial temporal lobe
battery mediation of source memory in the Glisky et al. (2001) study may be
explained by task differences such that Mather and Johnson (2003) gave
participants relatively simple tasks that presumably recruited fewer executive
processes until sources had to be remembered over a long delay.
More evidence that only those older adults who suffer disproportionate
FL deficits have greater memory deficits comes from a recent fMRI study that
found older people with better declarative memory had right prefrontal activation
greater than younger participants and equal left FL activation (Rosen, Prull,
O’Hara, Race, Desmond, Glover, Yesavag & Gabrieli, 2002). Again this can
explain differential rates of decline and the increase in variability of older
people’s ability to complete tasks involving executive abilities and episodic
memory.
Given that WM is theoretically the component of memory that deals with
conscious, strategic processing it is unsurprising that this is associated, or even
synonymous, with frontal lobe function. As an example, Rypma, Prabhakaran,
Desmond and Gabrieli (2001) gave a WM task consisting of encoding a one to
six letter memory set, maintaining these letters for five seconds, and then
deciding whether a probe letter had been part of the memory set. Again
prefrontal cortex activation as assessed by fMRI was greater for younger than
older participants, as was performance in the WM task, suggesting a frontally
mediated decline in WM ability. Furthermore Salat, Kaye and Janowsky (2002)
found age correlated negatively with WM, which was predictable with prefrontal
cortex volumes, again suggesting an interaction between age and frontal function
in determining WM abilities.
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Since PM is theoretically a demanding form of memory it should not be
unexpected that age related deficits on these tasks should also be associated with
frontal lobe function. Despite this there are relatively few data available that
explicitly compare age, PM, and frontal lobe functions. McDaniel, Glisky,
Guynn and Routhieaux (1999) found that, of a group of older adults, those who
scored highly on neuropsychological assessments of frontal lobe function
performed better on an event based PM task, whereas no differences in PM
performance were found between those adults who did well in a medial temporal
lobe test battery.
Furthermore Martin, Kliegal and McDaniel (2003) varied the complexity
of PM tasks and found that frontal function could not predict performance in a
single task paradigm, but did in more complex tasks. Although age differences
were apparent age itself only predicted performance in the most complex
multiple PM task. These data suggest that frontal function is a good predictor of
performance in PM tasks since PM itself involves the kind of self initiated
processing associated with executive, frontally mediated processes. The clear
difference between PM and source monitoring is that there seems to be little
medial temporal lobe involvement in PM tasks, presumably since the
retrospective memory components are designed to be as simple as possible. The
inability of age to predict PM performance in all but the most complex tasks is
consistent with the increase in variability of cognitive performance with age.
While FL deficits, as well as general cognitive decline, may become more
prevalent with age they are likely in many cases to be neither severe enough nor
general enough to predict performance deficits in simple tasks.
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Up until now it has been assumed that FL deficits are the result of
structural changes. There is, however, some evidence to relate dopamine
depletion in age and the loss of frontal function (see also Raz, 2000; Woodruff-
Pak, 1997). Bäckman, Ginovart, Dixon, Wahlin, Halldin, and Farde (2000), for
instance, conducted a positron emission tomography (PET) study to detect
changes in the binding of dopamine receptors. Both age and dopamine binding
predicted performance on word and face recognition tasks, and two perceptual
speed tasks, with dopamine binding as the strongest predictor. Another PET
study (Volkow, Gur, Wang, Fowler, Moburg, Ping, Hitzemann, Smith & Logan,
1998) found similar associations between age, dopamine levels, and performance
on the WCST and Stroop tasks.
More recently researchers have found that dopamine binding in the
striatum exhibits an age related decline that mediates decrements in executive
function and episodic memory tasks (Erixon-Lindroth, Farde, Wahlin, Sovago,
Halldin & Backman, 2005). Taken together these observations suggest that age
related decline in executive abilities may not be solely due to physical
deterioration or atrophy of brain tissue but that neurochemistry may also play a
part. Another consideration is that the term ‘frontal lobe function’ is somewhat
vague. Most commentators, including West (1996) tend to mean the prefrontal
cortex when discussing changes in cognition with age. More recently researchers
have made efforts to dissociate age effects in different regions of the prefrontal
cortex. Lamar and Resnick (2004), for example found that neuropsychological
assessments sensitive to orbitofrontal cortex damage showed greater age related
declines than tasks assessing dorsolateral prefrontal cortex function, although
remember that this area too seems to suffer structural decline (e.g. Raz, 2000) as
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well as being related to an age related deficit in inhibitory processes (Milham et
al. 2002).
Recall, again from Chapter 2, that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has
been implicated in tasks requiring discriminations between rewards and
punishments (Francis et al. 1999; Rolls, 1999, 2000, 2004; Thorpe et al. 1983)
and discrimination reversals (Thorpe et al. 1983; Kringelbach et al. 2003). This,
together with the evidence presented above, implies that OFC is not only
vulnerable to age related decline but also that this decline may result in
difficulties with predicting the consequences of one’s actions and in amending
responses following environmental changes, as in the WCST and other rule shift
paradigms, and may therefore predict a vulnerability to proactive interference in
reversal learning paradigms. Furthermore the observed age related decline in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may reflect an inability to inhibit inappropriate
responses.
The predictions of neuropsychological theories of learning theories
concerning the impact of FL dysfunction and dopamine depletion in the FL area
have already been dealt with in Chapter 2. The weight of evidence discussed in
this chapter suggests that the pattern of deficits associated with FL dysfunction is
similar to the patterns of deficits associated with age-related cognitive decline.
Furthermore scanning studies indicate that older participants are less likely to
recruit frontal lobe areas when completing cognitive tasks.  Given this the frontal
lobe hypothesis is a strong contender for giving a physiologically grounded
account for much of the observed age-related cognitive decline. One
interpretation in the context of learning theories could be that older participants
employ less effortful learning strategies based on elemental assumptions of
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summation, whereas younger people may have the capacity to choose strategies
that best address a learning problem. For instance, it is clear from earlier studies
(e.g. Shanks, Darby, and Charles, 1998) that younger participants can inhibit
generalisation through perceptual similarity to a greater extent than even
configural theories predict. This would involve effortful processes inhibiting
responses to similar stimuli, as well as source memory for the exact
configuration of stimuli that would indicate a particular learning context. In this
view it is unlikely that older people would resist either proactive or retroactive
interference to the same extent as younger participants and that their responses
would be more consistent with elemental theories of learning.
Recall, however, from earlier in this chapter, that some of the age-related
deficits in cognitive tasks were associated with compromised medial temporal
lobe function.  Specifically medial temporal lobe involvement is strongly
suspected in explaining age-related deficits in associate learning (Dimitrov et al.
1999), source accuracy after a short delay (Henkel et al. 1998) and schema
reliance (Mather et al. 2003).  Furthermore ageing is associated with the decline
in the volume and task related activity of hippocampal and medial temporal lobe
regions (West, 1993; Woodruff-Pak, 1997; Raz, 2000), and many researchers
doubt that the neuropsychological consequences of ageing are entirely
attributable to deficits associated with a single brain area (see Band,
Ridderinkhof and Segalowitz, 2002). Lastly, an increase in age is also associated
with the depletion of acetylcholine (Woodruff-Pak, 1997; Raz, 2000; Terry &
Buccafusco, 2003).  This may result in difficulties in suppressing the
autoassociative recall function of the hippocampal area and consequently result
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in deficits related to the storage of new memories and the establishment of
stimulus-stimulus associations.
These observations and assumptions have more recently been formalised
as the associative deficit hypothesis (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Naveh-Benjamin et
al. 2002; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2004).
4.9: The Associative Deficit Hypothesis
Naveh-Benjamin (2000; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2002; Naveh-Benjamin et
al. 2003; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2004) suggests that one explanation for the
pattern of older adults’ episodic memory deficits lies in their difficulties in
creating associations between items and context as well as between items and
other items.
Naveh-Benjamin (2000) tested the Associative Deficit Hypothesis (ADH)
by comparing performance between item and interitem associations. In this series
of studies older adults’ memory for verbal material was tested by presenting
word pairs and subsequently asking participants whether they had seen a
particular word (item memory) and whether they had seen two items together
(interitem memory). Older people performed worse overall but were
disproportionately worse at recalling interitem associations. Similarly older
adults performed more poorly when asked to identify which words were
presented in which fonts despite a lack of difference between older and younger
people in remembering either words or fonts separately. Furthermore the
differences between old and young adults were exacerbated when recalling
unrelated as opposed to related word pairs. This implies that the problem lies in
encoding and retrieving novel word pairs rather than remembering existing
relationships.
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Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2003) replicated the earlier studies using
nonverbal stimuli, in this case pictures. Again older adults were
disproportionately worse on associative tests as opposed to item tests, whereas
younger adults under divided attention simply showed a generalised performance
deficit. This suggests that associative deficits with age are inexplicable in terms
of attention and effortful processes, in turn implying that any associative deficit
is unlikely to be frontally mediated.
Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2004) used face-name pairs to test whether older
people’s subjective complaints concerning name forgetting were due to simple
forgetting or difficulties with the associations between names and faces. Each
participant saw 40 face-name pairs and participants were then given forced
choice recognition tasks for names, faces, and name-face pairs. Results showed
no age differences in terms of face or name recognition but older participants
were significantly less likely to correctly identify face-name pairs, even when a
sub sample of older and younger participants were matched for item recognition.
Furthermore young participants who completed the tasks under divided attention
conditions were worst at item recognition, but were significantly better than
older adults in terms of recognising face-name pairs.
Naveh-Benjamin (2000; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2002; Naveh-Benjamin et
al. 2003, Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2004) explain their results in terms of medial
temporal lobe related deficits in the ‘binding’ of stimuli. This explanation
certainly makes sense in terms of what we know of the function of this area and
in terms of evidence to suggest atrophy and reduced function of this area in the
later years of life. A note of caution is warranted at this point though, since there
are no data in these studies derived from neuropsychological testing or in vivo
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scanning techniques to test the assumption that medial temporal dysfunction best
explains these data. Although this assumption is entirely plausible it may equally
be difficulties related to the conscious discrimination between existing stimulus
representations that may cause the deficits observed by Naveh-Benjamin (2000;
Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2002; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003; Naveh-Benjamin et al.
2004). Although FL dysfunction may not easily explain why inter-item
associations are disproportionately affected, WM and attentional or inhibitory
processes could explain why younger adults under divided attention conditions
showed a different pattern of results. It seems that the associative deficit
hypothesis may offer a reasonably coherent, albeit weaker alternative to the
frontal lobe theory and, as with the frontal lobe theory we can draw on the
predictions made by the neuropsychological theories of learning discussed in
Chapter Two to anticipate the effect of ageing on associative learning. Caution
over the interpretation of these data is, however, appropriate since the possibility
of a failure of inhibitory or source monitoring processes has not been ruled out,
and it may be that learning interitem associations represents a form of context
learning similar to source monitoring deficits that appear to be mediated by
declines in executive abilities associated with the frontal lobes.
One problem this leaves us with is in distinguishing between the effects
of deterioration in processes associated with the frontal or medial temporal lobes.
This is, however, assuming that the frontal lobe theory and the associative deficit
hypothesis are in competition and that either theory can on its own explain all
age-related declines in learning and memory.  This competitive view may be
disingenuous since neuropsychological and in-vivo scanning evidence suggests
that both areas may be subject to structural and neurochemical decline.  It may be
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more useful, therefore, to see these views as complementary and work towards
delineating the extent of decline associated with each area and specifying the
relative contribution each makes to age-related cognitive change. On balance,
however, West’s (1996) frontal lobe hypothesis seems more compelling since
there are many more data to support this view that have been collected by many
different research groups. Naveh-Benjamin’s (2000) theory, on the other hand,
lacks direct empirical support from outside of his own research group and is,
therefore, a more speculative, although potentially useful, addition to the
explanations for age related cognitive decline.
4.10 Directions for Research
From the literature that has been reviewed so far it has been possible to
gain an insight into both associative learning and cognitive ageing. A multitude
of factors seem to influence cognitive ability in later life, although this shouldn’t
be a surprise since by definition older people have had more time to absorb the
experiences and environmental influences that, at least in part, shape our
behaviour. Certainly it will be necessary to gather data that account for the
health, lifestyle and general cognitive factors discussed over the last two chapters
that may affect contingency learning abilities. Beyond this, however, it should be
obvious to the reader that the clearest predictions concerning developmental
changes in contingency learning abilities may be derived from a combination of
observations of neuropsychological and cognitive deficits associated with age
and theories of learning.
In terms of testing the nature of age related declines in learning the
current research will adopt the food allergy paradigm employed by Shanks et al.
(Shanks, Charles, Darby & Azmi, 1998; Shanks & Darby, 1998; Shanks, Darby,
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& Charles 1998). Furthermore the experiments will employ positive patterning
problems (PPP), negative patterning problems (NPP), as well as biconditional
and conditional designs in order to illuminate any age related deficiencies. From
what has been discussed so far it should be clear that both frontal (FL) and
medial temporal (MTL) lobe deficits should result in learning deficits for the
older participants. In some instances it may be possible to discriminate between
the predictions offered by the FL theory and the associative deficit hypothesis.
FL theory would predict that NPPs should be more difficult than PPPs
since the latter class of problem is soluble through summation, which surely
requires fewer processing resources than acquiring a truly non linear
discrimination (c.f. Experiments 1-5) and does not assume any inhibition of
responses to similar stimuli. One can anticipate, therefore, that older people’s
learning will conform more closely to the predictions of elemental theories when
asked to solve NPPs and biconditional problems. This should, in this instance, be
due to difficulties remembering which of two similar stimuli lead to a certain
outcome and in inhibiting inappropriate responses.
In addition it might be expected that FL theory would define ‘complexity’
in terms of increased strategic processing demands and WM loads. In this view
using more stimuli, or exemplars, increasing the number of possible responses,
or presenting different problems concurrently would exacerbate age related
deficits (c.f. Experiments 1-8). The deficits predicted by FL theory should be the
result of the use of simple elemental strategies in response to increasing
processing loads. The resulting overgeneralisation should in this instance be
analogous to Lashley and Wade’s (1946) view discussed in Chapter Two: that
overgeneralisation is the result of confusion between whether a stimulus leads to
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one outcome or another and that the failure to inhibit inappropriate responses
may lead to erroneous predictions, rather than a consequence of confusion
between stimuli. All of which should mean that problems with multiple
responses should be more ‘complex’ than those with single responses, given that
the number of exemplars stays the same (c.f. Experiments 1-2).
Equally, concurrent PPPs and NPPs presented together should be more
‘complex’ than two concurrent PPPs or two concurrent NPPs, and therefore lead
to greater age related deficits (c.f. Experiments 3-5). Beyond this a relative
inability to learn initial discriminations should lead to fewer rules of conjunction
being induced among an ageing population (c.f. Experiments 2-5).
Furthermore, an ageing population should be more prone to
perserverative errors if rules are changed or shifted, whereas a younger
population should adapt to this change more flexibly (c.f. Experiments 9-10).
Lastly an ageing population should be more prone to retroactive interference
since a deficit in strategic processing resources will make it less likely the
context in which initial learning took place will be identified correctly, and that
even if it is initial learning will be more likely to be confused with later learning
in any event through an age related deficit in generalisation processes through
the inability to inhibit inappropriate responses (c.f. Experiment 11).
A purely MTL based deficit would, on the other hand, make slightly
different predictions although would similarly anticipate overgeneralisation.
Here this would result from an inability to distinguish between similar stimuli
due to the kind of spreading activation advocated by Pavlov (1927) and Hebb
(1949), again referred to in Chapter Two. Since both PPPs and NPPs involve the
same level of ‘complexity’ in terms of creating and distinguishing between
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elements and their compounds a purely MTL deficit would predict little
difference between the two, although compound learning should be more
difficult than elemental learning (c.f. Experiments 1-5) and post experimental
compound recognition should be impaired (c.f. Experiments 9-11). On the other
hand conditional problems may still be seen as less ‘complex’ than biconditional
problems, since their solution is contingent on learning that a single element
signifies a response and another single element signifies no response (c.f.
Experiments 6-8).
In terms of rule learning an MTL deficit implies that NPPs and PPPs
couldn’t be learned and therefore no rule of conjunction could be induced. In this
instance a rule shift would make little difference since there would be no rule to
‘unlearn’. Here ‘complexity’ can be viewed as the number of compound stimuli
to be formed, rather than as the number of responses or in terms of processing
demands (c.f. Experiments 1-5).
What the reader may note at this juncture is that both explanations
alluded to above implicate overgeneralisation in their predictions for how
learning ability may change with age. What is to be avoided is mere confirmation
of Perfect and Maylor’s (2000) ‘dull hypothesis’ in detecting only a simple,
monotonic decline in learning ability with age. Experiments will therefore be
designed to address the questions outlined above in order to examine the role of
changes in generalisation and rule induction processes with age. Before going on,
however, some studies reported in the last few years will be considered to see if
they can shed any light on the question of changes in associative learning
processes with age.
115
Few extant data directly address the question of human ageing and
stimulus-response learning to guide the present investigation. Bellebaum and
Daum (2004) investigated age differences in eyeblink conditional discrimination
using a paradigm identified as being sensitive to Medial Temporal Lobe damage
(Daum, Channon, Pokey & Gray, 1991). In this study participants were exposed
to two different coloured lights (A or B) that predicted whether a tone (S) that
followed predicted an airpuff US (AS+) or not (BS-). They found that older
participants were less likely to develop a CR to the AS+ compound relative to
the BS- stimuli, demonstrating that older participants are slower to learn stimulus
response discriminations. The problem itself is linear, so this could merely reflect
a general, monotonic decline of cognitive ability with age, although it may be
that younger participants were better able to recruit configural processes to
facilitate quicker solution. This would make sense since the tone that
immediately precedes the US was the same in each condition, and it would take
longer for an elemental model to derive correct predictions because the model
would have to learn that the tone stimulus was non-predictive, allowing the
coloured lights to gain all the associative strength. A configural model, on the
other hand, would assume that AS+ and BS- were separate stimuli, and although
some generalisation should occur this would not be to the extent assumed by
elemental models. Again, it seems useful to assume that humans make elemental
predictions when configural processes break down and that this would lead to
greater generalisation between similar stimuli.
Bellebaum et al. (2004) also found that younger participants’ CR rate
decreased over an extinction block, whereas older participants’ CR rate did not.
This may seem odd at first, and difficult to explain since this appears to imply
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some kind of deficit in younger participants due to accelerated decay of memory
traces. A reconsideration of this observation in terms of West’s (1996) FL theory
may make more sense, though. By definition extinction trials are a change in the
experimental conditions from reinforced trials so the decrease in CRs can be seen
as flexible, adaptive responses to changing circumstances rather than
symptomatic of decay. Equally, older participants’ slower adaptation to
environmental change could be characterised as a perserverative error and
therefore consistent with FL decline (e.g. Dempster et al. 1999; Gunning-Dixon
et al. 2003). Although Bellebaum et al. (2004) reported no age group differences
in reported awareness of contingencies there was an interaction in that aware
older participants exhibited fewer CRs than their younger counterparts whereas
there were no age differences among participants who were unaware of the
contingencies, suggesting that older participants were less able to make use of
explicit knowledge than younger people, suggesting a deficit in conscious,
reflective processes. This could relate to rule learning in associative learning
(Shanks & Darby, 1998) in that some younger people may have been quicker to
learn initial contingencies (possibly as a greater ability to recruit configural
processes) and, consequently, induced applicable rules more easily.
Lastly Bellebaum and Daum (2004) report that discrimination and CR
frequency correlated with measures of memory intended to reflect an MTL
deficit but not with any measures from a battery of FL tests. This indicates that
age related declines in associative learning are perhaps due to problems
discriminating between CRs as a result of impaired stimulus-stimulus learning,
although it should be noted that this experiment’s design was a fairly simple
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discrimination that may not have tapped into higher order executive processes
sufficiently for a decline of this nature to be detected.
Mutter and Williams (2004) asked older and younger participants to
judge whether pressing a spacebar in a computer task caused a triangle to flash
on screen where the probability of this occurring was varied between –0.8, -0.4,
0, 0.4, and 0.8. Participants were asked to judge the probability on a percentage
scale from –100 to +100 in three conditions: short and long interval 60 trial
conditions and a short interval 240 trial condition. They were also offered a
financial reward for correctly identifying the probability of a spacebar press
stopping the triangle from flashing. Although participants completed background
tests of verbal fluid and crystallised intelligence, executive ability, and
associative memory these were, unfortunately, not analysed with respect to
experimental results but showed the expected age related differences. Older
adults were found to be especially poor at estimating negative contingencies
when there was a short interval between response and outcome, suggesting a
potential difficulty with creating stimulus representations in short time periods,
although this trend was apparent in young adults too. Again this is, relative to the
following experiments, a simple task and it is difficult to extrapolate from these
results, especially in the absence of any background data comparisons.
Mell, Heekeren, Marschner, Wartenburger, Villringer and Reischies
(2005) investigated the effect of ageing on stimulus-reward association learning
using a probabilistic object reversal task (pORT) and test batteries reflecting
general cognitive and executive abilities. The pORT involved presenting
participants with four of six stimulus letters on each trial and choosing the letter
associated with the greatest non-monetary reward (either 40, 20, 0, -20, or –40
118
points) to maximise the number of points gained over the task as a whole. Once
participants had reached a learning criterion and had identified the maximum
reward available over 6-8 successive trials the feedback schedule was changed
without warning.
Results showed that younger participants were more successful at the task
overall, needed fewer trials to reach criterion accuracy, and made fewer random
errors. A surprising finding, however, was that older adults made fewer
perseverative errors, that is they persevered no more than younger people with
incorrect responses and pORT performance was correlated with only one of a
battery of executive tasks (the Self Ordered Pointing Task, Petrides & Milner,
1982). Analysis of relationships between pORT and general intellectual ability
and processing speed were non-conclusive. The lack of relationships between
associative learning and general and executive abilities may, again, be a
reflection of the simple nature of the task. In the pORT participants merely have
to identify one of six letters associated with maximal reward rather than learn
multiple stimulus response contingencies and the task is therefore linearly
soluble.
Other strands of research have more directly addressed the question of
whether generalisation processes are affected by age. Wearden, Wearden, and
Rabbitt (1997) investigated time perception with older adults split into Young
Old (60-69) and Old Old (70-79) age groups. Experiment 1 was a direct
replication of one conducted by Wearden (1992) on undergraduates, so these
results were used as an informal comparison. Participants were presented with a
400ms standard stimulus and asked whether subsequent stimuli of 100, 200, 300,
400, 500, 600, and 700ms were of the same duration by responding with ‘Yes’
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and ‘No’ keys on a computer. Each trial was followed by corrective feedback
and so could be considered to be analogous to a learning task. Wearden (1992)
had found that young adults’ responses were analogous to rats’ in that the
distribution of ‘Yes’ responses in that by far the majority were to 400ms duration
stimuli, with responses falling sharply as stimuli became less similar than the
standard, although responses to longer durations were more frequent than to
shorter durations, leading to an asymmetrical distribution of the frequency of
responses. Wearden et al. (1997) found an increasing and significant tendency
across the two older age groups toward a flatter, more symmetrical distribution
of ‘Yes’ responses, indicating that generalisation between stimuli increased with
age. They also found that IQ and age predicted the frequency of incorrect
responses such that increasing age and decreasing IQ were synonymous with
increasing inaccuracy and, as such, also predicted the extent of
overgeneralisation.
Experiment 2 used a temporal bisection task indicated no age differences
in Young-Old and Old-Old participants’ ability to state whether 300, 400, 500,
600, and 700ms stimuli were closer in duration than 200ms and 800ms stimuli.
Furthermore, data were almost identical to those obtained by Wearden (1991)
from undergraduates, overall indicating that generalisation processes may be
distinct from discrimination processes in terms of age related change.
These results were replicated by McCormack, Brown, Maylor, Darby,
and Green (1999) with the exception that older adults’ generalisation gradients
were similarly asymmetrical to, though flatter than, the younger groups’, and IQ
no longer predicted response accuracy significantly, although Digit Symbol
Substitution Task (Wechsler, 1981) scores did. McCormack et al. (1999) also
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found no differences between age groups in terms of a temporal bisection task,
reinforcing the notion that generalisation and discrimination processes are
differentially affected by age.
This leads to the question of whether generalisation processes are, as
suggested by Gluck and Myers (1993, 1997), mediated by unconscious stimulus-
stimulus processing in the MTL region or whether generalisation processes are
contingent on more conscious, reflective processes consistent with FL region
processing. Recall that Bellebaum et al. (2004), in an eyeblink conditioning task,
found that discrimination learning correlated with MTL test battery scores but
that age differences only manifested themselves among those who reported
conscious awareness of contingencies. This suggests that a decline in conscious,
reflective processes were also at work and may have been the major source of
age differences in that experiment. This observation may relate to the
dissociation between discrimination learning and generalisation processes in the
experiments of Wearden et al. (1997) and McCormack et al. (1999), and suggest
that the latter may be directed more by conscious, executive processing than by
unconscious stimulus-stimulus learning.
More evidence that generalisation processes may suffer age related
decline and are associated with frontal lobe deficits comes from LaVoie,
Willoughby, and Faulkner (2006). They employed a false memory paradigm to
test Frontally Impaired (FI) and Older Control (OC) groups of older adults and
compare their performance to younger participants’. They used twelve
established semantic category lists of fourteen words (e.g. fruits, clothing) and
took away the two words most highly associated with the category (e.g. apple,
pear) and the two words least associated with the category (e.g. melon and
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nectarine) to use as strongly and weakly associated critical non-presented lures
(Strong CNP and Weak CNP). The twelve lists of the remaining ten words in
each category were presented to participants before they were asked to complete
a recognition task in which list items, CNPs, and filler stimuli were presented
and participants had to state whether they had seen the stimuli before or not.
False recognition of Weak CNP items showed no significant differences
between Young, OC, and FI groups, suggesting that if items are sufficiently
semantically different both age and frontal lobe function made little difference.
False recognition of the Strong CNP stimuli did, however, show age differences
such that older participants in general were more likely to falsely identify an item
strongly associated with the semantic category of a studied list as having been
seen than younger participants, and that the FI group were particularly prone to
this tendency. This suggests, again, that generalisation gradients become flatter
with age and that frontal lobe impairment may underlie this deficit.
In a related experiment Badre and Wagner (2005) also found that fMRI
analysis demonstrated frontal region involvement in a task involving judging
whether a probe word had been in a recently presented set of target words. They
found that participants made more errors, and took longer to make a judgement
about words that had been presented in a recent, but not the most recent, target
list, and that such judgements engaged more frontal area activity. Again, this
suggests that the closer an item is in time or meaning to another item, the more
likely people are to become confused between items and that this tendency
towards interference increases with age and is negatively associated with
executive abilities and extent of frontal activation.
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Given the convergence between generalisation, frontal lobe ability, and
age it seems reasonable to suppose that generalisation as a process may be
crucial in establishing the nature and extent of any age related deficits in
associative learning processes. Furthermore, given that the Gluck et al. (1993,
1997) model emphasises generalisation as a hippocampal or medial temporal
lobe ability it is questionable how useful the predictions of this theory will be in
establishing a reason for any observed age related changes.
Fortunately it is apparent that overgeneralisation in learning would be
more consistent with elemental than configural processing. This means that a
simple way to judge whether participants are overgeneralising would be to
compare behavioural data with the predictions of elemental and configural
models of learning.
 Since data concerning ageing and associative learning have been derived
from experiments of a relatively simple design the current research will seek to
firstly describe the nature and extent of any age related deficits in contingency
learning in NPP, PPP, conditional and biconditional problems before going on to
examine the consequences of rule shifts and attempts to induce retroactive
interference. The results of these studies will make it possible to offer tentative
conclusions on the likely neuropsychological bases of contingency learning
deficits, test the predictions concerning generalisation processes, and to indicate
directions for further, more specific research.
The remainder of this thesis will be structured as follows. The next
chapter will look at the individual differences factors identified in previous
chapters. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. Firstly one may ascertain
whether the current samples of older and younger adults exhibit a similar pattern
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of differences to that seen in other samples. Secondly it will be possible to
identify those factors that vary with age and may have a bearing on general
cognitive ability and therefore may predict overall performance across cognitive
domains. This will allow either control or analysis of the effects of background
factors on conditional learning.
Following this a series of experiments will be described and analysed
allowing conclusions concerning the nature and causes of any age related decline
in contingency learning ability to be drawn and directions for future research
outlined. Experiments 1 to 5 deal with positive and negative patterning problems
whilst Experiments 6 to 8 will examine conditional and biconditional problems.
These experiments will manipulate the number and nature of the problems
systematically in order to ascertain the extent of age related learning and rule
induction deficits, and whether older participants’ learning is more consistent
with elemental or configural processes of generalisation in relatively simple one
stage learning tasks. Experiments 9 to 11 will go on to use multiple stage
experiments to examine the effects of pro- and retro-active interference on
learning, and again whether this implies if participants are using elemental,
configural, or rule based processes of generalisation.
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Chapter 5: Individual Differences Measures and
Results
5.1: Individual Differences Measures
In order to estimate how far cognitive function in a specific domain is
compromised by age it is important to consider factors that co-vary with age but
are also associated with general cognitive decline. Factors that may underlie age
related cognitive decline other than age itself have already been discussed in
Chapter 3, but include education, ‘processing speed’, general intelligence, basic
memory, motor speed and hand-eye co-ordination, health, and lifestyle. This
section revisits some of the evidence for these factors, as well as detailing the
measures that have been used to account for them in the present research.
Participants themselves were split into three age groups. The Young (Y)
group were 279 undergraduates who completed selected background assessments
as part of a course requirement, and later participated in experiments either
voluntarily or as part of their courses. Older participants were all independent,
community dwelling volunteers, and were split into two age groups: the Young-
Old (n = 164: YO: 55-74), and the Old-Old (n = 59: OO: 75 and over). All of the
older participants were recruited over a period of a year through posters,
newspaper articles, radio interviews, and contact with older people’s groups. All
were spoken to personally by telephone on volunteering and the nature of the
investigation explained to them before they attended any assessments.
Those that decided they might like to participate were then sent a
questionnaire and informed consent form by post to complete if and when they
chose. Most participants who received a questionnaire completed and returned it,
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although some decided not to continue. Data from completed questionnaires
were entered into a spreadsheet and hard copies kept in a locked filing cabinet, as
were experimental data. Personal details were entered into a database used only
for contacting participants and cross referenced with questionnaire data by
assigning each volunteer a participant number.
Following questionnaire return participants were invited to either a
University of Wolverhampton campus in Wolverhampton or Telford, or
alternatively venues were arranged at local centres in Oswestry, Leek, Bradley,
Ludlow, and Dudley. The reasoning behind this was that participants from
outlying areas would be more comfortable travelling to a local centre than to the
University itself. It also allowed participants to be recruited from a wider
geographical area. Participants were offered no inducements beyond
refreshments following background and experimental sessions, as well as the
opportunity to ask questions.
The questionnaire sent to participants was an important source of
background data. Participants answered questions pertaining to many of the
factors discussed in Chapter 3, which are discussed more fully below. One of the
most reliable predictors of cognitive ability in old age is participant’s level of
education. A simple ‘years of education’ factor can account for much of age
related cognitive decline in many cases (e.g. Salthouse, 1991), and participants
were asked what level of education they had attained and how old they were
when they left full time education.
Another important issue is that of the relationship between declining
health and increasing age. As the brain is part of the physical body it makes
sense that somatic illness should have an adverse effect on cognition. The
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questionnaire asked for general information such as recent hospitalisation, and
number and nature of prescribed drugs, as these factors may have indicated the
presence of serious illness. Participants also rated their general health on a five-
point scale, and were asked to indicate the extent to which any health problems
had a negative impact on social and necessary activities.
Some more specific disorders commonly found to increase with age and
which adversely affect cognition are covered as well. Zelinski, Crimmins,
Reynolds, and Seeman (1998) found that diabetes, high blood pressure or stroke
had a negative impact on basic cognitive abilities, while Barusch, Rogers, &
Abu-Bader (1999) found similar results for depression. Van Boxtel, Buntinx,
Houx, Metsemakers, Knottnerus, and Jolles (1998) found cognitive decline in
older people exacerbated by heart disease, circulatory disorder, and bronchitis or
other respiratory disorder while Streisand, Rodrigue, and Sears (1999) found
evidence relating liver and kidney disease to cognitive decline. Finally Ebert and
Heckerling (1998) related cancer and Parkinson’s disease with cognitive deficits,
as well as highlighting glaucoma or cataracts’ negative impact on participants’
ability to communicate. Participants were asked on the questionnaire whether
they had suffered from any of these disorders.
Finally the extents of daily activities need to be considered. Pushkar,
Arbuckle, Conway, Chaikelson, and Maag (1997) found that participant scores
on the Everyday Activities Questionnaire (EAQ) accounted for some age related
variance in cognitive ability. The EAQ itself is divided into Necessary (e.g. using
a car or public transport to get out) and Voluntary (e.g. reading, gardening)
components as well as generating a total score by asking participants the
frequency with which they participated in the activities asked about. In addition
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to an amended version of the EAQ participants were asked about the frequency
of their social interactions with family and friends, and whether they live alone
or with a partner. Hopefully these data will provide an estimate of the influence
of keeping active and sociable into older age on cognitive abilities.
In addition to questionnaire data several more formal tests of cognitive,
visuo-spatial, and sensori-motor ability were undertaken. Salthouse (1996)
suggests that a general slowing of the brain’s function can account for age related
cognitive decline. This ‘processing speed’ factor was accounted for with a simple
test of perceptual speed, the digit cancellation task (Parkin & Java, 1999, 2000).
This task involved giving participants a 20x20 grid of single digits between 0 and
9. Within this grid were 40 number 4s, and participants were asked to mark as
many number 4s as they could within thirty seconds.
General intelligence can be split between fluid and crystallised
intelligence. Fluid intelligence is suggested to reflect the ability to operate on
new information, solve problems, and think flexibly. Most large-scale studies
show that fluid intelligence declines with age (e.g. Horn & Masunaga, 2000). In
common with many studies of cognitive ageing the Alice Heim 4 group test of
general intelligence (AH4, Heim, 1968) was used as a measure of fluid
intelligence. In this instance the standardised instructions for this timed test were
closely adhered to, as detailed in the handbook. The AH4 itself is divided into
Verbal and Spatial components that are summed to derive an AH4 Total score.
The verbal component is composed of assessments of verbal and numerical
problem solving such as verbal analogies and number series. The spatial
component requires participants to solve problems involving spatial relationships
and the mental manipulation of objects.
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Crystallised intelligence represents participants’ level of acquired
knowledge and was assessed with the equally ubiquitous Mill Hill Vocabulary
Scale Form A (MHV, Raven, 1982). The MHV is an untimed assessment that
presents participants with a series of increasingly obscure words and asks them
to identify synonyms from a list of six alternatives.
The Digit Cancellation task, AH4, and MHV were completed by both
undergraduates and older volunteers. In addition older volunteers completed two
further tasks. Evidence for age related decline in short-term memory is equivocal
(e.g. Craik & Jennings, 1992) but any decrement would adversely affect
participants’ performance on virtually any cognitive task.
An estimate of short-term memory capacity was made using Wechsler’s
(1955) forward digits task. The task was administered to participants as a group;
participants were read out strings of digits varying in length between three and
nine digits long. They were then asked to remember the strings immediately after
they had been presented and record their responses in an answer booklet. Their
digit span was the longest string of numbers they could remember in the order
presented without mistakes.
Motor speed and hand-eye co-ordination are of obvious importance in
completing any cognitive task in which time is a factor. It has been suggested
that some of the age-related differences in fluid intelligence may be attenuated
by removing time limits, and any experiment involving response times should
take account of physical slowing and co-ordination problems. These factors were
assessed using the MacQuarrie Test for Mechanical Ability (McQ, MacQuarrie,
1953), a standardised battery of motor and visuo-spatial function. Four timed
assessments were used from the battery: Tracing, Dotting, Tapping, and Copying
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and the scores combined to give a total. The ‘Tracing’ test presented participants
with a series of vertical lines with gaps in varying positions. Participants had to
‘trace’ a horizontal line through the gaps without touching the vertical lines.
‘Dotting’ involved placing a dot in the middle of a series of small circles without
touching the edges. ‘Tapping’ required participants to place three dots in the
middle of a series of larger circles, although speed was more important in the
latter than accuracy. In both instances scores were given by the number of valid
dots. Finally ‘Copying’ required participants to copy a complex figure into a
dotted grid. Scores here were the number of correct lines copied. All McQ tests
were subject to time constraints and administered according to the standardised
procedures given in the handbook.
5.2: Individual Differences Results
In common with statistical analyses throughout this thesis the probability
value accepted as showing a statistically significant result is 
€ 
α  < 0.05. This
section examines the descriptive data gathered from questionnaires and
background tests to assess whether the population of participants can be regarded
as representative of the populations from which they are drawn. Furthermore it is
hoped that factors will emerge that may help to explain age differences in general
cognitive ability. These factors may then be used as predictor variables in later
multiple regression analyses.
Table 5.1 (below) shows Means and standard deviations (S.D.) of each of
three age groups for measures of age, years of education, AH4, MHV, and digit
cancellation scores. The values show that measures of fluid intelligence (i.e.
AH4 scores) decreased with age, as did the Digit Cancellation scores.
Crystallised intelligence (i.e. the Mill Hill Vocabulary scale: MHV) increased
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with age. These results are consistent with the literature, suggesting that our
samples are representative.
One way ANOVAs and Bonferonni post hoc tests were performed to
ascertain whether these group differences were significant. ANOVA showed
significant differences in terms of AH4 Verbal (F(2,381)=4.995, p<0.008), AH4
Spatial (F(2,381)=76.21, p<0.001), AH4 Total (F(2,381)=40.98, p<0.001), MHV
(F(2,386)=107.97, p<0.001), Digit Cancellation (F(2,381)=69.03, p<0.001), and
Years of Education (F(2,498)=47.301, p<0.001). Bonferonni tests showed that
these differences were significant between Y and OO groups for AH4 Verbal
(Mean Difference = 4.55, p<0.02), AH4 Spatial (Mean Difference = 18.51,
p<0.001), AH4 Total (Mean Difference = 23.06, p<0.001), MHV (Mean
Difference = 7.35, p<0.001), Digit Cancellation (Mean Difference = 7.51,
p<0.01), and Years of Education (Mean Difference = 1.93, p<0.001).
Differences were also observed between Y and YO groups in terms of
AH4 Spatial (Mean Difference = 11.93, p<0.001), AH4 Total (Mean Difference
Table 5.1: Means and Standard Deviations For Age and Individual Differences
Variables by Age Group
Age Group Young Young-Old Old-Old
Valid
N Mean S.D. Valid N Mean S.D. Valid N Mean S.D.
Age 279 23.69 7.01 164 66.78 5.30 59 79.46 3.75
AH4 Verbal 279 35.72 8.31 75 33.63 9.12 30 31.17 8.99
AH4 Spatial 279 48.31 10.14 75 36.37 10.36 30 29.80 8.66
AH4 Total 279 84.03 16.95 75 68.73 19.05 30 60.97 16.67
MHV 279 26.68 3.66 79 32.78 4.63 31 34.03 4.28
Digit
Cancellation
279 23.48 5.41 75 16.89 4.10 30 15.97 4.32
Years of
Education
279 14 0 163 12.4 2.88 59 12.07 3.02
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= 15.3, p<0.001), MHV (Mean Difference = 6.1, p<0.001), Digit Cancellation
(Mean Difference = 6.58, p<0.001), and Years of Education (Mean Difference =
1.595, p<0.001). Additionally there were significant differences between YO and
OO groups in AH4 Spatial (Mean Difference = 6.57, p<0.009).
Comparisons were also made between YO and OO groups in terms of
data gathered from the questionnaire sent to all participants on recruitment (see
section 5.1). Table 5.2 (below) shows Medians and Inter Quartile Ranges (IQR)
for ordinal level data derived from the questionnaire. Subsequent analysis was by
Mann-Whitney U test.
Table 5.2: Medians and Inter Quartile Ranges of Non-Parametric
Questionnaire Data by Young-Old and Old-Old Age Groups
Young-Old Old-Old
Valid N Median IQR Valid N Median IQR
Health Limits N=163 5 1 N=59 4.50 1.5
Social Contact N=162 3 0.5 N=58 3.25 0.5
EAQ Necessary N=163 14 2 N=59 13 3
EAQ Voluntary N=163 56 10 N=59 53 12
EAQ Total N=163 71 11 N=59 70 13
Self Rated fitness N=163 4 1 N=59 3 1
Self Rated Memory
Decline
N=163 2 1 N=59 2 1
Units of alcohol N=162 2 2 N=59 2 2
Self Rated Health N=163 4 1 N=59 4 1
Hearing Quality N=160 3 1 N=59 3 1
Vision N=163 4 1 N=59 3 1
Health limits was a composite measure of two questions: How much
difficulty do you generally have doing your usual everyday activities and tasks,
both inside and outside the house because of your physical and emotional health;
and does your physical and emotional health limit your social activities with
family, friends, neighbours or groups. Both questions were answered on a five
point Likert scale from ‘extremely limited’ (1) to ‘not at all limited’ (5). The
overall ‘health limits’ measure was an average of these two scores, with low
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scores being more desirable. Social contact was an average of four responses:
How often do you see your family; and how often do you see your friends (both
measured on a five point Likert scale from (1) ‘less than once a year’ to (5)
‘daily’); please indicate how often you attend club/society activities (six point
scale from (0) ‘never’ to (5) ‘daily’); and do you live: (1) alone; (2) with
professional carers; (3) with friends; (4) with family; and (5) with a long term
partner. Puskar et al.’s (1997) EAQ has already been described. ‘Self rated
fitness’ was measured on a five point scale from (1) ‘very poor’ to (5) ‘very
good’, and memory decline was measured on a six point scale from (0) ‘none’ to
(5) ‘a great deal’. Units of alcohol was given as a five point scale from (1) none,
through (2) less than 7, (3) 7-14, (4) 14-28, to (5) over 28. Self-rated health,
hearing quality, and vision were given on a five point scale from (1) very poor to
(5) very good.
For ‘Health Limits’ the OO were significantly more limited than the YO
(U (N1=163, N2=59) =3342.5, p<0.001), although both groups scored highly on
this measure. The OO group’s median EAQ Voluntary was significantly less
than the YO (U (N1=163, N2=59) =3802.5, p<0.02), as was EAQ Necessary (U
(N1=163, N2=59)=3842.5, p<0.02), and Total (U (N1=163, N2=59)=3754,
p<0.015); but their Social Contact ratings were not significantly different. This
tells us that the over 75s in our sample participated in fewer activities, made
fewer necessary journeys, but saw as much of friends and family as the YO
group. The YO group rated themselves as fitter (U (N1=163, N2=59) =3960.5,
p<0.04), healthier (U (N1=163, N2=59) =3342.5, p<0.001: mean YO=3.9,
OO=3.61), with better hearing (U (N1=163, N2=59) =3342.5, p<0.001), and sight
(U (N1=163, N2=59) =3568.5, p<0.003). This pattern of results is unsurprising
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and it is certainly possible that the OO group’s subjectively poorer health may be
responsible for at least some of the variance in the observed age differences in
terms of cognitive tasks. Alternatively it may be equally possible that differences
in questionnaire scores may be due to respondent bias. Certainly those who took
prescription medicines were significantly older (t(219)=4.13, p<0.001), and had
worse visuo-spatial ability according to the MacQuarrie (1953) Tests
(t(107)=2.27, p<0.03) than those who did not, perhaps indicating greater physical
decline for this group.
Parametric measures restricted to the older sample included Digits
Forward, Years of Education, Number of Prescription Medicines (NPM), and the
MacQuarrie Test for Mechanical Ability (MCQ). Table 5.3 shows the means and
standard deviations for these measures for YO and OO age groups. Only the YO
group’s advantage for MCQ Total proved significant (t(108) = 3.34, p<0.002),
indicating an age difference here only for visuo-spatial ability, and no consistent
differences in digit span, or number of prescription medicines.
Table 5.3: Means and Standard Deviations for Parametric Measures
Confined to Older Participants
Young-Old Old-Old
Valid N Mean
Std
Deviation
Valid N Mean
Std
Deviation
Digits
Forward
N=75 6.49 1.12 N=30 6.37 1.16
NPM N=163 2.35 2.11 N=59 2.66 1.67
MCQ Total N=79 106.49 27.56 N=31 87.42 25.33
Individual differences measures, including Everyday Activities
Questionnaire (EAQ) data, were also analysed in terms of those of the older age
group who had suffered any one of the serious illnesses asked about on the
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questionnaire (diabetes, heart or circulatory disease, stroke, high blood pressure,
depression, bronchitis, liver or kidney disorders, cancer, glaucoma or cataracts,
and ‘other serious illness’) or not. Those who indicated any one of these
disorders were significantly older than those who did not (t (220)=2.15, p<0.04),
although the mean difference was small (2.29 years). This reinforces the OO
group’s self reported poorer health, but more detailed comparisons for individual
disorders yielded mostly non-significant differences, although those who
suffered high blood pressure were older (t (220) = 2.55, p<0.02), and performed
more poorly on AH4 Spatial (t (103)=2.78, p<0.02). Those who suffered
Glaucoma or Cataracts were also significantly older (t (220) =2.54, p<0.02).
Overall these illness comparisons are both good and bad in research
terms. On the good side the lack of differences with regard to cognitive and
visuo-spatial measures means that within the sample these variables seem to
make little difference, meaning that participants with these disorders will not
have to be discounted on the grounds of illness in the experimental stage. On the
negative side there is no corroboration for earlier work, although it should be
noted that the sample as a whole consisted of community dwelling participants,
and that those who took part in background testing and experimental work were
required to travel either to the University or a local centre to take part. It seems
reasonable to suppose that this sample would by definition be healthy relative to
those chosen to take part in studies comparing acutely or chronically ill
participants to a ‘normal’ population. Although this sample’s cognitive ability
seems relatively unaffected by illness this does not by any means constitute
evidence that illness cannot be responsible for cognitive decline.
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5.3: Correlational Analyses
In order to evaluate the relationships between age, background and
questionnaire data a correlational analysis was performed. Variables common to
all age groups entered into the initial analysis were Age, AH4 Verbal, AH4
Spatial, AH4 Total, MHV scores, Digit Cancellation, and Years of Education.
Other measures included were the MacQuarrie Test for Mechanical ability and
Digits Forward scores from the older groups’ background assessment, and self
assessed hearing and vision quality, general health, fitness, and extent of any
memory decline as well as number of prescription medicines, Everyday Activity
Questionnaire Necessary, Voluntary, and Total scores and the health limits
measures from the questionnaire.
Age itself was negatively correlated with some measures common to all
age groups: AH4 Verbal (r= -0.157, p<0.003), AH4 Spatial (r= -0.553, p<0.001),
AH4 Total (r= -0.437, p <0.001), Digit Cancellation (r= -0.509, p<0.001), and
Years of Education (r= -0.395, p<0.001). Age was also positively related to
MHV scores (r= 0.61, p<0.001). In terms of measures completed only by YO
and OO groups Age was negatively related to the MacQuarrie Test for
Mechanical Ability total score (r= -0.394, p<0.001), and self rated vision (r= -
0.202, p<0.003) and hearing (r= -0.194, p<0.005) quality. All other questionnaire
measures were uncorrelated with age, although a negative relationship between
Age and EAQ Necessary scores approached statistical significance (r= -0.129, p=
0.055).
Other than Age AH4 Total scores were, unsurprisingly, correlated with
both AH4 Verbal (r= 0.865, p<0.001) and AH4 Spatial (r= 0.9, p<0.001) and
AH4 Spatial and Verbal scores were also correlated (r= 0.668, p<0.001). Beyond
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this AH4 Verbal scores were correlated with MHV (r= 0.351, p<0.001), Digit
Cancellation (r= 0.238, p<0.001), Years of Education (r= 0.257, p<0.001),
MacQuarrie total (r= 0.671, p<0.001), and Digits Forward (r= 0.287, p<0.001)
scores. AH4 Spatial scores were furthermore correlated with Digit Cancellation
(r= 0.387, p<0.001), Years of Education (r= 0.37, p<0.001), Self Rated Vision
(r= 0.206, p<0.04), and MacQuarrie total (r= 0.579, p<0.001) scores. AH4 Total
correlated with MHV (r= 0.107, p<0.05), Digit Cancellation (r =0.367, p<0.001),
Years of Education (r= 0.382, p<0.001), MacQuarrie total (r= 0.702, p<0.001),
Digits Forward (r= 0.247, p<0.02), and EAQ Total (r= 0.193, p<0.05).
The correlation between MHV and AH4 scores probably reflect the AH4
Verbal scale’s demands on vocabulary through verbal reasoning. This line of
reasoning is reinforced by the weaker correlation between AH4 Total and MHV,
and the lack of an association between AH4 Spatial and MHV. One may
furthermore suppose that the correlation may result from more able and
knowledgeable undergraduates because of the Young group’s superiority in the
AH4. A similar argument could explain the correlations between AH4 scores and
Digit Cancellation and Years of Education: since younger people scored better
on these measures anyway and had, on average, received more education it is
perhaps unsurprising that they are associated. Only the older group completed
Digits Forward and the association between this and AH4 Verbal may reflect the
demands of manipulating numerical information. As before the lack of a
relationship between this and AH4 Spatial indicates that the association between
Digits Forward and AH4 Total results from the Verbal component only.
Perhaps the most surprising association is that between MacQuarrie test
scores and AH4 measures. These were stronger than between AH4 and all other
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measures, including Age itself. The fact that younger people did not complete the
MacQuarrie test militates against the explanation that the correlation merely
reflects gross age differences. Furthermore it weakens this explanation in
accounting for relationships between AH4 and Digit Cancellation as MacQuarrie
and Digit Cancellation tests both tests involve basic perceptual and motor skills
and are positively correlated (r= 0.324, p<0.07). Indeed the correlation between
AH4 and Digit Cancellation scores could be taken as evidence for a processing
speed explanation although this account is weakened by the far stronger
relationship between AH4 and the more complex MacQuarrie test. Even more
surprisingly MacQuarrie test scores were positively associated with the untimed
MHV (r= 0.293, p<0.003) whereas Digit Cancellation was negatively associated
with this measure (r= -0.178, p<0.02). This suggests dissociation between the
two measures, although quite why sensori-motor ability should be related to
vocabulary in an ageing population is unclear.
Years of Education was correlated with both MacQuarrie test scores (r=
0.371, p<0.001) and Digit Cancellation (r= 0.269, p<0.001), although bear in
mind that in the latter case this could be due to the Younger group’s better
performance on this measure and greater average years in education. MacQuarrie
test scores were also associated with Self Rated Vision (r= 0.199, p<0.04),
Health (r= 0.191, p<0.05), and EAQ Voluntary (r= 0.276, p<0.005) and Total (r=
0.286, p<0.004). Additionally Digit Cancellation was associated with Self Rated
Vision (r= 0.206, p<0.04), Health (r= 0.253, p<0.01), and Fitness (r= 0.217,
p<0.03). It is perhaps unsurprising that measures that rely on vision such as the
Digit Cancellation task and MacQuarrie test are associated with vision and this
may reflect the accuracy of self-ratings in this area. The problems associated
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with basic perceptual and sensori-motor skills may be associated with self-
ratings of general health and fitness because they may adversely affect people’s
perceptions of how fit and healthy they feel. Alternatively they may be
symptomatic of underlying health problems and would clearly limit the extent of
unnecessary activity, hence the associations with EAQ scores.
The correlation between AH4 scores and both MacQuarrie and Digit
Cancellation scores may reflect either slowed processing speed, slowed
perceptual motor speeds or indeed difficulty with reading the AH4 question
booklets, although large print versions were made available for those who felt
they needed them. Whilst this explanation may suffice for associations with Digit
Cancellation ratings it cannot explain the associations between MacQuarrie
scores and the untimed MHV, where participants could take as long as they
wished to read and respond to the requirements of the test.
Other significant correlational relationships are detailed in Table 5.4
(below). These relationships, however, are between questionnaire items and are
not directly relevant to the present research since they do not directly impinge on
standardised measures of cognitive ability.
This completes the account of relationships between background and
questionnaire measures. Although much of what has been described is
unsurprising the associations between MacQuarrie test scores and measures of
both crystallised and fluid intelligence seems somewhat paradoxical and difficult
to account for. Since these associations are stronger and more broadly applicable
than those between the Digit Cancellation task and other variables a simple speed
of processing account may seem inappropriate in explaining general cognitive
decline. Whilst this may be a compelling research question in its own right the
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purpose of this part of the investigation was to assess the suitability of
background variables for inclusion as possible predictors of associative learning
ability in multiple regression equations applied to experimental rather than
correlational data.
This aim is consistent with most of the ageing literature but not with
cognitive psychology broadly. Background data are important since they can tell
us something about possible causes for cognitive decline with age but this
principle could easily be applied to investigations concerning ‘normal’ cognitive
ability. Surely it would be in the interests of cognitive psychology more broadly
to adopt background testing in order to identify factors that have a bearing on
different cognitive abilities. This would enable researchers to address questions
regarding the relationships between abilities and to be more precise concerning
what factors underlie a particular ability such as associative learning.
Equally background data can tell us whether our samples of participants
can be considered representative of a general population. Again this would be
useful information in any cognitive psychology experiment; allowing researchers
to gauge more accurately how populations may differ and in what respects they
are similar. Background testing is, therefore, a useful and informative exercise
irrespective of whether cognitive ageing is involved, and cognitive research may
benefit from a more rigorous approach.
Whilst it is important to include as many predictor variables as possible
to allow a comprehensive analysis it is equally important to be parsimonious
since an overabundance of variables would have inevitably reduced the power of
the analysis to detect significant associations and predictions. To this end only
background and questionnaire measures that correlate with Age and AH4 Total
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will be included, in addition to these two factors. There is, however, some
controversy around which parts of the AH4 test constitute ‘fluid intelligence’.
Most researchers seem to use a summed AH4 Total score (e.g. Parkin &
Java, 1999, 2000; Rabbitt et al. 1993, 2004), although others use just the verbal
and numerical scale (e.g. Rabbitt, Chetwynd, & McInnes, 2003) and yet others
the spatial scale (e.g. Darby & Maylor, 1998). Since AH4 Spatial and Verbal
correlated highly with each other and even more so with AH4 Total the present
research will not enter them into regression analyses separately and will instead
use the summed scale for analyses. Both the Digit Cancellation and MacQuarrie
tests will be entered since they are dissociable to an extent. Years of Education
will also be used as a predictor variable, as will MHV scores.
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Table 5.4: Correlations Between Questionnaire Variables
Covariate 1 Covariate 2 r p
Years of Education EAQ Voluntary 0.386 <0.001
Years of Education EAQ Total 0.354 <0.001
Years of Education Health affects Social Life 0.174 <0.01
Years of Education Self Rated Health 0.232 <0.001
Years of Education Self Rated Fitness 0.156 <0.03
Self Rated Vision Self Rated Hearing 0.346 <0.001
Self Rated Vision EAQ Necessary 0.158 <0.02
Self Rated Vision EAQ Voluntary 0.197 <0.003
Self Rated Vision EAQ Total 0.216 <0.01
Self Rated Vision Self Rated Health 0.326 <0.001
Self Rated Vision Self Rated Fitness 0.242 <0.001
Self Rated Vision Self Rated Memory Decline -0.26 <0.001
Self Rated Hearing EAQ Necessary 0.155 <0.025
Self Rated Hearing EAQ Voluntary 0.15 <0.027
Self Rated Hearing EAQ Total 0.195 <0.005
Self Rated Hearing Self Rated Health 0.315 <0.001
Self Rated Hearing Self Rated Fitness 0.222 <0.002
Self Rated Hearing Self Rated Memory Decline -0.23 <0.002
EAQ Necessary EAQ Voluntary 0.258 <0.001
EAQ Necessary EAQ Total 0.453 <0.001
EAQ Voluntary Health affects Social Life 0.315 <0.001
EAQ Voluntary EAQ Total 0.978 <0.001
EAQ Total Health affects Social Life 0.308 <0.001
EAQ Voluntary Self Rated Health 0.288 <0.001
EAQ Voluntary Self Rated Fitness 0.191 <0.004
EAQ Total Self Rated Health 0.258 <0.001
EAQ Total Self Rated Fitness 0.194 <0.005
Health affects Social Life Self Rated Health 0.478 <0.001
Health affects Social Life Self Rated Fitness 0.489 <0.001
Health affects Social Life Self Rated Memory Decline -0.195 <0.005
Self Rated Health Self Rated Fitness 0.719 <0.001
Self Rated Health Self Rated Memory Decline -0.279 <0.001
Self Rated Fitness Self Rated Memory Decline -0.191 <0.005
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Chapter 6: Formative Experiments I: Negative and
Positive Patterning
6.1: Preface to the Experiments
As stated in the previous chapter the probability level accepted as
showing a statistically significant result was α = 0.05. Eleven experiments were
conducted during the course of the studies and although designs varied, there
were a number of common factors. The reader should assume, unless otherwise
stated, that the following general methods were adhered to.
6.1.1: Procedures
All experiments used the same basic paradigm in the form of a human
conditional learning task. Most used a food allergy problem as employed by
Shanks and colleagues (Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi, 1998; Shanks,
Darby, & Charles, 1998; Shanks & Darby, 1998) and first developed by
Wasserman (1990). Note, however, that Experiments 7 & 8 used different stimuli
and responses and these will be discussed in Chapter 7. As described earlier, the
food allergy task requires participants to learn which food items or combinations
of items lead to an allergy, and which do not. Participants in all cases received a
varying number of trial types randomised within blocks that consisted of single
presentations of all stimulus-response contingencies. Two versions of each
experiment were presented to different participants and the order of stimulus
presentations altered to control for order effects. Stimuli were randomly drawn
from a pool of food or other items. Food items had been ranked by a sample of
older volunteers and undergraduates in terms of the likelihood they would cause
an allergy, and consistently highly ranked foods excluded. Furthermore all
stimuli were reassigned between versions such that if they predicted an outcome
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in one version they would predict no outcome in the other version to further
account for any preconceptions concerning foods and allergies. Stimuli were
presented as a Powerpoint presentation using a Hewlett Packard Omnibook 4150
laptop computer linked to a Sanyo data projector. Participants were told that the
experiment would examine how difficult it was for people to learn the
relationships between foods and different types of allergic reactions. They were
asked to ignore any knowledge they may have about food allergies, as this would
not help them during the experiment. Responses were to be made in a booklet
provided and each food or foods would lead to one of several outcomes: an
Allergy type or simply Allergy, or No Allergy. Participants were asked to make
an outcome prediction following each presentation of food or pair of foods, and
having done so they were immediately told the correct outcome for that trial.
Food compounds were presented one over the other and this order of
presentation was counterbalanced across trials. Each trial and its outcome were
numbered and corresponded to participants’ response booklets. To account for
the possibility that older participants’ performance may have been compromised
by an inability to see stimuli and the answer book or have difficulty switching
focus from one to the other both items used large font sizes. Answer sheets used
a bold 20-point Times New Roman font and Powerpoint slides used a similar 40-
point high contrast yellow font on a blue background. Answer booklets were also
available as large print A3 size photocopies of the A4 originals if participants
indicated they would need to use such an item. Afterwards participants were
debriefed and given the opportunity to ask questions. The following instructions
were printed in participants’ answer booklets and were verbally reinforced.
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Participants were encouraged to ask questions if they did not completely
understand the instructions.
The learning task requires you to make a prediction about which food
types cause an allergy, and which do not. You will be guessing at first but will
become more accurate as the task progresses.
This is an artificial categorisation task; the allergies are hypothetical
and are not necessarily associated with any real food allergies.
Simply tick the box underneath the prediction you make for each food as
it is presented on the screen. Each trial is numbered and you should match the
numbers on your answer sheets with the numbers on the screen.
When you have recorded each prediction look up so I know you have
finished, otherwise the whole process will take much longer than necessary.
Please don’t make notes or crib sheets, the task is designed to be
completed unaided and to do otherwise would invalidate the results.
6.1.2: Results
Other than Experiment 1 all experimental data were dealt with in the
following way prior to analysis. Participants’ response booklets were collected
and their responses entered into a spreadsheet as 1 for an outcome prediction and
0 for a no outcome prediction. Responses to trials resulting in no outcome (which
should be 0 if correct) were then subtracted from responses to trials resulting in
an outcome (that should be 1, if correct) to derive a score for each trial. This
procedure derived a number between 1 and –1 that showed how far participants
correctly discriminated between stimuli. For instance, had a participant correctly
responded to both allergy and no allergy trials they would receive a score of 1
(i.e. 1 - 0= 1). If, however, a participant responded incorrectly to both stimuli
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then they would receive a score of –1 (i.e. 0 - 1= -1), and a score of 0 indicates
chance levels of responding. This score therefore shows how far participants
discriminated between stimuli that led to an outcome and those that led to no
outcome. This method of calculation differs slightly from that employed by
Shanks (Shanks, Charles, Darby, and Azmi, 1998; Shanks, Darby, & Charles,
1998; Shanks & Darby, 1998) in that the former studies tested discrimination on
the basis of significant differences between Allergy and No Allergy predictions.
Whilst the present studies do use this method for some analyses it was felt that
calculating discrimination scores in the manner outlined above was more
parsimonious for other types of analysis. These ‘discrimination’ scores were then
treated in a number of ways to reflect different aspects of participants’
performance. For the purposes of analysis discrimination scores were averaged
over several trials to derive 5 blocks per experiment or stage in order to see how
responses changed over the course of experiments. Thus each block in an
experiment or experimental stage that presented 10 trials of each stimulus would
be the average of responses to two stimulus presentations, and each block in a
15-trial experiment or stage was the average of responses to three stimulus
presentations. Further analysis was also performed on overall and final trial
accuracy measures. Here scores coded as 0 for an incorrect prediction and 1 for a
correct response were summed over the whole experiment or stage to derive
overall accuracy, whilst scores calculated in the same way for the final trial of
the experiment were summed to give an indication of how accurately problems
had been ultimately learned.
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6.2 Negative and Positive Patterning Problems
Experiments 1 to 5 all involve negative and positive patterning problems.
Recall that PPPs require participants to learn that compounds predict an outcome
(in this case an allergy) whereas elements do not (e.g. A-, B-, AB+; where +
indicates an Allergy outcome and - represents a No Allergy outcome).
Conversely NPPs require the opposite discrimination: elements lead to outcomes
but compounds don’t (e.g. A+, B+, AB-). Remember too that both types of
problem can be solved by adopting a rule of conjunction: elements and
compounds have opposite outcomes. The following experiments varied the
difficulty of the problems systematically in order to identify the influence of task
complexity on learning. Furthermore participants were asked whether they had
used any rules to help them complete the task in experiments 2-5. This not only
allows us to identify the effects of age on learning but also the interaction of age
and complexity. Because these formative studies are based on the same
fundamental design and seek to address similar issues they will be grouped
together in a single chapter so that an overview will be possible.
6.3: Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was a replication of Experiment 1a from Shanks, Darby,
Charles and Azmi (1998) and served to begin the study by verifying whether the
paper and pencil version used for the present series of studies gave results
compatible with the original study. The experiment involves two concurrent
NPPs and two concurrent PPPs with No Allergy and Allergies 1-4 as outcomes.
There are a number of theoretical predictions that could be made concerning this
experiment, particularly from quantitative theories that would help to ascertain
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the extent of any change in generalisation processes with age for these two types
of problem.
The Rescorla-Wagner (1972) theory would predict that the PPP would be
insoluble since each element would be associated with an outcome or no
outcome equally frequently. Assuming a threshold of activation when λ>0.5
would, however, render the problem linearly soluble since each compound would
acquire a net associative value of 1λ by summation of elements’ associative
weights of 0.5λ. As a consequence the compound would be associated with the
presence of an allergy, whereas the elements would not be activated sufficiently
to activate this association.
Unique-cue theories such as Rescorla’s (1973) model would easily
predict learning since, for the problem A-, B-, ABX+, the unique cue X would
acquire all associative strength since it would be the only ‘element’ that
consistently predicted the outcome, and cue-competition would ensure that
elements A and B would acquire no associative value since their capacity to
predict the outcome is inconsistent.
Pearce’s (1987, 1994) model would, equally easily, predict that
the problem be learned. A compound AB would have a similarity of 0.5 in
relation to the elements A and B, and these elements would have a similarity of
0.5 to the compound, but no associative strength would be generalised between
elements. For the net associative strength of VAB to equal 1λ and for those of VA
and VB to equal 0λ the associative strength of the compound AB would be 2λ
and that of the elements A and B would be –1λ. This can be proved through the
calculations 
€ 
VAB = 2 + ((0.5 ⋅ −1) + (0.5 ⋅ −1)  and 
€ 
VA /VB = −1+ (0.5 ⋅ 2) , which
148
show that, after generalisation has been accounted for, 
€ 
VAB =1 and 
€ 
VA /VB = 0 ,
allowing the model to correctly anticipate responses.
Strictly elemental theories such as the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model
would not predict learning of a NPP since each element would be associated with
an outcome or no outcome equally frequently. Consequently elements would
acquire associative strengths of 0.5λ and compounds would have a weight of 1λ
by summation, whereas the problem requires that compounds reach an
associative weight of 0λ, and elements a value of 1λ. In essence the model is
incapable of discriminating between NPPs and PPPs.
Rescorla’s (1973) unique cue model could solve the problem A+, B+,
ABX- by assuming that the unique cue X would acquire an associative strength
of -2λ in order to counteract the associative strengths accrued by the elements A
and B of 1λ, although this would require the further assumption that unique cues
could acquire associative strengths greater than λ.
Pearce’s (1987, 1994) model makes the uncontroversial prediction that
the NPP would be learned if compound AB acquired an associative strength of
–2λ and the elements A and B values of 2λ since
€ 
VAB = −2 ⋅ ((0.5 ⋅ 2) + (0.5 ⋅ 2)) ,
€ 
VA /VB = 2 + (0.5 ⋅ −2)  and therefore, after
generalisation, 
€ 
VAB = 0  and 
€ 
VA /VB =1. Note that both the unique-cue and
Pearce’s model suggest that more learning is necessary to solve a NPP and
therefore predict that such problems should take longer to learn and engage more
processing resources, and therefore participants’ ability to learn NPPs should
show a greater age related decline than learning of PPPs.
Individual differences variables will also be entered into multiple
regression analyses using the enter method to see if Age, AH4 Total, Digit
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Cancellation (DC), MacQuarrie test of mechanical ability (McQ), Years of
Education (YE) and Mill Hill Vocabulary scale (MHV) measures are able to
predict learning accuracy. Since all these factors may, theoretically, mediate
learning no predictions are offered at this stage concerning the nature and extent
of their influence on learning and generalisation processes.
6.3.1: Participants
Older participants were 25 volunteers from the Wolverhampton Ageing
and Memory Project. Their ages ranged from 61 to 83 with a mean of 72.57
(S.D. = 6.14). The Young Old (YO) group consisted of thirteen participants with
a mean age of 67.76 (S.D. = 4.1), and the Old Old (OO) group had twelve
members with a mean age of 77.7 (S.D. = 2.67). Younger participants were 12
undergraduate volunteers, their ages ranged from 19 to 32 with a mean of 22.51
(S.D. = 4.73).
Table 6.1: Participant Summary Statistics
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean
Std
Deviation
Mean
Std
Deviation
Mean
Std
Deviation
Age 22.51 4.73 67.76 4.10 77.70 2.67
Years of Education 14.00 .00 11.38 2.06 11.67 2.77
AH4 Total 87.73 18.34 61.08 24.03 67.63 14.25
Digit Cancellation 24.36 5.14 15.62 2.60 15.00 4.41
Mill Hill Vocabulary
Scale
27.18 4.31 32.70 4.30 29.36 10.93
MacQuarrie Total . . 95.20 25.67 93.80 20.15
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Table 6.2: Experiment 1 Design and Stimuli
Abstract Form Foods Version 1 Foods Version 2 Outcome
A Cheese Fish Allergy 1
B Chocolate Banana Allergy 1
AB Cheese & Chocolate Fish & Banana No Allergy
C Milk Olive Oil Allergy 2
D Eggs Avocado Allergy 2
CD Milk & Eggs Olive Oil & Avocado No Allergy
E Fish Cheese No Allergy
F Banana Chocolate No Allergy
EF Fish & Banana Cheese & Chocolate Allergy 3
G Olive Oil Milk No Allergy
H Avocado Eggs No Allergy
GH Olive Oil & Avocado Milk & Eggs Allergy 4
 6.3.2: Design & Materials
There were two NPPs and two PPPs presented concurrently in the form
of a food allergy task, as detailed earlier. The experiment was a mixed design
with age group as the between subjects factor (old and young), and trials (1-10),
stimuli (elements and compounds), and problem (negative and positive
patterning problems) as within subjects factors. Table 6.2 shows the
experimental design. Foods A, B, C, D, and the compounds AB and CD
constituted the negative patterning problem whilst foods E, F, G, H, and the
compounds EF and GH comprised the positive patterning problems. There were
five possible outcomes: allergies 1-4 and No Allergy. Participants received ten
trials of each type randomised within blocks of twelve stimulus types, making
120 trials in total.
6.3.3: Procedure
The standardised procedures outlined above were adhered to in this
experiment, other than participants were informed that there were five possible
responses to each stimulus: No Allergy and Allergies 1-4.
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6.3.4: Results: Initial Analysis
The initial analysis was by a mixed 3 (Age) by 2 (NPP or PPP: Problem)
by 5 (Blocks of 2 trials) ANOVA. Data were initially entered as 1 for a correct
prediction and 0 for an incorrect prediction. These scores were then adjusted on
No Allergy trials by subtracting 1 from coded scores so that correct No Allergy
responses were worth 0 and Incorrect No Allergy responses 1. After that
discrimination scores were calculated for each stimulus and problem type over
five blocks of two trials, and raw scores used to calculate final trial and overall
accuracy.
There were no significant differences overall between age groups (F (2,34)
=1.48, p>0.05) in this experiment. There was a significant effect of Blocks (F
(4,136) =44.01, p<0.001), showing simply that participant responses changed as the
experiment progressed. Figure 6.1 and Table 6.3 suggests that this change
reflected increasing accuracy.
Figure 6.1: Age Group by Blocks
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Table 6.3: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.1
Young Young Old Old Old
 Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 -.53 .12 -.38 .21 -.29 .19
2 -.15 .16 -.10 .28 -.14 .28
3 .11 .28 -.04 .30 .03 .31
4 .34 .29 .06 .31 .03 .31
5 .47 .38 .20 .32 -.06 .35
The Age by Blocks interaction (see Figure 6.1) was also significant (F
(8,136) =5.9, p<0.001), showing that the Y group’s responses changed more and
became more accurate than the YO and OO groups’ as the experiment
progressed. This interaction was not significantly attenuated by AH4 Total scores
when these were entered as a covariate in an ANCOVA (F(8, 124) = 2.62, p<0.012)
This suggests that age itself may be a greater arbiter of speed of learning than
fluid intelligence in this experiment. There was also a significant interaction
between Problem and Blocks (F (4,136) =3.34, p<0.013; see Figure 6.2), reflecting
the overall superiority of participants at solving the PPP over the NPP. Although
this trend was more marked in the older age groups the Problem by Age by
Blocks interaction was non-significant, and the addition of AH4 as a covariate
rendered this interaction non significant (F (4,124) = 0.39, p>0.05), suggesting that
any differences in learning problems may originate in differences in fluid
intelligence regardless of age.
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Further analysis was conducted on participants’ responses on the final
trial to indicate how well they had learned the problems overall. Age differences
in overall accuracy on the final trial were tested by a one way ANOVA. This
showed that older people’s accuracy was significantly worse on the final trial (F
(2,34) =3.9, p<0.03). A Bonferroni post-hoc test showed that the difference was
confined to that between Y and OO groups (Mean Difference = 0.25, p<.03).
Interestingly, this age difference was attenuated by AH4 scores (F (2,31) = 0.243,
p>0.05) when this variable was entered as a covariate. For each age group t-tests
were then performed to compare their final trial outcome predictions on elements
and compounds on each problem. A significant difference shows participants
Table 6.4: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.2
PPP NPP
Block Mean
Std.
Deviation
Mean
Std.
Deviation
1 -.43 .26 -.38 .31
2 -.07 .26 -.19 .36
3 .09 .28 -.03 .46
4 .28 .33 .01 .51
5 .22 .38 .19 .54
Figure 6.2: Problem by Blocks
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were consistently discriminating between outcomes for elements and compounds
on the final trial and therefore whether they had ultimately learned the problems.
These revealed that the Y group had learned both the PPP (t=3.08, df= 11,
p<0.02) and the NPP (t=3.84, df = 11, p<0.004). The YO group learned the PPP
(t=2.35, df= 12, p<0.04), but not the NPP (t=0.501, df= 12, p>0.05), and the OO
group had learned neither problem (PPP: t=0.17, df= 11, p>0.05; NPP: t=0.11,
df= 11, p>0.05). One-Way ANOVAs were then performed separately for each
problem to see if final trial discriminations for NPPs and PPPs differed with age
(see Figure 6.3, overleaf). This revealed a difference between age groups for
NPPs (F (2,34) =3.75, p<0.035), but not PPPs (F (2,34) =2.31, p>0.05). Bonferroni
post-hoc tests showed that the Y group were significantly more accurate at
solving the NPP than the OO group (Mean Difference = 0.604, p<.05) and that
this difference was confined to these two groups. This demonstrates that older
participants ultimately learned the discriminations less well than younger
participants and that the linear insolubility of the NPP makes it practically, as
well as theoretically more difficult than the PPP for older people. Again, though,
Age differences here were attenuated by the introduction of AH4 as a covariate
(F (2,31) = 0.325, p>0.05), suggesting that a general fluid intelligence factor is
more important in predicting learning difficult problems than age as such.
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Table 6.6: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.4
Young Young Old Old Old
Stimulus
Type Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Compound .65 .25 .44 .25 .35 .25
Element .84 .24 .74 .26 .65 .27
A second analysis was conducted to test for differences in learning
contingencies involving elements and compounds. This was initially achieved
through an Age (3) by Blocks (5) by Stimulus (2: elements and compounds)
Table 6.5: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.3
Young Young Old Old Old
Problem Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
NPP .58 .53 .08 .55 -.02 .66
PPP .40 .45 .29 .44 .02 .43
Figure 6.4: Final Trial Accuracy by Stimulus
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Figure 6.3: Final Trial Discrimination by Problem
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mixed ANOVA. This revealed main effects of Stimulus (F (1,34) =44.02, p<0.001)
and Blocks (F (4, 136) =44.01, p<0.001), showing that participants’ discriminations
improved over the course of the experiment and that discriminations were
significantly more accurate for elements than for compounds. Furthermore the
Age by Blocks (F (8,136) =5.9, p<0.001) and Stimulus by Blocks (F (4,136) =2.84,
p<0.03) interactions were significant, suggesting that younger people learned the
problems more quickly and that all participants’ accuracy improved more
quickly for elemental stimuli than compound stimuli.
Beyond this age group comparisons were made with separate one way
ANOVAs for final trial accuracy on elements and compounds. They revealed a
significant effect of age on compound (F (2,34) =4.29, p<0.03) but not element
final trial accuracy (F (2,34) =1.79, p>0.05: see Figure 6.4). A Bonferroni post-hoc
test demonstrated that once more the age difference was solely between Y and
OO groups (Mean Difference = 0.292, p<.03). Again, entering AH4 as a
covariate eliminated the age differences in compound learning accuracy (F (2,31) =
0.65, p>0.05).
6.3.5: Results: Multiple Regression
To decide which of the variables decided on in Chapter 5 to enter into a
multiple regression analysis using the enter method an initial correlation was
performed between potential predictor variables (Age, Years of Education (YE),
Digit Cancellation (DC), MacQuarrie Total (McQ), MHV, and AH4 Total) and
dependent variables (overall (OA) and final trial (FTA) accuracy). This analysis
revealed significant associations between FTA and Age (r= -0.481, p<0.04), YE
(r = 0.573, p<0.001), DC (r = 0.355, p<0.05), and AH4 (r = 0.517, p<0.003).
Similarly OA was correlated with Age (r = -0.347, p<0.04), YE (r = 0.559, p<
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0.001), DC (r = 0.360, p<0.05), and AH4 (r = 0.386, p<0.03). Neither FTA nor
OA were associated with McQ or MHV scores and consequently these variables
were not entered as predictors of either OA or FTA in the subsequent multiple
regression analysis.
In terms of OA the multiple regression model using the enter method was
significant (F (4,27) = 3.25, p<0.03, Adjusted R
2 = 0.225), indicating that overall
the predictor variables accounted for a little under a quarter of the variability in
OA. The only significant predictor variable to emerge, however, was YE (Beta =
0.476, p<0.03), whereas all other predictor variables were non-significant.
The regression model was also a significant predictor of FTA (F (4,27) =
4.89, p<0.04, Adjusted R2 = 0.334). Although the overall model accounted for
more of the variance in FTA none of the individual predictor variables were
significant, although YE approached significance (Beta = 0.375, p=0.057).
Overall this seems to suggest that both OA and FTA could, to an extent,
be predicted by the selected predictor variables. The only significant overall
predictor of OA was YE, whereas FTA had no significant individual predictor
variables. This analysis obviously begs the question of why YE should predict
overall accuracy in a contingency learning problem.
6.3.6: Discussion
The lack of overall age differences in this experiment suggests floor
effects since the Young group’s final block discriminations were only 0.47,
implying that this group were correctly discriminating between stimuli less than
half the time during the final trial block. There were, however, some age
differences in terms of an Age by Blocks interaction, and an inspection of Figure
6.1 suggests that the Y and YO groups’ learning had not reached asymptote after
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ten trials and may have improved further, whereas the OO group’s learning
peaked in block 3 and became worse thereafter and, as a consequence, less likely
to improve. Taken together these observations imply that the problem may have
been too difficult for participants to learn and that this may have minimised any
overall age differences.
Having said that, it was clear that the OO group was especially
disadvantaged in that they really did not learn either NPPs or PPPs at all,
suggesting an overall decline in learning consistent with the notion that older
people’s learning was more ‘elemental’ than younger participants’ learning. This
could be explained in terms of an overgeneralisation between stimuli. Younger
people use configural strategies and can therefore learn both problems, whereas
older people may use a rule of summation that leads to overgeneralisation,
especially the Old-Old. Confirmation that the NPP was more difficult than the
PPP came in terms of a Problem by Blocks interaction and the observation that
the YO group’s discriminations between elements and compounds were
significantly different for the latter but not the former. This observation is also
consistent with the assumption that older people should process stimuli in an
elemental manner, since the OO group failed to learn either problem, as
predicted by Rescorla-Wagner (1972) and the YO group only learned the PPP,
elementally soluble if one adopts a threshold of activation rule, but not the NPP,
which remains insoluble to any elemental theory. This may illustrate the
relatively preserved capacity of the YO to use strategies that require more
processing resources. Figure 6.3 illustrated a contradictory observation though;
the Y group’s responses on the final trial were more accurate for the NPP than
the PPP. Perhaps this underlies the significant difference between YO and OO
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for the NPP and the lack of any differences for the PPP. One explanation could
be that greater exposure to the multiple allergy contingencies in the former
problem facilitated learning since there are twice as many element trials as
compound trials. It is possible that greater exposure to these contingencies
facilitated learning relative to the PPP, although it would be equally plausible to
assert that since there were more no allergy trials in the latter problem this should
have been easier too. The fact that multiple allergy outcomes existed seems to
have made the problems unduly difficult and rendered any meaningful
comparison between them difficult, and this will have to be addressed in
subsequent experiments by using only Allergy and No Allergy response types.
The relevance of the differences between compound and element learning
may not, however, have been obscured by this contamination since there were
equal numbers of element and compound trials with equal numbers of Allergy
and No Allergy responses. Here the OO group was significantly disadvantaged
relative to the Y group in terms of compound, but not element learning. There
are two possible interpretations of this observation. Firstly it seems reasonable to
suppose that learning both stimulus-stimulus as well as stimulus-response
associations makes compound learning especially difficult for the over 75s. This
is certainly consistent with the associative deficit hypothesis (Naveh-Benjamin,
2000; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2002; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003; Naveh-
Benjamin et al. 2004) and an underlying MTL dysfunction. On the other hand,
this could be the result of overgeneralisation between stimuli rather than an
inability to form compounds. Using an elemental strategy would also obviate the
need to learn about compounds since this strategy requires the assumption that
responses to compound stimuli are merely the product of the associative
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strengths of their constituent elements. More sophisticated elemental
explanations such as Rescorla’s (1973) unique-cue model presumably tap into
executive processing resources, which would be susceptible to age related
decline. Similarly configural generalisation processes may require more strategic
processing than simple elemental assumptions and be similarly subject to age
related decline. This could also be explicable in the context of the observation
that entering AH4 scores as a covariate attenuated age differences between
problem and stimulus type. It could be that engaging configural processing
resources may be more cognitively demanding than elemental strategies, and
consequently tap into general intellectual abilities that decline with age as
opposed to lower level learning abilities.
In terms of the multiple regression analysis it seems curious that YE
should predict overall accuracy in an associative learning experiment. One
interpretation could be that, as with Hebb’s (1949; see Chapter 2) rats, an
enriched intellectual environment led to greater complexity within the brain and
increased problem solving abilities. Even allowing for the ravages of age the
cognitive abilities of people with an enriched mental life through education and a
subsequent intellectually demanding career should still be well preserved relative
to others of their cohort. Whilst this is entirely plausible it is equally possible that
this merely reflects the fact that the Young group was composed entirely of first
year undergraduates who had a greater mean number of years of education and
were better than the older groups at solving the problem. Despite this Age
remained non-significant as an individual predictor of OA and FTA, which
militates against the latter interpretation, so it seems likely to reflect the
performance of both younger people and better-educated older participants.
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Furthermore, the inability of Age to predict learning may be due to floor effects.
Certainly, it suggests that this design was difficult for participants of all ages.
6.4: Experiment 2
To test this assumption that floor effects weakened age differences
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with the sole difference that
responses were confined to simply Allergy or No Allergy. This manipulation
should not only make the problems simpler to solve but also make comparisons
between problems easier since multiple responses rendered the reasons why one
problem should be easier than another equivocal. Theoretical predictions remain
the same, although age differences may be more marked since the decrease in
complexity should allow the Y group to learn the problem better. Participants
were also asked whether they had induced any rules to aid them in this
experiment, and it should be expected that older participants would be less likely
to induce a rule because of their slower learning and tendency to overgeneralise
between stimuli.
6.4.1: Participants
Participants were 30 undergraduates (Mean Age = 24.11, S.D. = 6.57), 19
Young-Old (Mean Age = 68.09, S.D. = 3.63), and 13 Old-Old (Mean Age =
77.88, S.D. = 3.14) people.
Table 6.7: Participant Summary Statistics
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Age 24.11 6.57 68.09 3.63 77.88 3.14
Years of Education 14.00 .00 11.84 2.54 12.46 2.63
AH4 Total 78.38 17.55 66.11 16.10 64.33 16.71
Digit Cancellation 24.27 5.77 15.89 2.88 14.25 4.97
MHV 26.54 3.82 33.50 4.03 34.45 6.23
MacQuarrie Total . . 100.21 28.17 98.36 20.62
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6.4.2: Design & Materials
The design of Experiment 2 was, as stated, only different to that of
Experiment 1 in that responses were solely Allergy or No Allergy.
6.4.3: Procedures
Procedures were as per the general procedures, outlined earlier in this
chapter. One addition to the general procedures was that participants were asked
if they had spotted a rule that had helped them to solve the problem and what, if
any, that rule was. This was in response to the observations of Shanks and Darby
(1998) that induction of a rule of conjunction for PPPs and NPPs was mediated
by associative learning accuracy.
6.4.4: Results: Initial Analysis
Table 6.8: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.5
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .06 .23 .13 .24 -.07 .26
2 .34 .24 .20 .36 .09 .38
3 .48 .23 .29 .33 .04 .31
4 .49 .30 .30 .38 .09 .29
5 .60 .35 .31 .46 .15 .35
Figure 6.5: Age by Blocks
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Again the initial analysis was by a mixed 3 (Age) by 2 (NPP or PPP:
Problem) by 5 (Blocks of 2 trials) ANOVA. Calculations of the discriminations
for analyses were as per the procedures described earlier in this chapter.
This analysis revealed an overall effect of Age (F (2,59) =7.97, p=0.001)
and a Bonferroni post-hoc demonstrated that this difference was confined to that
of the Y and OO groups (Mean Difference = 0.33, p=0.001). This age difference
also remained significant after AH4 scores were entered as covariates (F (2,56) =
6.21, p=0.005). There was also a main effect of Blocks (F (4,236) =19.899,
p<0.001), mundanely showing that participants’ responses had changed over the
course of the experiment, although there was no main effect of Problem,
suggesting no overall difficulties with NPPs relative to PPPs. A Blocks by Age
interaction (see Figure 6.5; F (8,236) =3.667, p=0.001) showed that Younger
participants had learned the problems more quickly than older groups, and this
remained significant after entering AH4 as a covariate (F (4,224) = 5.198, p<0.01).
Interestingly there was a three-way interaction between Age, Problem,
and Blocks (F (8,236) =2.1, p<0.04: see Figures 6.6.1 & 6.6.2). This interaction is
difficult to interpret but it seems that different age groups are responding in
different ways to the different problems. Here Young participants learned the
NPP better than the PPP again, although clearly one cannot attribute this to
multiple allergy outcomes. The YO learned the PPP better than the NPP whilst
the OO had learned the NPP slightly better by the end of the experiment after
they had been making more accurate responses to the PPP midway through the
experiment. The Young’s performance on the PPP was still, however, better than
the YO group’s despite the fact that the YO were better at this problem than the
NPP. This interaction was, however, attenuated by the entry of AH4 as a
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covariate (F (4,224) = 0.218, p>0.05). The lack of any significant Age by Problem
interaction reflects the lack of consistency around how different age groups
solved NPPs and PPPs.
Table 6.9: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.6.1 (NPP)
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .08 .31 .17 .34 -.14 .30
2 .44 .32 .08 .53 .07 .34
3 .52 .29 .24 .38 -.02 .29
4 .57 .37 .28 .47 .06 .31
5 .63 .44 .24 .47 .24 .36
Table 6.10: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.6.2 (PPP)
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .05 .37 .09 .32 .01 .37
2 .25 .35 .32 .42 .12 .50
3 .43 .38 .34 .49 .11 .43
4 .42 .38 .32 .55 .13 .40
5 .57 .35 .39 .58 .07 .50
To ascertain whether there were any differences between response
accuracies for elements and compounds a 3 (Age) by 5 (Blocks) by 2 (Stimulus)
ANOVA was performed. Unsurprisingly, and identically to the previous
analysis, there were main effects of Blocks (F (4,236) =19.899, p<0.001), Age (F
Figure 6.6.1: NPP by Blocks
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Figure 6.6.2: PPP by Blocks
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(2,59) =7.97, p<0.001), and Blocks and Age (F (8,236) =3.67, p<0.001). All other
effects were non-significant, implying that there were no real differences here in
the way participants learned compounds and elements.
As in Experiment 1 paired sample t-tests were performed to see whether
participants’ responses to trials resulting in allergy and no allergy were
consistently different in the final block of trials. Since there were no differences
between age groups in terms of stimuli or problem there were no separate
analyses in terms of these factors. Here the Young’s responses to trials resulting
in Allergy or No Allergy were significantly different (t =7.92, df=29, p<0.001),
as were the YO’s (t =3.22, df=18, p=0.005), although the Young’s mean
difference (6.125) was nearly twice that of the YO’s (3.55). Contrarily the OO’s
responses on the final trial did not differ between stimuli resulting in Allergy and
No Allergy (t =1.35, df=12, p>0.05), indicating that they were the only group
that did not learn the problems, although the means suggest that the Young
learned the problem better than the YO.
6.4.5: Rule Induction
Recall that participants had been asked whether they had induced any
rules to help them solve the problems. Here their responses were deemed correct
if they specified a general rule of conjunction: elements and their compounds had
opposite outcomes. Only six participants were correct and the remaining 56
specified either no rule or an incorrect one. All of the Rule Correct (RC) group
were in the Young age group (Mean Age = 21.64, SD = 1.6) whereas the Rule
Incorrect group (RI) were from all age groups (Mean Age = 51.78, SD = 24.5).
There were significant differences between RI and RC groups in AH4 Total (t =
3.21, df = 55, p<0.005), and Digit Cancellation (DC; t = 2.84, df = 55, p<0.007),
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suggesting that these variables may be important contributors to learning and rule
induction, as well as age. Although it is likely that these differences reflect the
fact that the RC group were all in the Young age group it is also possible that
rule learners represented the more able of their age cohort. There is partial
support for this notion in that when only the Young group were entered into a
comparison between RC and RI groups in terms of AH4 Total scores a
significant difference emerged (t = 2.32, df = 24, p<0.03) although this did not
extend to DC scores(t = 0.92, df = 24, p>0.05). This suggests that general
intelligence may be a bigger factor in rule induction than processing speed.
Table 6.11: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.7
Rule Incorrect Rule Correct
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .04 .24 .18 .26
2 .24 .33 .29 .22
3 .32 .33 .42 .24
4 .33 .36 .50 .33
5 .38 .42 .83 .24
Further analysis was by two ANOVAs; one was Rule (2: RC & RI) by
Problem by Blocks in terms of discrimination scores and the other Rule (2) by
Figure 6.7: Rule by Blocks
Blocks
54321
M
ea
n 
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
1.0
.8
.6
.4
.2
0.0
Rule Group
RI
RC
167
Stimulus (2) by Blocks (5) for accuracy scores. None of the interactions between
Stimulus or Problem were significant whereas both analyses revealed identical
main effects of Blocks (F (4,240) =17.28, p<0.001) and a Rule by Blocks
interaction (F (4,240) =3.27, p<0.015). Figure 6.7 shows that the learning of the RI
group proceeds in a classic negatively accelerated ‘learning curve’ and appears to
reach asymptote by Block 5 with a mean discrimination of 0.38 (SD = 0.42),
although clearly this group were not homogenous. The RC group, on the other
hand, showed a similar but more accurate pattern until Block 4, whereupon their
discrimination increases rapidly to reach 0.83 (SD =0.24) by Block 5. This
suggests that rule induction happened in Block 5 and the sharp increase in
discrimination accuracy reflects a ‘moment of revelation’ for RC participants.
There was also a clear difference between groups in terms of accuracy in the
final trial (t = 2.27, df = 60, p<0.02), whereas the comparison in terms of overall
accuracy only approached significance (t = 1.52, df = 60, p = 0.068). This again
suggests that participants in the RC group may have induced a rule relatively late
in the experiment.
6.4.6: Multiple Regression
Again an initial correlation was performed between potential predictor
variables (Age, Years of Education (YE), Digit Cancellation (DC), MacQuarrie
Total (McQ), MHV, and AH4 Total) and dependent variables (overall (OA) and
final trial (FTA) accuracy). There were significant correlations between OA and
Age (r = -0.426, p<0.001), and DC (r = 0.354, p<0.008), and between FTA and
Age (r = -0.442, p<0.001) and DC (r = 0.308, p<0.03). Age and DC were
therefore entered as predictor variables in a multiple regression analysis using the
enter method. The model proved significant for OA (F (2,54) =6.66, p<0.004,
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adjusted R2 = 0.168) with Age emerging as the only significant single predictor
of OA (beta = -0.381, p<0.04). The results for FTA were similar. The model
again proved significant (F (2,54) =5.85, p<0.006, adjusted R
2 = 0.148) with Age
again emerging as the only significant predictor of FTA (beta = -0.41, p<0.03).
6.4.7: Discussion
In this experiment differences between age groups were significant
overall, although mainly confined to differences between Y and OO groups. This
suggests that the use of simple Allergy versus No Allergy outcomes had
simplified the problem to the extent that younger participants could learn the
problems and that this could be viewed as decreasing the complexity and
demands of the problem. Furthermore, Age emerged as a strong predictor of both
final trial and overall accuracy, confirming the importance of Age as a predictor
over and above other individual differences factors. This suggests that
conditional learning may be dissociable from other cognitive abilities,
particularly general intelligence, sensori motor and perceptual speed, and this
interpretation is underlined by the observation that age differences remained
significant when AH4 scores were entered as a covariate. Unlike Experiment 1,
however, there were no differences in terms of Problem apart from a three way
interaction between Age, Problem and Blocks implying that there were few
differences in the way participants learned NPPs and PPPs although younger
participants learned the former more quickly. This ability to learn NPPs more
quickly may also implicate higher level processing abilities, since AH4 scores
rendered this interaction non-significant when entered as a covariate. This,
therefore, does not rule out the assumption that older people process stimuli in a
more elemental manner since there were overall age differences reflecting the
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relative difficulty of what are both non-linear problems. There were also no
differences between element and compound accuracy, which creates difficulties
for a MTL deficit interpretation of age related decline in associative learning.
The observations concerning rule induction seem to confirm Shanks and Darby’s
(1998) assertion that rules are only induced once sufficient learning has occurred
since there were highly significant differences between RC and RI groups not
only in learning accuracy but also in terms of AH4 and DC scores and Age.
Certainly, this experiment confirmed two things. Firstly that there are age related
declines in the ability to learn HCL problems and secondly that the food allergy
paradigm supports learning in a paper and pencil version. One major problem
with the current experiment was, however, that there were no older participants
in the RC group. This makes it difficult to say whether the observed individual
differences in AH4 and DC scores between RC and RI groups were the result of
ageing or whether they underlie rule induction. The next experiment should be
made simple enough to allow older people to induce rules, if they are able to at
all.
6.5: Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was a direct replication of Experiment 2, the only
differences being that participants learned only one negative and one positive
patterning problem concurrently and the number of trials was increased to 15.
This reduction in problem complexity should also reduce age differences in
overall performance and the ability of age to predict learning accuracy both
overall and on the final trial. It will also allow the older participants more of a
chance to induce rules since no participant in the YO or OO groups had done so
in the previous experiment.
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6.5.1: Participants
Participants in the older group were 25 volunteers, their ages ranged from
56 to 85 with a mean of 70.24 (S.D. 6.71). Young Old participants had a mean
age of 67.91 (n=18; SD=5.23) and Old Old participants had a mean age of 78.2
(n=8; SD=3.89) Younger participants were 20 undergraduates who volunteered
to participate in the study aged between 18 and 47 with a mean of 25.78
(SD=7.22).
Table 6.12: Participant Summary Statistics
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Age 25.78 7.22 67.91 5.23 78.20 3.89
Years of Education 14.00 .00 13.94 3.11 12.75 2.25
AH4 Total 86.41 17.50 82.31 17.29 65.43 20.49
Digit Cancellation 22.94 6.34 17.23 3.88 16.86 3.72
MHV 27.00 4.00 34.67 3.73 34.29 1.98
MacQuarrie Total . . 120.08 21.78 89.43 23.87
6.5.2: Design & Materials
Table 6.13: Experimental Design
Abstract Version 1 Version2 Allergy
A Soup Chicken No Allergy
B Lettuce Jam No Allergy
C Chicken Soup Allergy
D Jam Lettuce Allergy
AB
Soup
Lettuce
Chicken
Jam Allergy
CD
Chicken
Jam
Soup
Lettuce No Allergy
The experiment was a mixed design with age group as the between
subjects factor (old and young), and trial blocks (1-5), stimuli (elements and
compounds), and problem (negative and positive patterning problems) as within
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subjects factors. Table 6.13 shows the experimental design, which consists of
one negative and one positive patterning problems presented concurrently. Foods
A, B, and the compound AB constituted the positive patterning problem whilst
foods C, D, and the compound CD comprised the negative patterning problems.
There were two possible outcomes: Allergy and No Allergy. Participants
received fifteen blocks of 6 trials randomised within blocks, making 90 trials in
total. As can be seen in Table 6.5, foods were reassigned between versions.
6.5.3: Procedures
Procedures were as detailed in the general procedures, outlined earlier in
this chapter. As in Experiment 2 participants were asked if they had spotted a
rule that had helped them to solve the problem and what, if any, that rule was.
6.5.4: Results: Initial Analysis
Table 6.14: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.8
Young Young Old Old Old
Blocks Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .05 .24 .10 .29 .08 .15
2 .35 .34 .22 .27 .15 .31
3 .50 .35 .41 .33 .24 .27
4 .62 .40 .47 .42 .39 .33
5 .64 .44 .54 .37 .25 .39
Figure 6.8: Age Group by Blocks
Blocks
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Initial analysis was by an Age (3) by Problem (2) by Blocks (5) mixed
ANOVA with Age Group as the between subjects factor with discriminations
averaged over five three trial blocks as the dependent variable. This revealed no
significant effects of Age Group (F (2,43)=1.67, p>0.05). The only significant
main effects were, mundanely enough, that of Blocks (see Figure 6.8: F
(4,172)=23.14, p<0.001), and more interestingly of Problem (see Figure 6.9: F (1,172)
= 9.34, p<0.005). Even more intriguingly the Age by Problem interaction was
also significant (F (2,172) = 6.98, p<0.003), and remained so once the covariance
with AH4 had been accounted for (F (2,164) = 3.38, p<0.05). These results seem to
reflect an overall disadvantage at the NPP, with the OO group particularly poor
at this class of problem relative to PPP, which was solved reasonably well by all
groups. This implies that the oldest participants were particularly compromised
when solving the NPP.
Figure 6.9: Problem by Age Group Interaction
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As in the previous experiment an Age by Blocks by Stimulus analysis
was performed on response accuracies for elements and compounds over the
course of the experiment. There was, again and dully enough, an identical effect
of Blocks (F (4,172)=23.14, p<0.001) and a non-significant Age main effect.
Fascinatingly, though, in this experiment the main effect of stimulus was
significant (see Figure 6.10: F (1,43)=26.62, p<0.001) although there were no
interactions between Age and any other variables.
A series of t-tests conducted by comparing allergy predictions on the final
trial confirmed the observation that the oldest group were particularly
Table 6.15: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.9
Young Young Old Old Old
Problem Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
NPP .36 .34 .39 .26 .00 .43
PPP .50 .31 .31 .38 .45 .17
Table 6.16: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.10
Young Young Old Old Old
Stimulus Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Elements .76 .14 .73 .16 .71 .13
Compounds .68 .17 .61 .18 .51 .14
Figure 6.10: Accuracy by Age Group & Stimulus
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compromised in terms of the NPP. The Young group’s responses to compounds
were significantly different to responses to elements in both the PPP (t = 7.09,
df=19, p<0.001) and NPP (t = 2.87, df=19, p<0.02), as were the YO group’s
(PPP: t = 4.75, df=17, p<0.001; NPP: t = 4.75, df=17, p<0.001) whereas the OO
group’s responses in the PPP were significantly different (t =5.61, df = 7,
p<0.002), but not the NPP (t = 0, df=7, p>0.05). This again demonstrates that
Age decrements in the present experiment were confined to the OO group’s
responses to the NPP and that their predictions for this problem were no better
than chance.
6.5.5: Rule Induction
As in Experiment 2 data were also analysed in terms of whether
participants had correctly induced a rule of conjunction to help them solve the
problem. In terms of age those who induced the rule correctly (RC) were
younger (Mean Age 47.33, S.D. 20.96) than those who did not (RI: Mean Age
52.32, S.D. 24.34), but this difference was not statistically significant (t= .650, df
=44, p>0.05). The standard deviations also indicate that both groups’ ages were
far from homogenous. Frequency counts indicate that 6 of 12 participants in the
YO group and 1 of 8 in the OO group correctly induced the rule. For the younger
group 6 participants were correct, and 14 incorrect. This indicates that the extra
trials and design simplification helped older groups to give more accurate
responses and consequently to induce the rule of conjunction. In this experiment
the RC group scored significantly better on AH4 Total (t= 3.89, df =35, p<0.001)
and DC (t= 2.05, df =35, p<0.05). Here the differences between groups were
more significant for AH4 scores, suggesting that this factor was more important
in determining rule induction than processing speed.
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 Analysis was again by two ANOVAs; one was Rule (2: RC & RI) by
Problem (2) by Blocks (5) in terms of discrimination scores and the other Rule
(2) by Stimulus (2) by Blocks (5) for accuracy scores. Both analyses yielded a
significant effect of Rule (F (1,44)=15.45, p<0.001) and of Blocks (F (4,176)=41.32,
p<0.001) and a Blocks by Rule interaction (F (4,176)=5.82, p<0.001: see Figure
6.11). This demonstrates that the RI group learned the problems more quickly
and accurately despite the lack of consistent age differences.
Table 6.17: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.11
Rule Correct Rule Incorrect
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .14 .31 .05 .22
2 .39 .26 .21 .32
3 .67 .23 .32 .33
4 .85 .26 .39 .37
5 .89 .29 .39 .37
The Problem analysis demonstrated no significant effects or interactions
beyond those alluded to above. The Stimulus analysis, however, revealed a main
Figure 6.11: Rule by Blocks
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effect of Stimulus (F (1,44)=13.12, p<0.002), and interactions between Rule and
Stimulus (F (1,44)=4.46, p<0.05) and Stimulus and Blocks (F (4,176)=2.9, p<0.03:
see Figures 6.12.1 and 6.12.2, overleaf). This suggests that although overall
elements were learned better and quicker than compounds this difference was
bigger for the RI than the RC group.
Table 6.18: Summary Statistics for Figures 6.12.1 & 6.12.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Rule
Group Stimulus Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Elements .83 .05 .79 .17 .85 n = 1Rule
Correct Compounds .76 .11 .79 .13 .73 n = 1
Elements .72 .16 .71 .16 .69 .13Rule
Incorrect Compounds .64 .18 .52 .13 .48 .12
6.5.6: Multiple Regression
Once more an initial correlation was performed between potential
predictor variables (Age, Years of Education (YE), Digit Cancellation (DC),
MacQuarrie Total (McQ), MHV, and AH4 Total) and dependent variables
(overall (OA) and final trial (FTA) accuracy). DC (r=0.367, p<0.03) and AH4
Total (r=0.401, p<0.02) correlated significantly with FTA. In terms of OA there
Figure 6.12.1: Elements
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were significant correlations with Age (r=-0.332, p<0.03), DC (r=0.404, p<0.02),
McQ (r=0.484, p<0.02), and AH4 Total (r=0.496, p<0.003). As before only these
significant correlations will be entered into the multiple regression equations
using the enter method.
Consequently two predictor variables were entered as predictors of FTA:
DC and AH4 Total. The model proved a significant predictor of FTA (F (2,34)
=4.58, p<0.02, adjusted R2 = 0.166) although neither DC nor AH4 Total emerged
as a single significant predictor.
For OA Age, DC, McQ, and AH4 Total were entered as predictor
variables. Again the model proved significant (F (4,11) =4.49, p<0.025) and was
able to predict more variation in the dependent variable than the previous model
(adjusted R2 = 0.482). In this analysis Age emerged as the sole significant
predictor of OA (beta = -0.555, p<0.05). This implies a slower start for older
participants since Age did not even correlate with, let alone predict FTA.
6.5.7: Discussion
In this experiment, the overall age differences observed in Experiment 2
disappeared but the differences in participants’ responses to stimuli and problems
were significant as well as the interaction between Age and Problem. These
observations were similar to those seen in Experiment 1 in that the OO group had
difficulties in terms of learning a NPP relative to the other groups and
participants overall found elements easier to learn than compounds. Again, this
fits the idea that the oldest participants overgeneralise between stimuli and that
linear solubility is a factor in determining the ‘complexity’ of a problem and may
be consistent with FL decline. On the other hand the fact that compounds were
more poorly learned than elements suggests a potentially MTL mediated deficit.
178
AH4 scores did not render the Age by Problem interaction non-significant,
suggesting that NPPs’ relative difficulty in this experiment is more the result of
poorer basic learning processes than a failure to engage higher level configural
processes. Overall, relative to Experiments 1 and 2 the present experiment shows
that as problems become easier and less complex and participants are given more
time to learn them then any age related deficits become smaller and are confined
to the over seventy fives. The question that remains is; why should there be no
age interactions in Experiment 2 when there were in Experiments 1 and 3?
Perhaps this is a case of difficulty in that Experiment 1 was very difficult for all
participants and produced a range of age related interactions whereas the simpler
Experiment 2 just produced an overall age difference. It may be that the further
simplified Experiment 3 led to deficits only for the OO group in terms of the
NPP rather than the monotonic differences seen in Experiment 2, and that age
itself is a factor in this above and beyond the effects of fluid intelligence. Perhaps
the inability of AH4 scores to attenuate the Age by Problem interaction has more
to do with compromised basic learning ability in a relatively simple problem, and
this explains why Age emerged as the sole individually significant predictor of
accuracy over the experiment, suggesting that basic HCL ability may be
dissociable from more general abilities.
In terms of rule learning the present experiment showed that, given a
simple enough problem and more trials to learn it, older adults are capable of
inducing rules to help them solve HCL problems although the over seventy fives
were under represented in the RC group. In this instance, the group differences
between RC and RI groups in terms of AH4 Total and DC persisted, although
differences were more marked in AH4 Total scores. This suggests that general
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intelligence in particular, but also perceptual speed, may mediate rule induction
in all age groups. Again, the RC group learned the problem more quickly and
thoroughly than the RI group, supporting the contention that rule induction in
HCL problems is contingent on initial learning. The Rule by Stimulus interaction
further supports this suggestion, and demonstrates that only the RI group had
problems with compound learning relative to element learning. It may be that the
difference in generalisation processes implied by this observation underlies the
learning ability of the RC group and their capacity to induce rules successfully.
6.6: Experiments 4 and 5
Experiments 4 and 5 are both direct replications of Experiment 3 in that
they both feature two concurrent patterning problems with bivalent outcomes
(i.e. Allergy/No Allergy). The manipulation here is in the fact that Experiment 4
features two NPPs whereas Experiment 5 includes two PPPs. This is in order to
ascertain whether the presentation of two different problems concurrently
constitutes complexity in a HCL problem, to see whether learning of PPPs alone
is easier than NPPs alone, and to establish the extent of learning that one can
expect of older participants in order to design subsequent and more rigorous
multiple stage experiments (see Experiments 9 & 10). Only the two older age
groups participated in these experiments because younger participants will
inevitably learn them well, and the main aim here was to simply see if older
people could be expected to learn concurrent problems of a similar nature.
6.6.1: Participants
Participants in Experiment 4 were 10 YO volunteers with a mean age of
66.52 (SD=3.63) and 6 OO people with a mean age of 77.26 (SD=3.58). In
Experiment 5 the YO group consisted of 11 participants with a mean age of
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69.39 (SD=4.19) and the OO group were 7 volunteers with a mean age of 79.06
(SD=3.58).
Table 6.19: Participant Summary Statistics Experiment 4
Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Age 66.52 3.63 77.26 3.58
Years of Education 13.00 3.43 15.17 3.60
AH4 Total 72.44 20.29 83.83 22.30
Digit Cancellation 16.89 3.30 16.33 4.68
MHV 34.33 3.83 35.00 6.39
MacQuarrie Total 105.83 22.64 114.50 31.09
Table 6.20: Participant Summary Statistics Experiment 5
Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Age 69.39 4.19 79.06 3.58
Years of Education 12.91 2.55 14.14 2.41
AH4 Total 58.70 16.29 59.00 10.04
Digit Cancellation 16.50 6.08 17.00 4.47
MHV 33.38 2.83 36.00 4.83
MacQuarrie Total 99.13 26.69 88.00 22.35
6.6.2: Design & Materials
As stated the design of Experiment 4 featured two concurrent NPPs and
Experiment 5 two concurrent PPPs. The foods used are detailed in Table 6.21
and 6.22, below.
6.6.3: Procedures
Procedures for both Experiments 4 and 5 were as outlined for Experiment
3.
Table 6.21: Experiment 4 Design
Abstract Version 1 Version2 Outcome
A Aubergine Cheese Allergy
B Lettuce Salmon Allergy
C Chicken Apple Allergy
D Peaches Carrots Allergy
AB
Aubergine
Lettuce
Cheese
Salmon
No Allergy
CD
Chicken
Peaches
Apple
Carrots
No Allergy
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Table 6.22: Experiment 5 Design
Abstract Version 1 Version2 Outcome
A Aubergine Cheese No Allergy
B Lettuce Salmon No Allergy
C Chicken Apple No Allergy
D Peaches Carrots No Allergy
AB
Aubergine
Lettuce
Cheese
Salmon
Allergy
CD
Chicken
Peaches
Apple
Carrots
Allergy
6.6.4: Results: Experiment 4
Initial analysis for both experiments was by Age (2) by Stimulus (2) by
Blocks (5) ANOVA. In Experiment 4 there were no significant effects of Age or
Stimulus but an overall effect of Blocks was significant (F(4,56)=22.51, p<0.001).
There was also a significant Blocks by Stimulus interaction (F(4,56)=2.67,
p<0.05). Figures 6.13.1 and 6.13.2 suggest that this is the result of quicker initial
learning of elemental stimuli and a drop in compound accuracy toward the end.
Figure 6.13.1: Experiment 4 Elements
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Figure 6.13.2: Experiment 4 Compounds
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Table 6.23: Summary Statistics for Figures 6.13.1 & 6.13.2
Elements (Fig. 6.13.1) Compounds (Fig. 6.13.12)
Young Old Old Old Young Old Old Old
Block Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Mean
Std
Deviation
1 .65 .19 .52 .28 .64 .25 .72 .25
2 .79 .17 .65 .33 .81 .25 .89 .17
3 .87 .21 .82 .30 .94 .09 .83 .26
4 .92 .14 .80 .33 .89 .17 .81 .30
5 .92 .14 .83 .27 .78 .34 .94 .09
These data suggest that both age groups are capable of learning two
concurrent negative patterning problems. To test this assumption and as in
previous experiments t-tests were performed to find out if participants
consistently discriminated between elements and compounds on the final trial of
the experiment. The t-tests proved significant for both YO (t=12.33, df=9,
p<0.001) and OO (t=4.74, df=5, p<0.006) groups.
Table 6.24: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.15
Young Old Old Old
Block
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .26 .40 .18 .27
2 .36 .30 .29 .37
3 .57 .39 .52 .37
4 .64 .38 .76 .35
5 .87 .27 .74 .37
Figure 6.15: Age by Blocks
Blocks
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Figure 6.16: Experiment 5 Age by Stimulus
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Table 6.25: Summary Statistics for Figure 6.16
Young Old Old Old
Stimulus Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Elements .84 .12 .82 .13
Compounds .70 .18 .68 .18
6.6.7: Results: Experiment 5
Initial analysis was, once more by Age (2) by Stimulus (2) by Blocks (5)
ANOVA. There was the usual main effect of Blocks (F(4,64)=15.87, p<0.001: see
Figure 6.15) as well as a more interesting main effect of stimulus (F(1,16)=13.48,
p<0.003: see Figure 6.16) but no main effect of Age or any further interactions.
These results clearly show that learning two concurrent PPPs was
relatively straightforward even for the over seventy fives. Since there were
obviously no consistent Age effects a single t-test established that participants
gave significantly different responses to elements and compounds on the final
trial (t=8.04, df=17, p<0.001), indicating that the problems were well learned.
6.6.8: Discussion of Experiments 4 and 5
These experiments confirm that older participants are capable of learning
a negative or positive patterning problem, providing only one problem type is
presented at a time. This, in turn, means that presenting different problems
concurrently constitutes complexity in HCL and presumably takes up more
processing resources than presenting the same problem types concurrently. This
suggests that configural generalisation processes take up limited resources that
may be replaced by less resource intensive elemental processes as task
complexity increases. There is also further support for the notion that elements
are easier to learn than compounds in both Experiment 4 and 5, indicating that
age related mnemonic decline might play a part. The absence of age effects in
either experiment, however, indicates that age had little impact in learning
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similar concurrent HCL problems, even NPPs. As a consequence one can assume
that it is not unreasonable to expect that older participants can learn two
concurrent NPPs and PPPs, provided that problem types are similar.
6.8: Discussion of Positive and Negative Patterning Experiments
Overall, the results of Experiments 1 to 5 have largely been as expected.
Firstly, and probably most importantly in the context of the present research,
they have confirmed that a paper and pencil version of the food allergy task
supports learning, and that older participants are capable of learning simple
problems. Beyond this they have confirmed that in two of three experiments
NPPs have been more difficult to learn than PPPs when presented concurrently,
especially for older age groups. The NPP is elementally insoluble whereas the
PPP may be soluble by adopting a threshold of activation rule, so this
observation makes sense in terms of the notion that older people may
overgeneralise between stimuli, although it is not clear exactly why they
overgeneralise. Either overgeneralisation may occur in the Pavlovian (1927) or
Hebbian (1949) sense because participants know the correct response but
become confused between stimuli, or in the sense articulated by Lashley and
Wade (1946) in that they can encode stimuli but become confused over the
appropriate response. The MTL probably mediates the former, and MTL decline
was suggested as a major reason for age related memory decline by Naveh-
Benjamin (2000; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2002; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003,
Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2004). There is evidence from the present experiments
that learning compound stimuli was more difficult for participants, especially
older ones, which is consistent with this view, although not unequivocally since
learning compounds may simply require more processing resources than learning
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elements, and this interpretation is reinforced by the observation that AH4 scores
rendered differences between stimulus types non-significant when entered as a
covariate. In addition there was a more general age related decline in learning
ability, consistent with the latter conception of overgeneralisation mediated by
the use of either elemental or configural strategies. Furthermore, there was
evidence to suggest that greater ‘complexity’ in terms of number of outcomes
and problems led to greater age-related deficits in learning. Moreover, when
processing demands were further reduced by presenting concurrent similar
problems (Experiments 4 and 5) age differences were heavily diminished relative
to the learning of two similarly concurrent but different problems (Experiment
3). Since the memory demands of Experiments 3, 4, and 5 were identical one
would not expect greater overgeneralisation in Experiment 3 as a result of MTL
declines. Rather, they may be seen as indicative of age related declines in
strategic, effortful, executive processing.
The multiple regression analyses were inconclusive but Age itself
emerged as the most consistent predictor of accuracy in Experiments 2 and 3.
Other than this, YE predicted accuracy for OA in Experiment 1. This may
suggest that associative learning may be dissociable from other age related
cognitive abilities, although DC consistently appeared in the significant models’
predictive accuracy in Experiments 1 to 3, although not as individually
significant factors. This may lend limited support for Salthouse’s (1996)
processing speed theory. There is also the observation that AH4 scores failed to
attenuate age differences in learning completely when entered as a covariate,
suggesting that very basic learning processes may be independent of higher order
cognitive abilities. Beyond this there is little to tell concerning associative
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learning and ageing since the intention of these experiments was to confirm the
suitability of the paradigm and describe any age related deficits in learning NPPs
and PPPs, which they have achieved.
In terms of rule induction, these experiments have done nothing to
disconfirm Shanks and Darby’s (1998) suspicion that thorough learning of
contingencies underlies rule learning. Age differences were observed between
RC and RI groups in Experiment 2, where there were overall age related deficits
in learning, but not in the simpler Experiment 3, where age related deficits were
more specific to stimulus or problem type. Those in the RC groups learned the
problems more quickly and thoroughly than RI groups in all experiments.
Individual differences were also evident in terms of especially AH4 Total but
also DC between RC and RI groups in Experiments 2 and 3. This suggests that
rule induction may be mediated by more general, fluid abilities, and gives some
support to theories suggesting that cognitive abilities are subsumed by factors
that are more general. For Experiments 2 and 3 the full rule of conjunction
stating that elements and compounds were always associated with opposing
outcomes was necessary to be correct. This is clearly a demanding task that
could tap into effortful processing, and rule learners’ higher AH4 scores may
reflect greater ‘executive’, frontally mediated abilities within this group. As a
further observation, it may be that the relative ease with which participants
learned the concurrent NPPs and PPPs in Experiments 4 and 5 may be due to the
induction of a very simple rule that allowed participants to learn that all elements
made the same predictions, and that all compound predictions should oppose
them.
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The experiments in this chapter have described age related differences in
learning two particular types of non-linear problem. The next chapter extends the
description of age related changes in associative learning to biconditional and
conditional problems in order more fully to compare problems that have
elemental solutions with those that do not.
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Chapter 7: Formative Experiments II: Conditional and
Biconditional Problems
7.1: Introduction
So far age related decline has been investigated only in terms of negative
and positive patterning problems. While this has been a useful exercise there are
some drawbacks to only using these problems. Firstly all problems contain twice
as many elements as compounds, making meaningful comparisons between
stimulus types difficult. It is certainly possible that the stimulus effects observed
in experiments one to five were due to the high frequency of element trials rather
than any particular difficulties with learning compound stimuli, although note
that there were no more trials of any particular stimulus type than another so to
benefit from this advantage participants would have had to establish stimulus-
stimulus associations in order to generalise from one element to another. Another
contamination involves the possibility of rule induction. Whilst this is an
interesting phenomenon in its own right it could be considered a confounding
variable when one is considering purely associative learning. The next three
experiments are formative studies involving biconditional and conditional
problems. Recall that a biconditional problem (e.g. AB+, CD+, AD-, BC-) is
composed entirely of compounds consisting of two elements and that each
element is associated both with an outcome and no outcome. The problem is
therefore doubly difficult in that it only involves compound learning and is
entirely non-linear. Furthermore there are no short cuts, heuristics or rules to help
one master biconditional discriminations. Conversely a conditional problem (e.g.
AC+, AD+, BC-, BD-), though also involving only compounds, is elementally
soluble since only one element in each compound consistently predicts a
response. This problem is, therefore, linearly soluble and should present far
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fewer problems for participants. Indeed this prediction has been confirmed in
both animals (e.g. Saavedra, 1975) and humans (e.g. Shanks, Charles, Darby, and
Azmi, 1998). This raises the question of whether older participants will be
particularly disadvantaged when given a biconditional problem relative to a
conditional problem.
7.2: Experiment 6
Experiment 6 featured a biconditional and a conditional problem
presented concurrently. A conditional problem of the form AC+, AD+, BC-, BD-
would be elementally soluble since elements A and B are consistent predictors of
the outcome and would consequently acquire associative strengths of 1λ and 0λ,
respectively.
Similarly a unique cue model would easily solve the problem by
conceiving of it as an ACW+, ADX+, BCY-, BDZ- problem and allowing the
unique cues W, X, Y, and Z to acquire associative strength. Note, however, that
this is not necessary and the model can seem unparsimonious and inelegant
under such conditions, since the problem is elementally soluble anyway and the
decision of whether a unique cue is formed or not is arbitrary.
Pearce’s model, however, makes the unequivocal prediction that the
problem should be learned. In this instance compounds AC and AD would, since
they generalise associative strength from each other, only need to reach 0.75λ
and compounds BC and BD would reach asymptote at  -0.25λ. This can be
demonstrated by the calculations 
€ 
VAC /VAD = 0.75 + (0.5 ⋅ 0.75) + (0.5 ⋅ −0.25)  and
€ 
VBC /VBD = −0.25 + (0.5 ⋅ −0.25) + (0.5 ⋅ 0.75), which ensure that with appropriate
generalisation AC and AD would have net associative values of 1λ and BC and
BC net associative strengths of 0λ. Note that relatively little learning needs to
190
occur for the problem to be learned, and as a consequence the Pearce (1987,
1994) model suggests that this problem would be solved quickly and easily.
The biconditional problem is another matter.  A basic elemental model
such as Rescorla-Wagner would simply predict that all elements would acquire
an associative strength of 0.5λ since they predict an outcome or no outcome
equally frequently, and therefore no discrimination between compound stimuli
would occur.
A unique-cue approach would, on the other hand, allow a solution by
assuming that the problem is represented as ABW+, CDX+, ACY-, and BDZ-.
Here the unique cues W and X would acquire an associative strength of 1λ as the
only consistent predictors of an outcome, and all other elements values of 0λ and
the model would therefore successfully predict the correct outcomes for each
compound stimulus. Note that within the unique cue framework the biconditional
problem should be no more difficult to learn than a conditional problem.
Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002) theory, on the face of it, would have great
difficulty solving a biconditional problem. Each compound would generalise no
associative strength from the other compound leading to a similar outcome but
half of the associative strength of each of the compounds leading to an opposing
outcome. If, for instance, one assumed that AB+ and CD+ had acquired
associative strengths of 1λ then stimuli AC- and BD- would have to acquire
associative values of -1λ in order to predict 0λ. This would mean that AB+ and
CD+ would then have to acquire an associative strength of 2λ to counteract the
generalisation from AC- and BD-, and so on, ad nauseam. As it stands, the model
assumes judgements about similarity are based purely and simply on perceptual
similarity, or the extents to which stimuli share superficial features. Given the
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well established empirical demonstrations regarding the influence of
generalisation through perceptual similarity on discrimination learning (e.g.
Guttman & Kalish, 1956; Hanson, 1959; Spence, 1937) this is not an
unreasonable assumption, but there has to be more to generalisation than just
perceptual similarity otherwise animals and humans would not be able to learn
biconditional problems at all. Given the empirical demonstrations of animals’
(e.g. Saavedra, 1975) and humans’ (e.g. Shanks, Charles, Darby, & Azmi, 1998)
ability to learn biconditional discriminations there is a clear need for
modification of Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002) theory, and a solution is possible by
making one minor assumption about the nature of similarity.
When a problem is intractable because of perceptual overgeneralisation it
is not unreasonable to suggest that solution may entail the engagement of higher
cognitive processes in the form of inhibition of generalisation processes based on
perceptual similarity. If, under these circumstances or if generalisation processes
led to a stimulus losing all of its associative strength, one assumed that
generalisation of associative strength through perceptual similarity was halved
the biconditional problem becomes tractable. Here, the model would predict that
compounds AB and CD would reach an associative strength of 1.33λ and
compounds AC and BD –0.66λ since
€ 
VAB /VCD =1.33+ (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅ −0.66)) + (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅ −0.66)), and
€ 
VAC /VBD = −0.66 + (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅1.33))+ (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅1.33)) . Whilst this modification
may seem a weakness of Pearce’s model, it is still more elegant than the
relatively unwieldy and unrealistically slow Gluck et al. (1993) model.
Moreover, the assumption that fallacious judgements based on perceptual
similarity can be attenuated by inhibition of generalisation is theoretically
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plausible and less arbitrary than the threshold assumptions that allow elemental
solution of positive patterning problems, or the assumption that ‘unique cues’
attach themselves to compounds, thereby suspending all generalisation between
perceptually similar stimuli. Furthermore, the assumption that learning a
biconditional problem engages effortful inhibitory processing resources leads,
quite naturally, to the prediction that older participants should find this problem
particularly difficult relative to the conditional problem. Although this does not
distinguish between elemental and configural models broadly, it is possible to
discount unique cue solutions if, as predicted by the Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce
theories, the conditional problem proves to be easier to learn than the
biconditional problem.
It is anticipated, therefore, that young participants should easily learn the
conditional problem and that the biconditional problem requires the engagement
of inhibitory processes to prevent overgeneralisation between stimuli and should,
as a consequence, be tractable but more slowly learned. For older participants the
conditional problem should be soluble since it merely requires elemental
strategies for solution. On the other hand the biconditional problem should be
more challenging for these groups since they require engagement of executive
processing resources or, possibly, the creation of unique cues for solution to be
possible. Note that both problems make the same demands in terms of basic
memory processes since they have the same number of compounds and outcomes
to learn.
7.2.1: Participants
Participants were 30 undergraduates (‘young’ group) who completed the
experiment as part of a course requirement. Their mean age was 23.03 (S.D. =
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7.22) and ranged from 18.69 to 46.68 years. Older participants were 35
volunteers who were subdivided into a ‘young old’ (YO) group with a mean age
of 68.19 (n = 25, S.D. = 4.36; range = 57-74.49) and an ‘old old’ group (OO)
with a mean age of 77.81 (n=10, S.D. = 2.76, range = 75.04-83).
Table 7.1: Participant Summary Statistics
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Age 23.03 7.22 68.19 4.36 77.81 2.76
Years Education 14.00 .00 10.64 1.63 12.60 3.03
AH4 Total 88.10 14.64 61.75 16.46 77.25 12.58
Digit Cancellation 21.93 4.33 14.88 3.44 14.50 4.12
MHV 27.03 3.59 30.52 3.78 34.30 3.43
MacQuarrie Total . . 98.00 30.18 96.40 26.26
7.2.2: Design & Materials
Table 7.2 shows the basic experimental design, which consisted of
concurrent conditional and biconditional problems. Participants received fifteen
blocks of 8 trials randomised within blocks, making 120 trials in total.
Table 7.2: Experimental Design
Biconditional Conditional
Abstract Version 1 Version2 Outcome Abstract Version 1 Version2 Outcome
AB+ Milk
Eggs
Fish
Banana
Allergy EF+
Fish
Banana
Cheese
Milk
Allergy
CD+
Chocolate
Cheese
Avocado
Olive Oil
Allergy EG+
Fish
Olive Oil
Cheese
Chocolate
Allergy
AC-
Milk
Chocolate
Fish
Avocado
No
Allergy HF-
Avocado
Banana
Eggs
Milk
No
Allergy
BD-
Eggs
Cheese
Banana
Olive Oil
No
Allergy HG-
Avocado
Olive Oil
Eggs
Chocolate
No
Allergy
7.2.3: Procedures
Procedures were as described in the general procedure section of Chapter
6.
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7.2.4: Results: Initial Analysis
Data were first analysed with an Age (3) by Problem (2) by Blocks (5)
mixed ANOVA. This analysis showed no significant effects of Age or Problem
but yet another main effect of Blocks (F(4,248)=10.35, p<0.001: see Figure 7.1)
was apparent, merely showing that participants’ responses changed over the
experiment.
Table 7.3: Summary Statistics for Figure 7.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .10 .24 .23 .27 .17 .29
2 .23 .31 .30 .28 .12 .21
3 .36 .33 .33 .31 .25 .29
4 .52 .27 .30 .36 .11 .31
5 .58 .34 .37 .31 .18 .35
Table 7.4: Summary Statistics for Figure 7.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Problem Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Biconditional .33 .24 .25 .31 .17 .24
Conditional .39 .36 .37 .31 .16 .26
There were, more interestingly, significant interactions between Age and
Blocks (F(8,248)=7.4, p<0.001) and between Problem and Blocks (F(4,248)=6.74,
Figure 7.1: Blocks by Age
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Figure 7.2: Problem by Blocks
Blocks
54321
M
ea
n 
D
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
0.0
Problem
Biconditional
Conditional
195
p<0.001) but other interactions proved non significant. The former results shows
that older participants’ responses changed less as the experiment progressed,
Figure 7.1 confirms this interpretation, and this interaction remained significant
once AH4 had been entered as a covariate (F(8,220) = 3.03, p<0.0035). As for the
latter interaction interpretation is more complex. As Figure 7.2 shows,
discriminations for the conditional problem rose fairly systematically, whereas
accuracy for the biconditional problem seemed more variable. This suggests that,
on average, participants may have found the latter problem more confusing than
the former, and a t-test showed that conditional discriminations were
significantly greater than biconditional discriminations on the final trial (t = 1.95,
df=64, p<0.03), although there had been no overall differences between the
problems.
After this final trial responses were analysed with t-tests to see whether
participants in each age group had significantly discriminated between stimuli
associated with an outcome and those associated with no outcome (see Figure
7.3). This analysis showed that the Young group successfully learned both
conditional (t=7.21, df=29, p<0.001) and biconditional (t=6.16, df=29, p<0.001)
problems. The YO group learned the conditional (t=5.48, df=24, p<0.001), but
not the biconditional problem (t=1.25, df=24, p>0.05). The OO group, on the
other hand, learned neither the biconditional (t=1.86, df=9, p>0.05) nor the
conditional problem (t=0.67, df=9, p>0.05).
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Table 7.5: Summary Statistics for Figure 7.3
Young Young Old Old Old
Problem Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Biconditional .57 .50 .16 .64 .25 .42
Conditional .65 .49 .50 .46 .10 .46
These data suggest that older participants may be slower to learn the
problems than younger people and that ultimately the biconditional problem was
less well learned than the conditional problem. The differences between the
problems seems to have become more pronounced as the experiment progressed,
implying that initial learning may have been difficult but that accuracy for the
easier conditional problem improved progressively but the biconditional problem
seems to have been confusing. This may have been due to attempts to learn both
problems elementally.
7.2.5: Multiple Regression
In experiment 6 only Age (r = -0.38, p<0.03) and Years of Education
(YE; r = 0.27, p<0.03) correlated significantly with FTA whereas none of the
potential predictor variables were associated with OA. A single multiple
Figure 7.3: Final Trial Discriminations
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regression analysis was performed using the enter method, therefore, on FTA
with Age and YE entered as predictor variables. This model proved statistically
significant overall (F(2,62)=5.24, p<0.009; R
2 = 0.15), and Age emerged as the
sole significant predictor of FTA (Beta = -0.34, p<0.03).
7.2.6: Discussion
The results of this experiment are largely as expected. Older participants
learned more slowly and the biconditional problem was less well learned by all
participants than the conditional problem. Although there were no Age by
Problem interactions, by the final trial the YO group only discriminated
successfully in the conditional problem, again suggesting that overgeneralisation
between similar stimuli and tendency to use elemental assumptions may underlie
their inability to learn the biconditional problem. The OO group, on the other
hand, did not significantly discriminate between stimuli associated with an
outcome and stimuli associated with no outcome in either problem, suggesting
that this group’s processing resources may have been overwhelmed by the
concurrent problems leaving them unable to discriminate at all. The
interpretation of a steady, monotonic age related decline in learning ability in the
current experiment was supported by the finding that Age emerged as the only
significant predictor of FTA, although no individual difference variables even
correlated with OA. Taken together the results of the multiple regression
analyses again suggest that age related decline in associative learning ability
might be dissociable from other factors rather than subsumed by them. It is likely
that the younger participants’ ability to use a modified configural strategy
involving partial inhibition of generalisation based on perceptual similarity
underlies their superiority here. Although it is equally true that unique cue
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assumptions make solution of a biconditional problem possible in the current
experiment this leads to the assumption that there should be no difference in
terms of difficulty between biconditional and conditional problems. Given the
Problem by Blocks interaction, therefore, it is unlikely that younger participants
are pursuing any kind of elemental strategy, whereas the YO seem to be
employing elemental strategies since they learned the configural but not
biconditional problems, and the demands of learning both problems concurrently
seemed to overwhelm the processing resources of the OO group since they failed
to learn either problem. The observation that AH4 scores failed to attenuate the
Age by Blocks interaction is problematic, but may reflect a slower basic learning
rather than any decrement in higher order processing.
7.3: Experiments 7 & 8
One question Experiment 6 raises is whether older participants are
capable of learning conditional and biconditional problems alone. This is
important for the critical experiments of the next chapter since it gives an idea of
what older participants can reasonably be expected to learn, and can guide design
of multiple stage experiments that will be able to discriminate more clearly
between the predictions of elemental and configural theories. Experiments 7 and
8, therefore, present YO and OO groups with single conditional and
biconditional problems. As with Experiments 4 and 5 the methods and
procedures for these experiments will be presented jointly, followed by separate
analyses and discussions. Since the aims of these experiments are limited no
multiple regression analyses will be performed.
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7.3.1: Participants
Experiment 7 (biconditional problem) enlisted the help of 18 YO
participants (Mean Age = 67.18, SD = 4.3) and 7 OO volunteers (Mean Age =
77.09, SD = 3.38). Participants in Experiment 8 (conditional problem) were 11
YO (Mean Age = 68.59, SD = 3.23) and 6 YO (Mean Age = 77.14, SD = 2.57)
volunteers.
Table 7.6: Participant Summary Statistics Experiment 7
Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Age 67.18 4.30 77.09 3.38
Years Education 12.47 2.81 13.00 3.87
AH4 Total 71.21 20.02 74.83 11.37
Digit Cancellation 16.93 3.99 15.83 4.54
MHV 32.89 4.43 34.00 5.97
MacQuarrie Total 105.39 22.97 101.86 38.38
Table 7.7: Participant Summary Statistics Experiment 8
Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Age 68.59 3.23 77.14 2.57
Years of Education 12.60 2.32 13.83 4.12
AH4 Total 79.25 22.85 69.33 17.88
Digit Cancellation 16.13 3.31 16.67 4.32
MHV 32.27 5.53 34.17 2.48
MacQuarrie Total 117.36 30.61 97.00 28.93
7.3.2: Design
Experimental designs are shown in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 below. Note that
different stimuli and responses have been used in these experiments but that the
paradigm remains the same. In these experiments stimulus words were the signs
of the zodiac.
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Table 7.8: Experiment 7 Design
Abstract Version 1 Version2 Outcome
AB + Capricorn
Aries
Scorpio
Libra
Open
BC - Aries
Leo
Libra
Taurus
Closed
CD + Leo
Pisces
Taurus
Aquarius
Open
AD - Capricorn
Pisces
Scorpio
Aquarius
Closed
Table 7.9: Experiment 8 Design
Abstract Version 1 Version2 Outcome
AB + Capricorn
Aries
Scorpio
Libra
Open
AC + Capricorn
Leo
Scorpio
Taurus
Open
DB- Pisces
Aries
Aquarius
Libra
Closed
DC - Pisces
Leo
Aquarius
Taurus
Closed
7.3.3: Procedures
Participants were told that there were ‘magic words’ that either opened a
door or left it closed via the following printed instructions that were verbally
reinforced by the experimenter. Other than this all procedures were identical to
those used in previous experiments: stimulus words were presented and read out,
participants made their responses and then corrective feedback was given.
The learning task requires you to make a prediction about which magic
words open a door, and which do not. You will be guessing at first but will
become more accurate as the task progresses.
This is a hypothetical, artificial categorisation task. Simply tick the box
underneath the prediction (i.e. OPEN or CLOSED) you make for the magic
words as they are presented on the screen. Each trial is numbered and you
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should match the numbers on your answer sheets with the numbers on the
screen.
When you have recorded each prediction look up so I know you have
finished, otherwise the whole process will take much longer than necessary.
Please don’t make notes or crib sheets, the task is designed to be completed
unaided and to do otherwise would invalidate the results.
7.3.4: Experiment 7 Results
Table 7.10: Summary Statistics for Figure 7.4
Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .21 .54 -.05 .27
2 .21 .32 .12 .27
3 .32 .37 .17 .33
4 .31 .48 .21 .27
5 .44 .40 .21 .30
Table 7.11: Summary Statistics for Figure 7.5
Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
.58 .46 .21 .27
Figure 7.4: Age by Blocks
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Figure 7.5: Final Trial Discriminations
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Initial analysis was by an Age (2) by Blocks (5) ANOVA. This revealed
only a significant main effect of blocks (F(4,92)=3.12, p<0.02), indicating merely
that participants’ responses had changed as the experiment progressed. Figure
7.4 shows that this was due to an increase in accuracy, and suggests some age
differences, although these were not significant.
As previously t-tests were then performed to see if participants in either
age group had predicted significantly different outcomes for trials associated
with outcomes and no outcomes. This showed that the YO had successfully
discriminated between trial types on the final presentation (t = 5.36, df = 17,
p<0.001), whereas the OO did not (t = 2.12, df = 6, p>0.05). This shows that
although there were no significant age differences overall, by the final trial the
YO group had learned the biconditional problem better than the OO group.
7.3.5: Experiment 8 Results
As in the previous experiment the conditional problem was first analysed
using an Age (2) by Blocks (5) ANOVA. This yielded another significant effect
of Blocks (F(4,60)=3.12, p<0.02), although no other main effects or interactions
were significant (see Figure 7.6).
Figure 7.6: Age by Blocks
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Table 7.12: Summary Statistics for Figure 7.6
Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .03 .36 .19 .43
2 .26 .51 .42 .48
3 .29 .55 .53 .45
4 .52 .42 .50 .52
5 .53 .49 .53 .45
Another set of t-tests were performed separately for each age group to
determine whether they had learned the conditional problem by the final trial. In
this instance both YO (t = 4.18, df = 10, p<0.003) and OO (t = 3.796, df = 5,
p<0.015) groups consistently discriminated between trials associated with
outcomes and those associated with no outcome.
7.3.6: Experiment 7 & 8 Discussion
Overall these experiments have demonstrated that older participants are
able to learn a single conditional problem when presented alone. On the other
hand the oldest participants still had difficulty learning the biconditional
problem. This reinforces the observations concerning age related deficits being
particularly pronounced in non-linear problems and the relative difficulty of the
biconditional problem. It also gives more credence to the notion that older
people’s associative learning deficits become more marked over the age of
seventy-five, and may be due to overgeneralisation between stimuli and the
inability to apply configural strategies. More importantly, these experiments
show that one shouldn’t assume that older participants are able to learn a
biconditional problem. This will inform the design of Experiment 11 in the next
chapter.
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7.4: Discussion of Biconditional and Conditional Problems
One can assume that these experiments reflect participants’ associative
learning ability for linear and non-linear problems because of the lack of rules
that could potentially be induced to aid learning. Experiment 6 showed that older
participants could not learn a biconditional problem when presented concurrently
with a conditional problem and Experiment 7 showed that even when a
biconditional problem was presented alone the over seventy fives could not learn
it after fifteen trials. This underlines the difficulty of the problem and provides
further evidence that the ageing process results in participants overgeneralising
between stimuli and attempting to use elemental strategies even when
inappropriate. Younger participants are unlikely to have been using any kind of
elemental strategies since they learned the biconditional problem, but more
poorly than the conditional problem. This is in accord with configural rather than
unique cue theories. Age predicted FTA in Experiment 6. This might be similar
to the observations made in the previous chapter in that accuracy in the more
difficult experiments tended to be predicted by age, and concurrent conditional
and biconditional problems can be regarded, both theoretically and empirically,
as difficult. Certainly it suggests, again, that associative learning accuracy may
be dissociable from other cognitive abilities, particularly since AH4 scores failed
to negate the Age by Blocks interaction in Experiment 6 when entered as a
covariate, or that the background test batteries do not reflect the vital predictive
factor.
The last two chapters have been largely descriptive. This has been a
necessary step because of the lack of extant data relating to ageing and HCL
tasks. The next chapter describes three critical experiments which look in more
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detail at the way ageing affects the learning process: whether ageing leads to
greater overgeneralisation and the use of elemental strategies, if stimulus-
stimulus learning is affected, and how rule induction shapes people’s responses.
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Chapter 8: Critical Experiments
The previous two chapters have dealt with an examination of what one
can reasonably expect older adults to learn in an experimental situation using a
human conditional learning task, and have made some contribution in terms of
understanding the nature of any decline in generalisation processes with age. The
following three experiments look at age differences in vulnerability to proactive
and retroactive interference in learning using positive and negative patterning,
and conditional and biconditional problems. In this sense elemental and
configural associative learning theories make different predictions concerning
the influence of prior learning on new learning (pro-active interference) and the
effect of new learning on old learning (retroactive interference).
8.1: Experiment 9 Introduction
Experiment 9 consisted of three stages and was designed to test the extent
of pro- and retro-active interference on associative learning as well as to look at
the effects of rule induction. Stage 1 consisted of two concurrent PPPs (A-, B-,
AB+; C-, D-, CD+), Stage 2 was composed of two concurrent NPPs, one of
which featured novel stimuli (E+, F+, EF-) whereas the other was a revaluation
of one of the Stage 1 problem stimuli (A+, B+, AB-), and the third stage
reintroduced unreinforced Stage 1 stimuli in order to evaluate the effects of Stage
2 revaluation.
From earlier results (see Experiment 5) it should be the case that all age
groups should be capable of learning the Stage 1 PPP contingencies, perhaps
because the solution of two similar problems allows enough cognitive resources
to remain for older participants to engage configural, or unique-cue processing
rather than having to rely on elemental processes. Stage 2 contingencies,
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however, should be much more difficult for older participants since they involve
reversal learning for one of the problems, which may, according to FL theory,
lead to perseverative responses and pro-active interference. On the other hand
Stage 2 contingencies may be easier for younger participants who may be able to
transfer knowledge from how to solve Stage 1 to Stage 2, particularly since the
PPP is easier than the NPP and pre-training on an easier discrimination facilitates
learning a harder discrimination in rats (Mackintosh et al. 1970) and humans
(Suret et al. 2003). Furthermore the younger participants’ more flexible learning
may enable them to similarly reverse a heuristic rule in a comparable way (c.f.
Weisberg et al. 1981; Novick et al. 1991).
According to associative learning theories in the Test Stage younger
participants should preserve Stage 1 C-, D-, CD+ responses whilst giving
responses consistent with Stage 2 for A, B and AB stimuli. Older participants
should be more prone to pro- and retro-active interference and should not
discriminate as well or as consistently between problems. On the other hand it
may be that rule learning, although contingent on associative learning, is general
and participants may apply a rule as an heuristic to solve a problem, possibly
resulting in revaluation of Stage 1 C, D, and CD contingencies to coincide with
A, B, AB contingencies since participants may apply the last rule they learned to
their unreinforced Test Stage predictions.
More formally in Experiment 9 the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model
predicts that in Stage 1 compound stimuli will acquire an associative strength of
1λ and elements an associative strength of 0.5λ. In Stage 2 the predictions would
not alter since each element would still each have a value of 0.5λ since they are
associated with an outcome as often as they are not. As a consequence there
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should be no difference between responses in Stage 1 and Test if participants are
employing a simple elementally based rule of summation. Note that, even if
participants manage to engage more cognitively demanding unique cue or
configural processes in order to solve Stages 1 and 2, use of an elemental
summation strategy in the test stage would result in very little or no
discrimination at test.
A unique-cue model, on the other hand, would allow Stage 1
discriminations to be solved by assigning unique cues W and X to the
compounds ABW+ and CDX+, which would be the only predictors of an
outcome and, as a consequence, acquire an associative value of 1λ. Similarly, in
Stage 2 new unique cues would be assigned to compounds ABY- and EFZ-,
which would acquire associative strengths of -2λ to balance the elements’
associative values of 1λ. Predictions are less clear in the test stage, and depend
on whether one assumes that activation of stimulus CDX would lead to
activation of ABW because compound CD forms part of contextual cue W, or if
compound ABY would be activated by presentation of stimulus AB since this is
the most recent example of AB. Effectively this suggests that participants’
responses should either be consistent with Stage 1, in which case AB would have
a value of 1λ, or it is equally likely that participants would respond to the AB
compound as they did in Stage 2, in which case AB would attract responses
consistent with an associative strength of -2λ. Clearly, though, C, D, and CD
stimuli would be unchanged from Stage 1 and elements A and B should still have
an associative value of 1λ. In many circumstances the unique cue model’s ability
to treat compounds entirely separately from their elements is helpful, but in this
instance this property makes the predictions of the model less than clear.
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As far as the Pearce (1987, 1994) model is concerned predictions for the
first two stages are the same as detailed earlier for the PPP and NPPs in
Experiment 1. Stage 1 PPPs would lead to A, B, C, and D elements acquiring an
associative strength of -1λ while the compounds AB and CD would have a value
of 2λ. In Stage two the NPPs would mean that elements A, B, E, and F would
acquire a value of 2λ and the compounds AB and EF an associative strength of -
2λ. This means that at test elements A and B will have a strength of 2λ, C and D
a value of -1λ, AB an associative valence of -2λ, and CD a value of 2λ. As a
consequence responses to C, D, and CD should be unaffected by Stage 2
discriminations whereas A, B, and AB responses should be consistent with Stage
2.
The question of the nature of age related decline in stimulus-stimulus
associations will be tested in this and two further experiments with a compound
recognition task. Participants will be asked whether they had seen a number of
compounds or not during the course of the experiment. Stimulus compounds will
include all compounds presented during the experiments together with the same
number of novel compounds composed of the same elements, and the task will
derive two scores: Hits and False Recognition. Hits denote the number of
correctly identified compounds whilst False Recognition is the difference
between the number of compounds incorrectly having been identified as seen and
the number of hits. It should be expected that there will be a monotonic decline
in performance with age. Note that, according to LaVoie et al. (2006), an index
of False Recognition may be indicative of executive dysfunction and FL
mediated overgeneralisation, whereas number of correct hits may give an
indication of more purely mnemonic, MTL mediated ability.
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8.1.1: Experiment 9 Participants
Participants for Experiment 9 were 44 Young undergraduates (Mean Age
= 22.88, SD = 6.73), 23 YO volunteers (Mean Age = 67.04, SD = 4.18), and 9
OO contributors (Mean Age = 77.89, SD = 2.74).
Table 8.1: Participant Summary Statistics
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Age 22.88 6.73 67.04 4.18 77.89 2.74
Years Education 14.00 .00 12.39 2.43 14.78 4.79
AH4 Total 79.68 19.61 82.94 16.18 62.63 14.7
Digit Cancellation 24.27 5.60 17.92 4.50 13.64 5.23
MHV 26.39 3.25 36.75 3.02 36.40 4.93
MacQuarrie Total . . 120.33 21.91 107.20 26.29
8.1.2: Design
Experiment 9 consisted of three stages: two with corrective feedback and
a third test stage. Stage 1 consisted of two concurrent Positive Patterning
Problems (PPP; A-, B-, AB+; C-, D-, CD+) presented in ten blocks of six trials.
Stage 2 presented one of Stage 1’s problems revalued as a Negative Patterning
Problem (NPP; A+, B+, AB-) and a novel NPP (E+, F+, EF-), again presented in
ten blocks of six trials. Following this, participants were given five blocks of six
Table 8.2: Experiment 9 Design
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
1 2 1 2 1 2
A- Chocolate Olive Oil A+ Chocolate Olive Oil A Chocolate Olive Oil
B- Fish Bread B+ Fish Bread B Fish Bread
AB+ Chocolate
Fish
Olive Oil
Bread
AB- Chocolate
Fish
Olive Oil
Bread
AB Chocolate
Fish
Olive Oil
Bread
C- Olive Oil Cheese E+ Cheese Chocolate C Olive Oil Cheese
D- Bread Avocado F+ Avocado Fish D Bread Avocado
CD+ Olive Oil
Bread
Cheese
Avocado
EF- Cheese
Avocado
Chocolate
Fish
CD Olive Oil
Bread
Cheese
Avocado
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unreinforced test trials for stimuli A, B, C, D, AB, and CD. Table 8.2 (above)
shows the design and stimuli used in the two versions of the experiment.
8.1.3: Procedures
Procedures were as detailed in Chapter 6. Each stage was presented in its
entirety before a new stage was begun. Participants were not notified that the
experiment would feature different stages nor were they told when Stage 1 ended
and Stage 2 began. They were, however, informed that they would receive some
unreinforced trials at the end of the experiment. This was explained as a way of
testing how well they remembered what they had learned over the course of the
experiment. Once the experiment was over participants were given a compound
recognition task. This consisted of three compounds they had seen in the
experiment (AB, CD, EF) and three they had not (AC, BE, CF) and participants
simply had to indicate whether they had seen the compounds during the
experiment. This derived two scores: ‘Hits’ (how many compounds correctly
identified as having been seen or not seen) and ‘False Alarms’ (how many non-
experimental compounds had incorrectly been identified as ‘seen’).
8.1.4: Experiment 9 Results
8.1.4.1: Stage 1 Analysis
Stage 1 results were analysed initially with an Age (3) by Blocks (5)
ANOVA. This analysis revealed main effects of both Age (F(2,73) = 4.09,
p<0.025), and of Blocks (F(4,292) = 90.21, p<0.001), but no interaction of Age and
Blocks (see Figure 8.1). This simply shows that younger participants learned the
problem almost perfectly, and older participants learned them significantly less
well overall, although overall Bonferroni post hoc age group comparisons proved
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non-significant, and AH4 scores attenuated the Age effect when entered as a
covariate (F(2,68) = 2.88, p>0.05).
Final trial learning was tested in the usual way by performing t-tests to
check that participants were discriminating significantly between elements and
compounds. The tests showed that all groups had learned the problems by the
end of Stage 1 (Young: t = 78.1, df = 43, p<0.001; YO: t = 9.65, df = 22,
p<0.001; OO: t = 5.29, df = 8, p<0.002).
Table 8.3: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .36 .32 .29 .37 .06 .07
2 .79 .23 .60 .58 .58 .33
3 .90 .27 .67 .48 .69 .41
4 .93 .18 .82 .26 .83 .33
5 .98 .09 .78 .33 .72 .55
8.1.4.2: Stage 1 Multiple Regression
Of those individual difference variables identified in Chapter 5 Age and
Years of Education (YE) correlated with Overall Accuracy (OA) (Age: r = -
0.309, p<0.008; YE: 0.369, p<0.002) and the same variables correlated with
Figure 8.1: Age by Blocks
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Final Trial Accuracy (FTA) (Age: r = -0.242, p<0.04; YE: 0.408, p<0.001). Age
and YE were therefore entered into two multiple regression analyses using the
enter method as predictor variables with OA and FTA as dependent variables.
For OA the model proved significant (F(2,73) = 9.11, p<0.001, Adjusted R
2
= 0.178) with both Age (Beta = -0.26, p<0.02) and YE (Beta = 0.33, p<0.004)
proving significant individual predictors of OA.
For FTA the model was, again, significant (F(2,73) = 9.04, p<0.001,
Adjusted R2 = 0.177) however only YE emerged as an individually significant
predictor of FTA (Beta = 0.379, p<0.002).
8.1.5: Results: Stage 2
8.1.5.1: Stage 2 Analysis
Stage two discriminations were analysed using an Age (3) by Blocks (5)
by Problem (2: A+, B+, AB- (AB problem); E+, F+, EF- (EF problem))
ANOVA. This showed a significant main effect of Age (F(2,73) = 5.26, p<0.008)
and Bonferroni post-hocs showed that this difference was confined to that
between Young and YO groups (mean difference = 0.26, p<0.006). Note,
however, that with the introduction of AH4 as a covariate that the effects of Age
(F(2,68) = 2.16, p>0.05) was rendered non-significant. Figures 8.2.1 and 8.2.2
show that whilst participants’ discriminations for the revalued AB problem were
initially worse than those for the novel EF problem this difference became less as
the experiment progressed, suggesting some proactive interference effects. It
also, surprisingly, shows that the YO group were the worst at learning Stage 2
discriminations overall, a conclusion verified by the Bonferroni comparisons
alluded to earlier and implying that this group were most vulnerable to proactive
interference, perhaps because they had learned the Stage 1 discriminations more
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completely than the OO group and were therefore vulnerable to making
perseverative errors.
Table 8.4: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.2.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .09 .46 -.12 .51 -.19 .51
2 .84 .42 .46 .57 .72 .26
3 .88 .40 .47 .54 .94 .11
4 .94 .31 .65 .45 .89 .22
5 .94 .31 .75 .53 .89    .22
Table 8.5: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.2.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .32 .45 .17 .53 .31 .24
2 .77 .46 .51 .51 .56 .27
3 .86 .38 .61 .49 .94 .11
4 .90 .34 .71 .44 .78 .44
5 .93 .33 .65 .49 .78 .44
As previously t-tests were employed to see whether participants
discriminated between elements and compounds on the final trial of Stage 2. In
this instance the Young group’s responses to stimuli were significantly different
for both the AB problem (t = 21, df = 43, p<0.001) and the EF problem (t =
Figure 8.2.1: Stage 2 AB Problem
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Figure 8.2.2: Stage 2 EF Problems
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18.51, DF = 43, P<0.001). The YO group’s responses were also significantly
different (AB problem: t = 6.28, df = 22, p<0.001; EF problem: t = 5.66, df = 22,
p<0.001), as were the OO Group’s (AB problem: t = 12.1, df = 8, p<0.001; EF
problem: t = 5.29, df = 8, p<0.002). This confirms that, although age differences
were apparent, participants learned both discriminations by the end of the tenth
trial.
8.1.5.2: Stage 2 Multiple Regression
For this analysis OA and FTA were calculated separately for the AB and
EF problems because of the Blocks by Problem interaction identified earlier. For
the AB problem OA correlated with Age (r = -0.297, p<0.01), AH4 Total (r =
0.276, p<0.05), and YE (r = 0.237, p<0.04) and FTA with YE (r = 0.285,
p<0.015). For the EF problem OA correlated with Age (r = -0.229, p<0.05) and
AH4 Total (r = 0.311, p<0.025), and FTA with Age (r = -0.251, p<0.03) and YE
(r = 0.24, p<0.04). These predictor variables were entered into multiple
regression analyses using the enter method.
In terms of the AB problem the predictors of OA were Age, AH4 Total,
and YE. This model was significant despite only predicting a small amount of
variance (F(3,68) = 2.98, p<0.05, Adjusted R
2 = 0.099) and Age (Beta = -0.263,
p<0.05) and AH4 Total (Beta = 0.268, p<0.045) were significant predictors of
OA, although YE was not. For FTA YE was entered as a predictor and resulted
in a significant model (F(1,74) = 6.56, p<0.015, Adjusted R
2 = 0.069) and YE
proved a significant individual predictor of FTA (Beta = 0.285, p<0.015).
Presumably, this pattern of results suggests that overall accuracy reflects the
effects of proactive interference, which may have been largely overcome by the
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final trial. This analysis is consistent with the Problem by Blocks interaction
found in the previous section.
For the EF problem the pattern was slightly different. Here Age and AH4
Total were entered as predictors of OA and derived a near significant overall
model (F(2,69) = 3.15, p = 0.051, Adjusted R
2 = 0.074) with AH4 Total emerging
as a significant individual predictor (Beta = 0.309, p<0.025). For FTA Age and
YE were entered as predictor variables and this produced a significant model
(F(2,73) = 4.23, p<0.02, Adjusted R
2 = 0.079) but neither variable emerged as a
significant sole predictor of FTA in the EF problem.
These results suggest that the YO group were most prone to proactive
interference in this stage, presumably because they had learned the Stage 1
contingencies better than the OO group. Despite this all age groups ultimately
learned the problems, although the AB problem was learned more slowly than
the EF problem.
8.1.6: Test Stage Analysis
There are a number of questions to be answered through the test stage
analysis. Firstly, do participants preserve the Stage 1 C-, D-, CD+
discriminations and differentiate between these and the revalued A+, B+, AB-
problem learned in Stage 2 or does reverting to the context of Stage 1 lead them
to revert to their earlier response patterns? Alternatively it may be that Stage 2
revaluation leads participants to employ the NPP solution as an heuristic, leading
to C+, D+, CD- responses during the test stage. Secondly: are participants’
responses consistent, indicating little confusion or uncertainty around responses?
Thirdly, are test stage responses consistent with elemental, unique cue, or
configural models of learning, and what can that tell us about the processes of
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generalisation being used? Fourthly, do older participants show a mnemonic
decline in failing to correctly recognise compounds seen during the experiment,
and, furthermore, do they falsely recognise unseen compounds as having been
seen?
8.1.6.1: Test Stage Responses and Consistency
A visual inspection of the pattern of responses during data entry
suggested that Young participants consistently responded to both A, B, AB and
C, D, CD stimuli in a similar and regular fashion. The response pattern suggested
that, whatever the stimuli, these participants were giving an NPP solution.
Discrimination scores were calculated, therefore, on the assumption that allergy
responses would be made to elements and no allergy responses would be made to
compounds. As a consequence negative discrimination would mean that
participants were proposing a PPP solution to a problem.
Analysis was conducted with an Age (3) by Problem (2: A, B, AB (AB);
C, D, CD (CD)) by Trial (5) ANOVA. This revealed a significant effect of Age
(F(2,73) = 7.2, p<0.002) and Trial (F(4,292) = 4.3, p<0.003), but not of Problem,
indicating that responses varied according to age and there had been some
inconsistency in participants’ responses, although there were few overall
differences between the AB and CD problems. The introduction of AH4 as a
covariate did not attenuate the significance in terms of Age (F(2,68) = 8.95,
p<0.001) or Trial (F(4,272) = 3.23, p<0.015). Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed
significant differences were confined to those between the Young and YO groups
(Mean Difference = 0.403, SE= 0.11, p=0.001). There were significant
interactions between Trial and Age (F(8,292) = 2.53, p<0.015), Problem and Trial
(F(4,292) = 4.03, p<0.0035), and Age, Problem, and Trial (F(8,292) = 2.12, p<0.035).
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Figures 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 in conjunction with the statistical analyses go some way
to explaining the pattern of these results. It can be observed that the Young group
were almost completely consistent in their responses, and that regardless of the
problem they gave a NPP response, showing that they were generalising the
solution to the Stage 2 AB problem to their predictions for the CD problem. The
relative inconsistency of older participants is reflected in the Age by Trial
interaction and the Problem by Trial interaction can be interpreted as reflecting
the uncertainty of the older groups. These interpretations are reinforced by the
Age by Trial by Problem interaction in that differentiation between the problems
was confined to the older groups, particularly the YO.
Table 8.6: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.3.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .90 .37 .50 .67 .72 .51
2 .89 .40 .50 .72 .89 .22
3 .92 .26 .67 .60 .89 .22
4 .95 .30 .46 .85 .78 .44
5 .93 .33 .57 .74 .78 .44
Figure 8.3.1: Test Stage AB Problem
Blocks
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Figure 8.3.2: Test Stage CD Problem
Blocks
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Table 8.7: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.3.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .92 .34 .26 .75 .67 .50
2 .93 .33 .67 .58 1.00 .00
3 .91 .42 .61 .58 .78 .44
4 .93 .33 .43 .77 .78 .44
5 .92 .34 .50 .78 .78 .44
Further analysis sought to establish the extent to which participants’
Stage 1 learning had been changed by acquiring Stage 2 contingencies, establish
age related differences, and identify predictor variables. Recall that according to
associative learning theories CD problem responses at test should be identical to
those learned in Stage 1, whereas AB problem contingencies had been re-valued
during Stage 2 and this difference should be preserved at test, unless participants
were using a wholly elemental strategy. By this logic a reasonable measure of
forgetting should be the difference between Stage 1 and Test Stage responses to
the CD problems since this should have been preserved in the face of Stage 2
revaluation. To this end the average Test Stage CD responses were subtracted
from the average Stage 1 final trial CD responses, to indicate the extent to which
they had been changed over the course of Stage 2. This was calculated by taking
the root of the squared difference between the average element predictions on the
final trial of Stage 1 and average Test Stage element responses added to the root
of the squared difference between the average compound predictions in the last
trial of the Stage 1 and the Test Stage divided by two. This resulted in a number
between 1 and 0 indicating the extent of change between Stage 1 and the Test
Stage for compounds and elements of the CD problem, henceforward referred to
simply as CD Change. Equation 8.1 illustrates this calculation, below, where CS1
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and DS1 indicate Stage 1 elements, CDS1 Stage 1 compounds, CT and DT Test
stage elements and CDT Test Stage compounds, and n the number of datum for
each stimulus type.
Equation 8.1:
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Figure 8.4 shows the mean CD Change scores for each age group. Note
that the pattern of differences reflects the earlier results. The Young group’s CD
Change scores were greatest and indicate an almost total interference of Stage 1
CD learning despite the fact that only the AB problem was re-valued. The OO
group’s CD Change was next greatest, followed by the YO group’s which was
least. As surmised before, this may reflect the OO group’s relatively poor
learning in Stage 1 and better Stage 2 accuracy relative to the YO group. A One
Way ANOVA revealed significant age differences in CD Change scores (F(2,73) =
5.98, p<0.005) that remained significant after the introduction of AH4 as a
covariate (F(2,68) = 5.58, p<0.01). Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that this
difference was confined to the Young and YO groups (Mean Difference = 0.196,
S.E. = 0.58, p<0.0035).
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Table 8.8: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.4
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
.96 .16 .77 .29 .84 .28
The next analysis was a multiple regression using the enter method with
CD Change as a dependent variable. Predictor variables entered into a
correlational analysis were Age, AH4 Total, DC, MHV, YE, McQ, and time
taken to complete Stage 2 (S2 Time). The last predictor variable was entered
since longer time intervals between Stage 1 and test may have caused
participants to simply forget Stage 1 contingencies. Initial correlations revealed
an association between CD Change and Age (r = -0.34, p<0.0025), AH4 Total (r
= 0.38, p<0.0045), YE (0.39, p<0.001), and S2 Time (r = 0.36, p<0.0025). These
four variables were therefore entered as predictor variables in a multiple
regression analysis with CD Change as a dependent variable. This analysis
revealed a significant model (F(4,71) = 8.15, p<0.001, Adjusted R
2 = 0.346) with
Age (Beta = -0.4, p<0.0055), AH4 Total (Beta = 0.37, p<0.0025), and YE (Beta
= 0.47, p<0.0035) emerging as significant predictor variables. The failure of S2
Figure 8.4: Mean CD Change by Age Group
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Time to significantly predict interference suggests that this factor was not a
confounding variable in the current experiment, and that forgetting of the CD
problem contingencies were not systematically predicted by elapsed time.
8.1.6.2: Compound Recognition
Recall that participants were asked to state whether they had seen, during
the course of the experiment, the three compounds used (AB, CD, and EF) and
three novel compounds (AC, BE, CF) or not. Two measures were derived from
these data: hits and false recognition, both expressed as a number between 0 and
1. Hits refers to the proportion of compounds out of six correctly identified as
having been seen or unseen during the experiment whilst false recognition is
calculated, following LaVoie et al. (2006), as the difference between the
percentile proportion of hits minus the percentile proportion of false alarms taken
away from one. This results in a number between 0 and 1 indicating the
proportion of falsely recognised items after controlling for correct recognition.
Figure 8.5: Hits by Age Group
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Figure 8.6: False Recognition by Age Group
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Table 8.9: Summary Statistics for Figures 8.5 & 8.6
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Hits .95 .09 .89 .13 .78 .17
False
Recognition .14 .27 .25 .34 .44 .33
The analysis itself was by two One Way ANOVAs: one for each
dependent variable, but both with Age Group as a between subjects factor. The
Hits analysis demonstrated a significant effect of Age Group (F(2,73) = 9.72,
p<0.001) that remained significant once AH4 had been entered as a covariate
(F(2,68) = 4.73, p<0.15), and Bonferroni post-hoc analysis showed that differences
were significant only between the Young and OO groups (Mean Difference =
0.18, SE= 0.042, p=0.001; see Figure 8.5). The data for False Recognition
followed a similar and statistically significant effect of Age Group (F(2,73) = 4.32,
p<0.02; see Figure 8.6). Bonferroni post-hoc tests again showed that this
difference was, again, confined to Young versus OO groups (Mean Difference =
0.31, SE= 0.08, p<0.02). The effects of age on False Recognition were, however,
eliminated by the introduction of AH4 as a covariate (F(2,68) = 1.94, p>0.05),
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giving some credence to LaVoie’s (2006) assertion that false recognition reflects
higher order processing.
8.1.7: Experiment 9 Discussion
Stage 1 of this experiment derived results that were largely anticipated.
There were age differences in the initial acquisition of the contingencies in that
older groups learned more slowly than younger groups and less completely,
although all groups discriminated significantly between elements and compounds
by the final trial. Age predicted OA, but not FTA, suggesting that perhaps Age
deficits were confined to the early part of the experiment, although the lack of an
Age by Blocks interaction makes this less likely. YE was, on the other hand a
predictor of both OA and FTA. This indicates that younger and more educated
older participants may be better at learning. Perhaps the latter had kept more
mentally active, giving support for the disuse hypothesis. This interpretation is
consistent with the observation that Age differences were attenuated by
covariance with AH4 scores in this stage. It may be that older, more educated
people were better able to induce a simple rule to aid solution.
In Stage 2 all groups learned the AB problem more slowly than the EF
problem, consistent with the predictions of unique-cue and configural theories,
but the overall age effects were, surprisingly, confined to a difference between Y
and YO, rather than OO, groups. Indeed the OO group learned better than the
YO group on both problems, although not significantly so. On face value this
suggests a curvilinear relationship between Age and vulnerability to proactive
interference. An alternative interpretation of this may be that the YO had learned
the Stage 1 contingencies better, or perhaps induced a threshold rule of
summation that had helped with the PPP but was a hindrance in learning the NPP
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in Stage 2. This is also evidence of perseverative responding since the YO may
have persevered with the PPP pattern of responses more than the OO because
these responses were better learned and thus more difficult to change. This
observation could therefore be seen as supporting a FL theory explanation of
cognitive ageing. Perhaps this underlies the ability of AH4 scores to attenuate the
main effect of Age and the Blocks by Problem interaction, The multiple
regression analysis gave Age and AH4 Total as predictors, so it is possible that
these proactive interference effects could be subsumed by a general fluid
intelligence factor, perhaps reflecting the analogical reasoning and pattern
recognition aspects of the AH4 test. On the other hand the best predictor of FTA
was YE and again this may be interpreted as support for disuse theories, perhaps
in limiting the extent of learning rather than learning rate, although there were no
significant predictors of FTA for the EF problem. In the EF problem AH4 Total,
but not Age, predicted OA, suggesting again that the ability to reason
analogically and detect patterns and regularities helped learn the Stage 2
discriminations overall.
At Test one can assume that preservation of discriminations between
elements and compounds reflects the use of configural assumptions whereas the
inability to discriminate suggests the use of elemental strategies. In this sense the
YO group seemed to revert to an elemental strategy, possibly as a result of their
poor learning in Stage 2, although the OO did not. In another sense, however,
Test Stage responses were even more unexpected than Stage 2 since it was the
Young who had suffered the greatest change to Stage 1 CD responses, although
this was clearly rule rather than associatively based and, as such, represents what
one might term heuristic interference rather than the forgetting this measure may
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be interpreted as representing. Paradoxically it seems that it was the Young
group’s superiority at learning that seemed to cause the interference since they
would have been more prone to inducing rules and generalising from them, and
this may underlie the observation that age differences in CD Change were
attenuated by AH4 scores. Young participants were almost totally consistent in
their responses in the test stage, whereas older participants gave far less regular
responses, suggesting rapid extinction, or unlearning, poorer retention of
responses, and a possible increasing reliance on summation strategies. The
Young also discriminated more between elements and compounds in both
problems. In a continuation of their poor performance in Stage 2 the YO
discriminated least and may reflect interference as a result of the disparity
between Stage 1 and Stage 2 contingencies and a FL mediated inability to map
stimuli to appropriate responses. The OO responses were more consistent and
may reflect generalisation from their most recent associative learning in Stage 2
rather than rule application.
It is certainly the case that the extent of change to the unseen CD problem
poses profound difficulties for the application of associative learning theories to
HCL beyond predicting the acquisition of initial contingencies. Indeed it seems
as though younger participants were, ultimately, taking more of a problem
solving approach to the experiment than an associative learning approach. Age,
AH4 Total, and YE predicted the extent of change between Stage 1 and Test
Stage responses to the CD problem. The Age effect reminds us that although
there were some differences between YO and OO the major differences were
between young and old more broadly and suggest, again, that age may mediate
rule induction, probably due to initial associative learning deficits. The predictive
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nature of AH4 Total may be related to the ability to spot patterns and regularities
in patterns of stimulus-response associations, whereas the effect of YE may be
due to better maintenance of cognitive ability, although one should note once
again that these two variables predicted more CD Change, not less. In this
instance FL mediated flexible, rule based thinking may, paradoxically, cause
greater apparent forgetting in learning, or, more likely, heuristic interference in
conditional learning. The inability of S2 Time to predict CD Change suggests
that time between Stage 1 and Test was not a factor in the current experiment.
Overall this experiment provides a demonstration of the profound effects
that rules can have on our responses and the limitations of the applicability of
associative learning theory to HCL. Although an associative analysis is possible
for Stages 1 and 2 the predictions of associative learning theories are almost
redundant in terms of explaining Test data. There is also evidence to suggest age
differences in the extent of heuristic interference in conditional learning, in that it
had a more acute effect on the Young group’s responses. The next experiment
looks at these phenomena in more detail.
Despite being less prone to rule based interference older participants were
less likely to correctly recognise compound stimuli as having been seen during
the experiment. This time the biggest differences returned to the more familiar
pattern of being significant between Young and OO groups. This indicates that at
least some of the overgeneralisation as evidenced by poor discrimination
between elements and compounds during the Test Stage may have been due to
MTL mediated associative deficits, although the biggest differences in terms of
responses at Test were between the Y and YO groups. Certainly, the observation
that AH4 scores did not render age differences non-significant when entered as a
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covariate suggests that compound recognition may be independent of higher
level cognitive abilities. Furthermore the significant age differences in false
recognition suggest that while memory deficits existed they may not entirely
underlie test stage responses in this experiment since false recognition is
associated with a decline in executive, rather than purely mnemonic, abilities.
Again, the observation that covariance with AH4 scores rendered age differences
non-significant supports this interpretation. Overall this is a complex picture, and
test responses seem to be more related to perserveration of learnt responses from
Stage 2 and an heuristic, rule based overgeneralisation between stimuli rather
than associative interference.
8.2: Experiment 10 Introduction
Experiment 9 produced some surprising results in that Stage 2
discriminations were more poorly learned by the YO rather than the OO group,
perhaps because they had induced a partial rule in order to solve the Stage 1
PPPs and lacked the cognitive flexibility to reverse it. The Young group, on the
other hand seemed able to transfer, by analogy, their learning of the easier PPP to
the solution of the more difficult NPP. As a consequence this may be an instance
of Easy-Hard transfer between associative discriminations following
discrimination reversal (e.g. Suret et al. 2003) or, perhaps more likely, a case of
applying an heuristic learned in an easy problem to a harder problem (e.g.
Novick & Holyoak, 1991). The latter possibility may be more plausible since it
was the Young group who had been most prone to retroactive interference in that
they had generally applied the most recently learned heuristic to their Test Stage
predictions. Given this assumption that analogical transfer of a solution had
occurred from the easier PPP to the harder NPP it makes sense to suggest that
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reversing the order of presentation should alter the pattern of test stage responses,
since there should be less transfer of a solution from Easy to Hard than from
Hard to Easy. This leads to the prediction that proactive interference from Stage
1 to Stage 2 should be greater than in Experiment 9 in this instance. The change
may, however, not affect the OO group’s learning to the same extent since they
seemed less likely to take advantage of the similarities between the problems to
aid solution. Indeed one could expect the same basic pattern of results.
Formal quantitative predictions for Experiment 10 are largely similar to
those derived from the models for Experiment 9. As far as the Rescorla-Wagner
model is concerned they are identical, since elements are still equally likely to be
associated with outcome or no outcome and would therefore each acquire an
associative strength of 0.5λ, and compounds the sum of the value of their
elements, 1λ, irrespective of whether they are NPPs or PPPs, so these simple
predictions would be carried forward to Test. Adopting a threshold of activation
of λ>0.5 would, paradoxically, mean that a strictly elemental approach would
lead to correct responses made to Stage 2 contingencies from Stage 1 learning, so
in this sense a strictly elemental approach may lead to diminished, rather than
increased, amount of proactive interference.
A unique-cue approach would predict in Stage 1 that compounds ABW-
and CDX- would acquire unique cues W and X that would accrue an associative
strength of -2λ to allow prediction of no response as elements A, B, C, and D
would have a value of 1λ. In Stage 2 elements A, B, E, and F would lose
associative strength and have an associative strength of 0λ, compound AB would
acquire a new unique cue Y, and EF the unique cue Z. Here both Y and Z would
accumulate an associative valence of 1λ. At Test the same problems occur as in
230
Experiment 9 as far as the predictions of unique-cue theory are concerned. It is
unclear whether the AB compound would be treated as having either unique cue
W or Y, and so could be worth either -2λ or 1λ. Responses to C, D, and CD
should, however, be as per Stage 1 and elements A and B should have an
associative strength of 0λ.
Pearce’s model, however, makes the unequivocal prediction that Stage 1
elements would acquire strengths of 2λ and their compounds -2λ. In Stage 2
elements would accrue associative values of -1λ and their compounds 2λ. At
Test A, B, and AB should remain unchanged from Stage 2 and C, D, and CD
would attract responses consistent with Stage 1.
Experiment 10 was, therefore, essentially a replication, the only
difference being that Stage 1 confronted participants with a NPP (A+, B+, AB-;
C+, D+, CD-) and Stage 2 stimuli were arranged as a PPP (A-, B-, AB-; E-, F-,
EF+).
8.2.1: Participants
Participants were 38 ‘Young’ undergraduates (Mean Age = 24.04, S.D. =
7.34), 21 YO participants (Mean Age = 69.34, S.D. = 4.42), and 13 OO
volunteers (Mean Age = 80.51, S.D. = 3.6).
Table 8.10: Participant Summary Statistics
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Age 24.04 7.34 69.34 4.42 80.51 3.60
Years Education 14.00 .00 10.95 2.16 11.31 2.53
AH4 Total 78.66 16.78 65.43 15.35 55.18 24.49
Digit
Cancellation
23.84 5.63 16.00 2.76 15.09 3.48
MHV 25.97 3.27 32.24 3.43 30.75 4.39
MacQuarrie
Total
. . 96.29 24.23 84.58 23.87
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8.2.2: Design
Stimuli were the same as Experiment 9, as shown in Table 8.11. As stated
previously the only differences between the present and previous experiment was
that Stage 1 now contains two concurrent NPPs and Stage 2 two concurrent
PPPs, including a revalued A, B, AB problem.
8.2.3: Procedures:
Procedures were identical to Experiment 9.
8.2.4: Results: Stage 1
8.2.4.1: Stage 1 Analysis
Here an Age by Blocks ANOVA demonstrated significant main effects of
Blocks (F(4,276) = 44.69, p<0.001) and Age (F(2,69) = 7.44, p<0.0015). Bonferroni
post hoc analysis showed that the Young’s discriminations were significantly
greater than the OO’s (Mean Difference = 0.27, SE= 0.072, p=0.0015; see Figure
8.7). This is slightly different to Experiment 9 since the Bonferroni comparisons
in that experiment were non significant, although similarly the main effect of
Age was attenuated by AH4 as a covariate (F(2,67) = 0.862, p>0.05). It is probable
Table 8.11: Experiment 10 Design
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
1 2 1 2 1 2
A+ Chocolate Olive Oil A- Chocolate Olive Oil A Chocolate Olive Oil
B+ Fish Bread B- Fish Bread B Fish Bread
AB- Chocolate
Fish
Olive Oil
Bread
AB+ Chocolate
Fish
Olive Oil
Bread
AB Chocolate
Fish
Olive Oil
Bread
C+ Olive Oil Cheese E- Cheese Chocolate C Olive Oil Cheese
D+ Bread Avocado F- Avocado Fish D Bread Avocado
CD- Olive Oil
Bread
Cheese
Avocado
EF+ Cheese
Avocado
Chocolate
Fish
CD Olive Oil
Bread
Cheese
Avocado
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that the relative difficulty of the NPP led to greater age differences in Stage 1,
and perhaps this difficulty was reflected by the elimination of any significant age
differences by the introduction of AH4 as a covariate.
Final trial learning was again assessed using t-tests to check that
participants were successfully discriminating between elements and compounds.
Here all Young participants’ predictions were all perfectly accurate and t was not
calculated since there was no within group variance. Both the YO (t = 10.12, df =
20, p<0.001) and the OO groups (t = 7.58, df = 12, p<0.001) also successfully
discriminated between the outcomes of elemental and compound stimuli and can
therefore be said to have learned the problems.
Table 8.12: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.7
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .29 .35 .29 .43 .10 .43
2 .73 .36 .60 .37 .49 .40
3 .81 .32 .66 .33 .52 .43
4 .95 .14 .76 .42 .52 .49
5 .99 .06 .82 .31 .80 .39
Figure 8.7: Age by Blocks
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8.2.4.2: Stage 1 Multiple Regression
Initial correlations showed that OA was significantly associated with Age
(r = -0.27, p<0.025) and AH4 Total (r = 0.27, p<0.025) but not Digit
Cancellation (DC), Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHV), MacQuarrie Total or YE.
FTA, meanwhile, was significantly related to Age (r = -0.32, p<0.0065), AH4
Total (r = 0.36, p<0.0035), DC (r = 0.33, p<0.0055), and MHV (r = -0.39,
p<0.001). The multiple regression model using the enter method for OA with
Age and AH4 Total entered as predictor variables was not significant. The
similar model for FTA with Age, AH4 Total, DC, and MHV as predictors, on the
other hand, was significant overall (F(4,64) = 7.15, p<0.001, Adjusted R
2 = 0.266).
Analysis of individual predictors revealed that AH4 Total (Beta = 0.425,
p<0.0025), Age (Beta = -0.4, P<0.045), and MHV (Beta = -0.545, p<0.0015)
significantly predicted FTA scores. Note that MHV was significantly associated
with Age (r = 0.64, p<0.001) and that the power of MHV as a negative predictor
of FTA may be as a result of this relationship. Furthermore, the introduction of
MHV as a covariate in an analysis of age differences in final trial discriminations
resulted in no age differences (F(2,67) = 0.92, p>0.05), whereas a simple one way
ANOVA did (F(2,69) = 4.62, p<0.015). This reflects the large correlation between
MHV and Age, and in the absence of other instances where MHV has predicted
accuracy or discrimination or theoretical reasons why crystallised intelligence
should have any relationship with basic learning processes beyond its
relationship with age it can be assumed that older participants in this experiment
had particularly good vocabularies, but that this did not influence their learning
ability.
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8.2.5: Results: Stage 2
8.2.5.3: Stage 2 Analysis
Once more Stage 2 data were analysed using an Age (2) by Problem (2:
AB & EF) by Blocks (5) ANOVA. This revealed significant main effects of Age
(F(2,69) = 10.26, p<0.001), Blocks  (F(4,276) = 78.85, p<0.001), and Problem  (F(1,69)
= 14.91, p<0.001). Bonferroni post hoc analysis showed significant differences
between the Young and both YO (Mean Difference = 0.32, S.E. = 0.074,
p<0.001) and OO groups (Mean Difference = 0.23, S.E. = 0.088, p<0.035). Note
that again the trend is for the YO performance to be worse than OO during Stage
2, although this was not significant. Furthermore, the effect of Age remained
once AH4 had been entered as a covariate (F(2,67) = 5.51, p<0.007), as did the
effects of Blocks (F(4,264) = 10.25, p<0.001) and Problem (F(1,264) = 11.103,
p<0.002). There were also significant Problem by Blocks  (F(4,276) = 17.18,
p<0.001) and Age by Problem by Blocks  (F(8,276) = 2.79, p<0.0065) interactions.
Figures 8.8.1 and 8.8.2 illustrate that AB problem discriminations are less
accurate overall than EF problem discriminations, with older groups, particularly
the YO, disadvantaged relative to the Young group. If anything the extent of
proactive interference is more marked for this experiment than in Experiment 9.
Although the Problem by Blocks interaction was attenuated by AH4 as a
covariate (F(4,264) = 2.29, p>0.05), the three way Age by Problem by Blocks
interaction was not (F(8,264) = 2.56, p<0.015).
Table 8.13: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.8.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
.16 .50 -.20 .54 -.31 .58
2 .76 .40 .25 .73 .44 .61
3 .86 .29 .49 .54 .63 .39
4 .90 .24 .62 .54 .69 .40
5 .94 .20 .62 .53 .88 .19
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Table 8.14: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.8.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .45 .46 .29 .50 .42 .24
2 .78 .41 .55 .46 .69 .36
3 .93 .20 .58 .46 .35 .50
4 .89 .28 .52 .45 .56 .41
5 .95 .19 .70 .48 .92 .28
Again the extent to which participants successfully discriminated
between Allergy and No Allergy outcomes by the final trial was examined with a
series of t-tests. In this instance the Young group’s responses to elements and
compounds were significantly different for both the AB problem (t = 43.33, df =
37, p<0.001) and the EF problem (t = 24.33, df = 37, p<0.001). Similarly the OO
group’s responses to Allergy and No Allergy trials were significantly different
for both problems (AB: t = 17.73, df =12, p<0.001; EF: t = 12, df = 12, p<0.001)
as were the YO group’s (AB: t = 8.88, df =20, p<0.001; EF: t = 8.37, df = 20,
p<0.001).
Figure 8.8.1: Age by Blocks AB Problem
Blocks
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Figure 8.8.2: Age by Blocks EF Problem
Blocks
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8.2.5.4: Stage 2 Multiple Regression
Once again separate multiple regression analyses using the enter method
were conducted for the AB and EF problems. In the AB problem OA correlated
significantly with Age (r = 0.413, p<0.001), AH4 Total (r = 0.551, p<0.001), DC
(r = 0.329, p<0.0055), and YE (r = 0.603, p<0.001) and FTA with AH4 Total (r
= 0.261, p<0.03) and YE (r = 0.326, p<0.0055). For the EF problem OA
correlated with Age (r = 0.419, p<0.001), AH4 Total (r = 0.459, p<0.001), DC (r
= 0.281, p<0.02), and YE (r = 0.514, p<0.001) and none of the potential
predictor variables were significantly associated with FTA.
In terms of the AB problem a regression model for OA with Age, AH4
Total, DC, and YE entered as predictor variables proved statistically significant
(F(4,65) = 12.52, p<0.001, Adjusted R
2 = 0.4) with AH4 Total (Beta = 0.293,
p<0.02) and YE (Beta = 0.489, p<0.002) emerging as individually significant
predictors. The model for FTA with AH4 Total and YE entered as predictors was
also significant but predicted only a small proportion of the variance in FTA
(F(2,65) = 4.48, p<0.02, Adjusted R
2 = 0.092). Neither independent variable was a
significant individual predictor of FTA, although YE approached significance
(Beta = 0.275, p = 0.056). It may be that general intelligence only affected intial
learning of the AB problem, particularly since AH4 scores only predicted overall
accuracy here, and did not attenuate earlier age related differences and
interactions when entered as a covariate for this stage.
For the EF problem the regression analysis with Age, YE, DC, and AH4
Total entered as predictors of OA provided a significant model (F(4,65) = 7.62,
p<0.001, Adjusted R2 = 0.277). In this instance only YE proved a statistically
significant predictor of OA (Beta = 0.336, p<0.045) although AH4 Total
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approached significance (Beta = 0.241, p = 0.069). Recollect that no potential
predictor variables were associated with FTA for the EF problem, so no multiple
regression analysis was conducted for this.
8.2.6: Test Stage Analysis
Recall that in Experiment 9 the Young group experienced almost
complete rule based interference since their test stage responses to the CD
problem had been re-valued such that they were the same as the AB problem that
had been re-valued during Stage 2. This may have been the result of the
application of a general heuristic. The following analysis will establish whether
the same observation holds true for the current experiment.
8.2.6.1: Test Stage Responses and Consistency
In this instance discrimination scores were calculated on the assumption
that participants will apply a PPP solution to Test Stage stimuli, since this was
the pattern of responses learned in Stage 2. A negative discrimination score in
this case will therefore indicate that participants are applying a NPP solution and
scores near 0 that participants are inconsistent in their responses.
Analysis was once more begun with an Age (3) by Problem (2: AB; CD)
by Trial (5) ANOVA. This showed no main effects of Age, Problem, or Blocks
in this instance. There was, however, an interaction between Age and Problem
(F(2,272) = 7.24, p<0.002) that remained significant once AH4 scores had been
entered as a covariate (F(2,264) = 3.83, p<0.025). Figures 8.9.1 and 8.9.2 suggest
that this interaction is due to inconsistencies in the way older participants
approached the CD problem and that at least some, but by no means all, Young
participants discriminated between the AB and CD problems.
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Table 8.15: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.9.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .39 .82 .26 .85 .23 .75
2 .38 .87 .00 .81 .46 .59
3 .36 .91 .17 .80 .15 .85
4 .29 .95 .21 .82 .19 .83
5 .29 .93 .10 .77 .42 .61
Table 8.16: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.9.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .00 .90 .12 .77 .27 .70
2 -.08 .96 .00 .82 .35 .75
3 -.13 .95 .17 .78 .38 .74
4 -.18 .93 .26 .82 .65 .55
5 -.17 .96 .17 .90 .54 .63
The scarcity of observable Age, Problem, and Trial effects and
interactions stands in stark contrast to the complex interactions seen in the last
experiment. It seems that much of this may have been due to a lack of
consistency in the Young group in terms of their predictions rather than across
trials, as opposed to the overwhelming consensus encountered for this group in
Experiment 9.
Figure 8.9.1: Age by Trials AB Problem
Trials
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Figure 8.9.2: Age by Trials CD Problem
Trials
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For the next round of analyses CD Change scores were first calculated in
the same way as they were for Experiment 9 and again reflected the difference in
allergy predictions for the CD problems between Stage 1 and the Test Stage.
Figure 8.10 shows that the pattern of CD Change scores differed markedly from
Experiment 9, with a more monotonic diminishing of the extent of change
between Stage 1 and Test Stage responses in the current experiment. A One Way
ANOVA, however, revealed no significant differences between age groups.
Table 8.17: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.10
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
.56 .43 .53 .35 .35 .31
Once more predictor variables, Age, AH4 Total, DC, MHV, YE, McQ,
and S2 Time, were entered into a correlational analysis with CD Change. This
showed that interference was significantly associated with S2 Time (r = 025,
p<0.035) but no other predictor variable. S2 Time was therefore entered into a
regression analysis as a predictor of interference. In this instance S2 Time proved
Figure 8.10: CD Change by Age Group
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a significant but weak predictor of interference (F(1,70) = 4.73, p<0.035, Adjusted
R2 = 0.05; Beta = 0.25, p<0.035). This implies that the longer participants spent
on Stage 2 then the more interference they suffered regardless of age or any of
the other individual difference variables. In fact it was the younger group that
had spent longer completing Stage 2 (F(2,69) = 17.89, p<0.001; Bonferroni Y vs.
YO Mean Difference = 27.71s, p<0.001; Y vs. OO Mean Difference = 32.54s,
p<0.001) This makes sense since one would expect CD Change to increase with
S2 Time, although the amount of variance explained is small albeit consistent
and there were no significant age differences in CD Change.
8.2.6.2: Compound Recognition
This task was identical to the previous experiment. Participants were
given a list of six compounds (AB, CD, EF, AC, BE, CF) and asked to identify
which they had seen and which they had not seen during the course of the
experiment. The dependent variables again were numbers between 1 and 0
indicating the proportion of Hits and False Recognition.
Figure 8.12: False Recognition by Age Group
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Figure 8.11: Hits by Age Group
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Table 8.18: Summary Statistics for Figures 8.11 & 8.12
young young old old old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Hits .91 .14 .83 .19 .82 .17
False
Recognition
.21 .35 .43 .46 .49 .42
As before analysis was by two One Way ANOVAs: one for each
dependent variable with Age group as a between subjects factor. In this case
there were no significant age differences in number of Hits, but there was a
significant effect of Age in terms of False Recognition (F(2,69) = 3.345, p<0.045),
although a Bonferroni Post Hoc analysis did not identify any specific differences
between the three Age groups (see Figures 8.11 & 8.12; note the difference in
scale), and the introduction of AH4 as a covariate rendered the age differences
non-significant (F(2,67) = 2.24, p>0.05), as in the last experiment.
8.2.7: Experiment 10 Discussion
Stage 1 results were largely as anticipated and very similar to those
obtained from Experiment 9. The overall age differences again suggest that older
groups’ learning was worse than the younger group’s, and in this instance there
were significant differences between the Y group and both older groups. These
observations may reflect the NPP’s difficulty relative to PPPs, and the addition
of AH4 as a covariate attenuated Age differences in Stage 1, suggesting that
general cognitive ability may underlie age differences. Despite this, in the
present experiment there were no significant predictors of OA, suggesting
dissociation from other cognitive abilities. For FTA though Age, AH4 Total and
MHV were all significant predictors. This may reflect age related deficits in rule
induction due to an inability to recognise patterns and use this to solve problems.
The significance of MHV as a predictor is somewhat problematic, but is likely to
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be related to Age since it is a strong correlate of Age (r = 0.636, p<0.001) and is
likewise a negative predictor of FTA, and its relationship to age may explain
why this factor attenuated age related differences when entered as a covariate.
Stage 2 results were also similar to those of Experiment 9 in that the trend
persisted for the YO group to be the worst performers (see Figures 8.8.1 and
8.8.2). The overall Age difference was significant with the Young group again
significantly better than the YO but also, in this case, significantly more accurate
than the OO too, although there were no significant differences between the two
older groups and all groups’ discriminations were significant by the final trial.
There was also a main effect of Problem as well as a Problem by Blocks
interaction, demonstrating that proactive interference had occurred since
participants had learnt the EF problem more quickly and more thoroughly than
the AB problem. This implies that there was less transfer of learning from a hard
to an easy problem than there had been from an easy to a hard problem, although
the Age by Problem by Blocks interaction suggests that younger participants
overcame proactive interference more quickly. Overall, though, it may be that
the greater effort involved in encoding the Stage 1 NPPs may have resulted in a
stronger, more persistent internal representation, less prone to change and
therefore greater proactive interference. It also makes sense in terms of the
earlier predictions made in terms of Hard-Easy transfers being more susceptible
to proactive interference than Easy-Hard ones. Certainly, associative learning
theories in general would either predict no differences in this sense between
Experiments 9 and 10, since the same amount of relearning would have to be
done regardless of which order the problems were presented in. In fact, a strictly
elemental theory assuming an activation threshold of λ > 0.5 would predict that
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no learning would be needed in order to make correct responses to Stage 2
contingencies after Stage 1. It may be that the fact that PPPs are linearly soluble
and participants did not need to engage configural processes could explain why
AH4 covariance failed to render any of the observed differences non-significant,
although this observation is difficult to account for.
For the AB problem AH4 Total and YE were significant predictors of
OA. This was similar to Experiment 9 and may reflect participants’ ability to
detect patterns and regularities in the problem and change responses flexibly as
appropriate. This seems at odds with the earlier observation that AH4 scores did
not attenuate any of the main effects or interaction in the earlier analysis, but
overall accuracy as a measure reflects all participants’ ability to counter
proactive interference rather than age differences per se. There were no
significant predictors of FTA although the model including AH4 Total and YE as
predictor variables was significant. For the EF problem, on the other hand, YE
predicted OA and there were no predictors of FTA. This suggests that factors
such as disuse and socio-economic status may mediate accuracy for this problem,
which was clearly approached in a different way to the AB problem. Overall the
results were similar to Experiment 9 for Stage 2 although there seems to have
been greater pro-active interference, perhaps because participants, particularly
younger ones, were less able to transfer their learning from a hard to an easy
problem than from an easy to a hard problem.
The Test Stage results were more fundamentally different to those of
Experiment 9. Here the Young group were not consistent in their predictions as
they had been in the previous experiment. Indeed they did differentiate, to a
point, between the AB and CD problems although not to the extent that would
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indicate a lack of heuristic interference. The lack of main effects and interactions
compared to Experiment 9 suggests that there was little consensus in any groups
about what should be predicted, although the attenuation of Age differences by
AH4 covariance suggests that consistency may be determined by general
cognitive ability rather than age as such. This stands in clear contrast to
Experiment 9 to an extent that is surprising given the minor seeming
manipulation of changing problem order, suggesting that Easy-Hard transfer is a
robust empirical observation in HCL. Looking at the extent of change to the CD
problem in the present experiment it is clear, again, that these results are very
different. The lack of age differences here may reflect the overall inconsistency
of responses to CD stimuli at test. Although S2 Time was a significant predictor
of interference this was unlikely to have reflected an age related deficit since
younger participants took longer over this stage on average, and Age was not
even a correlate of CD Change in this instance.
Finally there were, again, age differences in the compound recognition
task, although this time older groups were prone to false recognition but were not
less likely to correctly recognise seen compounds. This suggests false
recognition deficits associated with overgeneralisation between similar stimuli,
and a decline in strategic, FL mediated processing rather than a mnemonic
deficit, and this is reinforced by the observation that AH4 covariance accounted
for the age related differences in false recognition. Although the effects of rule
induction are of real interest and provide a major challenge to the applicability of
associative learning theories to HCL problems there still remains the question of
whether there are age differences in resistance to interference in non rule based
conditional learning problems.
245
8.3: Experiment 11
Given that Experiments 9 and 10 had demonstrated the profound effect
rule induction can have on responses to conditional learning problems the final
experiment sought to investigate the phenomena of proactive and retroactive
interference using a non-linear problem. This experiment is similar to the
previous two in that it employs two learning stages and an unreinforced test
stage. Each of the two learning stages is linearly soluble within itself, to allow all
groups to learn them, but between stages an AB+, CD+ problem is re-valued as a
AC-, BD- problem, thus rendering this part of the problem biconditional and non
linear. This should cause proactive interference in Stage 2 and retroactive
interference when Stage 1 contingencies are revisited in the test stage, which also
asks participants to predict responses to two novel compounds, AD and BC.
Stage 1 EF- and GH- contingencies are also featured in the test stage whereas
Stage 2 IJ+ and KL+ were present to provide balance and prevent participants
from merely learning that all stimuli in Stage 2 of the experiment resulted in No
Allergy.
In terms of formal quantitative predictions the Rescorla-Wagner model
would predict that participants would learn all Stage 1 and 2 contingencies,
although IJ+ and KL+ would be learned more quickly than AC- and BD- since
these stimuli would start the stage with an associative strength of 1λ whereas IJ
and KL would begin at chance, 0.5λ. At test AB and CD would, by summation
of their elements, have strengths of 0λ, as would AD and BC and, since their
associative strength would remain unchanged, EF and GH would also have a
value of 0λ.
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The unique cue model might predict that in Stage 1 compounds AB, CD,
EF, and GH would acquire cues S, T, U, and V, respectively, and that these cues
would acquire all associative strength such that S and T would have a strength of
1λ and U and V a strength of 0λ. Alternatively one could point out that such cues
are superfluous since the problem is linearly soluble and consequently unique
cues would not form. Consequently, elements A, B, C, and D would all acquire a
value of 0.5λ, and E, F, G, and H an associative strength of 0λ.
In the former case Stage 2 compounds AC, BD, IJ, and KL would acquire
unique cues W, X, Y, and Z, respectively, and W and X would accrue a value of
0λ and Y and Z a strength of 1λ. Here the model would predict responses to AB
and CD at Test to be either consistent with cues S and T at 1λ, or with cues W
and X at 0λ. Responses to EF and GH would remain unchanged, and, since
elements A, B, C, and D would have lost associative strength to the unique cues,
AD and BC should both have a value of 0λ.
In the latter case A, B, C, and D elements would start Stage 2 with an
associative strength of 0.5λ, so when compounds AC and BD form unique cues
X and Y these should both acquire a value of –1λ to allow ACX and BDY to
predict no response. IJ+ and KL+ should be easily learned and elements I, J, K,
and L would accrue a strength of 0.5λ each. At Test AB, CD, AD, and BC
should all have an associative strength of 1λ, through summation of the 0.5λ
associative strengths of the elements A, B, C, and D. The EF and GH
compounds’ associative strengths should remain unchanged from Stage 1 at 0λ.
Pearce’s (1987, 1994) configural model predicts that participants would
learn Stage 1 contingencies with ease; compounds AB+ and CD+ would acquire
associative strengths of 1λ and EF- and GH- values of 0λ. In Stage 2 the IJ+ and
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KL+ compounds would be equally easy to learn, accruing strengths of 1λ. Note
that the introduction of compounds AC- and BD- would effectively mean that
participants would have to make a biconditional discrimination to preserve Stage
1 learning of AB+ and CD+. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable to
make the same assumption concerning a reduction in the amount of associative
strength generalised from perceptually similar stimuli as detailed at the
beginning of Chapter 7. This assumption was as follows: ‘when a problem is
intractable because of perceptual overgeneralisation it is not unreasonable to
suggest that solution may entail the engagement of higher cognitive processes in
the form of inhibition of generalisation processes based on perceptual similarity’.
Under these circumstances, or if generalisation processes led to a stimulus losing
all of its associative strength, the assumption was made that generalisation of
associative strength through perceptual similarity was halved. The basic Pearce
(1987, 1994, 2002) model would predict that AC and BD would attenuate the
generalised associative strength of AB+ and CD+ by gaining an associative
strength of -1λ. That would mean that once this associative strength was
generalised back to AB and CD at test they would lose all their associative
strength at 0λ. Given that younger participants have been demonstrated to have a
capacity to resist retroactive interference in learning (e.g. Shanks, Darby, and
Azmi, 1998) it would not appear to be out of place to make the assumption that
the amount of associative generalisation between AB, CD and AC, BD
compounds be halved. Making this assumption means that during Stage 2
compounds IJ and KL would acquire an associative strength of 1λ, whereas AC
and BD would lose associative strength to reach –0.5λ to counter generalisation
from AB and CD since 
€ 
VAC /VBD = −0.5 + (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅1))+ (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅1)) .
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At Test, therefore, AB and CD should each generalise half of AC and
BD’s associative strengths of –0.5λ and have an associative value of 0.75λ since
€ 
VAB /VCD =1+ (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅ −0.5)) + (0.5 ⋅ (0.5 ⋅ −0.5)) . Novel compounds AD and
BC will have no associative strength of their own but would generalise
associative value from AB, CD, AC, and BD. Here, if one assumes that the
extent of generalisation through perceptual similarity is still halved AD and BC
would be worth 0.125λ, as the following calculation demonstrates: 
€ 
VAD /VBC =  0
+ (0.5•(0.5•0.75)) + (0.5• (0.5•0.75)) + (0.5• (0.5•-0.25)) + (0.5• (0.5•-0.25)).
Alternatively, one might assume that since there is no objective need to suspend
generalisation based on perceptual stimuli for novel compounds and this results
in the very similar prediction that AD and BC would have associative strengths
of 0.25λ since they would both generalise half the associative strengths of AC,
BD, AB, and CD compounds 
€ 
VAD /VBC =  0 + (0.5•0.75) + (0.5•0.75) + (0.5•-0.25)
+ (0.5•-0.25).
In conclusion, the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) theory anticipates that
compounds AB and CD would lose all their associative strength over the course
of Stage 2 and would, in common with novel compounds AD and BC and also
EF and GH, have an associative strength of 0λ at test. A unique cue modification
would lead to no generalisation of associative strength between compounds and
no revaluation of AB and CD during Stage 2, and makes equivocal predictions in
terms of how novel compounds AD and BC would be responded to. Pearce’s
(1987, 1994, 2002) model, on the other hand, assumes that AB and CD would
lose some associative strength through generalisation but that the discrimination
between these and EF and GH would be preserved. It also predicts that allergy
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predictions in response to AB and CD compounds should be greater than that to
AD and BC.
8.3.1: Participants
Participants for Experiment 11 were 29 Young undergraduates (Mean
Age = 21.01, SD = 2.9), 19 YO volunteers (Mean Age = 69.47, SD = 3.85), and
13 OO contributors (Mean Age = 78.34, SD = 3.53).
Table 8.19: Participant Summary Statistics
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
Age 21.01 2.90 69.47 3.85 78.34 3.53
Years Education 14.10 .31 11.74 2.54 11.69 2.95
AH4 Total 82.20 12.62 67.24 18.31 58.78 22.82
Digit Cancellation 24.48 6.53 16.65 4.83 14.22 3.23
MHV 25.08 3.91 32.53 3.70 34.10 6.10
McQuarrie Total . . 98.67 25.47 92.10 21.65
8.3.2: Design
This experiment consisted of two learning stages and a test stage. Each
learning stage consisted of compound stimuli presented in fifteen blocks of four
trials and the Test Stage presented unreinforced compound stimuli in five blocks
of six trials. Stage 1 required participants to learn an AB+, CD+, EF-, GH-
discrimination and Stage 2 an AC-, BD-, IJ+, KL+ discrimination. The Test
Stage presented participants with the Stage 1 AB, CD, EF, and GH stimuli along
with two novel AD and BC compound stimuli. Table 8.20 summarises the
design. After completing the experiment participants were asked to identify six
compound stimuli that had been seen during the experiment (AB, CD, EF, GH,
AD, BC) and six that had not been seen (AF, DG, BH, CE, EG, FG).
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 8.3.3: Procedures
Procedures were as detailed in Chapter 6. The compound recognition task
was the same as for Experiments 9 and 10, although there were twice as many
stimuli involved in the task.
8.3.4: Results: Stage 1
8.3.4.1: Stage 1 Analysis
Stage 1 analysis was carried out on discrimination scores for the AB+,
CD+, EF-, GH- problem averaged out over five three trial blocks of stimuli using
an Age (3) by Blocks (5) ANOVA. This resulted in main effects for Age (F(2,58) =
8.71, p<0.001) and Blocks (F(4,232) = 43.17, p<0.001) but no Age by Blocks
interaction. Bonferroni post hoc analysis identified significant differences
between the Young and YO (Mean Difference = 0.27, S.E. = 0.076, p<0.0025),
and the Young and OO groups (Mean Difference = 0.28, S.E. = 0.086,
p<0.0055), but no differences between the two older groups. Figure 8.13
(overleaf) illustrates this analysis and overall these data can be interpreted as
Table 8.20: Experiment 11 Design
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
1 2 1 2 1 2
AB+
Olive Oil
Avocado
Fish
Chocolate C-
Olive Oil
Eggs
Fish
Milk
AB
Olive Oil
Avocado
Fish
Chocolate
CD+
Eggs
Potatoes
Milk
Bread BD-
Avocado
Potatoes
Chocolat
e
Bread
CD
Eggs
Potatoes
Milk
Bread
EF-
Lettuce
Chicken
Cheese
Banana
IJ+
Bread
Milk
Eggs
Potatoes
EF
Lettuce
Chicken
Cheese
Banana
GH-
Cheese
Fish
Olive Oil
Avocado
KL+
Banana
Chocolate
Chicken GH
Cheese
Fish
Olive Oil
Avocado
AD
Olive Oil
Potatoes
Fish
Bread
BC
Avocado
Eggs
Chocolate
Milk
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showing that there is a simple age related decline in solving an AB+, CD+, EF-,
GH- problem. As in previous experiments the introduction of AH4 as a covariate
attenuated the effects of Age (F(2,50) = 2.02, p>0.05). Further analysis on separate
age group data using t-tests showed that the Young (t = 57, df = 28, p<0.001),
YO (t = 6.48, df = 18, p<0.001), and OO groups (t = 17.73, df = 12, p<0.001)
were significantly discriminating between Allergy and No Allergy trials and had
therefore learned the problem
Table 8.21: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.13
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .39 .26 .15 .28 .19 .39
2 .72 .34 .57 .36 .44 .42
3 .89 .24 .54 .45 .45 .47
4 .90 .20 .60 .42 .55 .45
5 .94 .16 .65 .42 .79    .25
8.3.4.2: Stage 1 Multiple Regression
Initial correlations indicated that OA was significantly associated with
Age (r = -0.51, p<0.001), AH4 Total (r = 0.44, p<0.0015), DC (r = 0.31, p<0.03),
Figure 8.13: Age by Blocks
Blocks
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and YE (r = 0.52, p<0.001) therefore these variables were entered into a
regression analysis using the enter method as predictor variables. This resulted in
a significant model (F(4,48) = 5.996, p<0.0015, Adjusted R
2 = 0.29) with YE
emerging as the sole significant predictor of OA in stage 1 (Beta = 0.34, p<0.05).
In the FTA analysis Age (r = -0.33, p<0.015), AH4 Total (r = 0.29,
p<0.05), DC (r = 0.36, p<0.015), and YE (r = 0.495, p<0.001) were significantly
associated with the variable of interest and were entered as predictor variables.
The model again proved significant (F(4,48) = 5.87, p<0.0015, Adjusted R
2 =
0.28), with YE emerging yet again as the sole significant predictor of FTA (Beta
= 0.54, p<0.0025). Since Age per se is not on its own a significant predictor in
either analysis whereas YE is a significant predictor of both OA and FTA it is
probably the case that younger and older better educated people did best in this
stage of the experiment.
8.3.5: Results: Stage 2
8.3.5.1: Stage 2 Analysis
Given that acquisition of the AC-, BD- contingencies should be more
difficult than learning the novel IJ+, KL+ associations due to proactive
interference this stage was analysed using accuracy scores. This allows accuracy
for the two types of contingencies to be compared. Initial analysis was by an Age
(3) by Problem (2: AC/BD and IJ/KL) by Blocks (5) ANOVA. This revealed
significant main effects of Age (F(2,58) = 7.998, p<0.0015), Blocks (F(4,232) =
41.31, p<0.001), and Problem (F(1,58) = 11.45, p<0.0015), showing that
participants were learning the discriminations, but differently according to
Problem and Age. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that the Young group were
significantly more accurate in their predictions than the YO (Mean Difference =
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0.17, S.E. = 0.042, p<0.025) and OO (Mean Difference = 0.17, S.E. = 0.047,
p<0.0025) groups but there were no significant differences between the two older
groups. The main effect of Age was attenuated by the introduction of AH4 as a
covariate (F(2,50) = 0.313, p>0.05). There was, furthermore, a three way
interaction between Age, Problem, and Blocks (F(8,232) = 4.26, p<0.001) that
remained significant after AH4 had been entered as a covariate (F(8,200) = 2.35,
p<0.02). Figures 8.14.1 and 8.14.2 illustrate this interaction and suggest that the
OO group were poor at solving the AC-, BD- problem in the early stages of the
experiment relative to other Age groups and suggesting they were more prone to
proactive interference, although their performance improved towards the end of
this stage. The YO, on the other hand, had started to learn the AC-, BD-
discriminations almost as well as the Young but their accuracy decreased
markedly after the second block of trials. In order to confirm this interpretation
two Age by Blocks ANOVAs were performed separately for each problem. This
showed that for the IJ+, KL+ problem there was a significant effect of Age
(F(2,58) = 4.41, p<0.02) and Blocks (F(4,232) = 28.87, p<0.001) but no interaction,
consistent with a monotonic age related decline. Bonferroni post-hoc tests also
showed that the Age differences were solely between Y and OO groups (Mean
Difference = 0.13, S.E. = 0.05, p<0.04). For the AC-, BD- predictions there were
also main effects of Age (F(2,58) = 9.895, p<0.001) and Blocks (F(4,232) = 30.78,
p<0.001) but also an interaction between Age and Blocks (F(8,232) = 2.99,
p<0.0035). Furthermore Bonferroni post-hoc tests demonstrated that age
differences were significant between the Young and both OO (Mean Difference
= 0.22, S.E. = 0.052, p<0.001) and YO (Mean Difference = 0.13, S.E. = 0.046,
p<0.02) groups. This demonstrates that proactive interference from Stage 1 had
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differentially affected the older groups’ ability to master the AC-, BD-
discriminations relative to the novel IJ+, KL+ associations.
Table 8.22: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.14.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .70 .16 .60 .22 .50 .20
2 .86 .23 .80 .20 .53 .24
3 .92 .18 .75 .31 .65 .22
4 .97 .09 .76 .29 .76 .24
5 .97 .11 .84 .23 .88 .18
Table 8.23: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.14.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .74 .19 .63 .15 .60 .28
2 .88 .20 .75 .22 .76 .32
3 .94 .13 .81 .23 .85 .19
4 .95 .13 .89 .19 .77 .23
5 .97 .10 .89 .23 .86 .18
To test whether participants had ultimately learned the contingencies t-
tests were performed on final trial data for each age group. This analysis showed
that the Young group successfully discriminated between AC/BD and IJ/KL
stimuli during the final trial (t = 57, df = 28, p<0.001), as did the YO group (t =
7.39, df = 18, p<0.001), and the OO group (t = 25, df = 12, p<0.001.
Figure 8.14.2: Age by Blocks IJ+, KL+
Blocks
54321
M
ea
n 
A
cc
ur
ac
y
1.0
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
Age Group
young
young old
old old
Figure 8.14.1: Age by Blocks AC-, BD-
Blocks
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8.3.5.2: Stage 2 Multiple Regression
Given the significant main effect of stimulus response accuracies in this
stage the stimulus types (AC/BD and IJ/KL) were separated for multiple
regression analysis using the enter method. For AC/BD stimuli there were
significant correlations between OA and Age (r = -0.51, p<0.001), AH4 Total (r
= 0.56, p<0.001), DC (r = 0.39, p<0.005), and YE (r = 0.322, p<0.015) and these
variables were entered as predictors for this analysis. This model proved a
significant predictor of OA (F(4,48) = 8.46, p<0.001, Adjusted R
2 = 0.37) with Age
(Beta = -0.44, p<0.0075) and AH4 Total (Beta = 0.47, p<0.0035) emerging as
significant individual predictor variables. For FTA response accuracy for AC/BD
stimuli correlated with Age (r = -0.29, p<0.025), AH4 Total (r = 0.46, p<0.0015),
and YE (r = 0.27, p<0.035). The regression model with these variables as
predictors was significant (F(3,49) = 4.44, p<0.0085, Adjusted R
2 = 0.17) and AH4
Total emerged as the sole significant individual predictor of FTA for AC/BD
stimuli.
For the IJ/KL overall response accuracy was significantly associated with
Age (r = -0.373, p<0.0035), AH4 Total (r = 0.32, p<0.025), and DC (r = 0.32,
p<0.025). When these variables were entered into a multiple regression analysis
using the enter method the model proved significant (F(3,49) = 4.15, p<0.015,
Adjusted R2 = 0.16) and Age was revealed as the only individually significant
predictor of OA for IJ/KL stimuli (Beta = -0.376, p<0.04). FTA for the IJ/KL
stimuli was significantly associated with YE (r = 0.28, p<0.035) and the model
derived from this predictor variable proved significant, although it only predicted
a small amount of FTA variance (F(1,59) = 4.91, p<0.035, Adjusted R
2 = 0.061;
Beta = 0.277, p<0.035).
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8.3.6: Test Stage Analysis
The fundamental questions to be answered by this analysis are whether
participants preserved the Stage 1 AB+, CD+, EF-, GH- discriminations and
whether their responses to AB and CD stimuli were different from their
predictions for the novel AD and BC stimuli. Recall that the Rescorla-Wagner
(1972) theory predicted no difference between responses to any of these stimuli
since all elements would have acquired an associative strength of 0λ. Unique-cue
theories predicted no differences between AB/CD and AD/BC compounds since
both types of response would be reached by summation of elements A, B, C, and
D. Predictions concerning differences between AB/CD and EF/GH were
equivocal with unique cue theory, but suggest either strong or no discrimination.
Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002) configural theory predicts that the discrimination
between AB/CD and EF/GH should be preserved and that responses to AB/CD
should be significantly stronger than those given to AD/BC, so this constitutes a
critical comparison. To this end two separate analyses were performed on these
data: one comparing responses to AB/CD and EF/GH stimuli and another to
compare predictions for AB/CD and AD/BC stimuli. In addition the compound
recognition task in this experiment constitutes a sterner test of participants’
stimulus-stimulus learning ability than the analogous tasks in Experiments 9 and
10 since there are 12 rather than 6 compounds involved.
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8.3.6.1: Test Stage Responses AB/CD and EF/GH Contingencies
Table 8.24: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.15.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .45 .31 .39 .36 .50 .35
2 .64 .35 .50 .17 .38 .42
3 .74 .32 .39 .39 .46 .38
4 .69 .36 .55 .37 .50 .41
5 .64 .38 .37 .37 .62 .36
Table 8.25: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.15.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .12 .22 .26 .26 .27 .39
2 .14 .26 .29 .42 .19 .38
3 .12 .22 .18 .25 .23 .39
4 .10 .21 .32 .25 .27 .39
5 .14 .26 .24 .35 .31 .38
Comparisons between AB/CD and EF/GH stimuli were made with an
Age (3) by Stimulus (2) by Trials (5) ANOVA. The main effect of Stimulus
demonstrates that overall participants differentiated between the two stimulus
types (F(1,232) = 29.51, p<0.001), although the main effects of Age and Trials
proved non-significant, suggesting that overall participants were consistent in
Figure 8.15.1: Age by Blocks AB/CD Stimuli
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Figure 8.15.2: Age by Blocks EF/GH Stimuli
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their responses to the stimuli with no overall age differences, and this main effect
was attenuated by covariance with AH4 (F(1,200) = 3.7, p>0.05). There were,
however, significant Stimulus by Age (F(2,58) = 3.92, p<0.03) and Trials by Age
(F(8,232) = 2.596, p<0.015) interactions. In conjunction with Figures 8.15.1 and
8.15.2 this implies that the Young group preserved the Stage 1 discrimination
best, and are therefore least susceptible to retroactive interference. It also
suggests that younger participants were more consistent in their responses to
unreinforced stimuli. Although this trend appears more marked for the EF/GH
stimuli there was no Age by Stimulus by Trials interaction so this interpretation
lacks empirical support. The Stimulus by Age interaction was rendered non-
significant by entering AH4 as a covariate (F(4,200) = 0.78, p>0.05), but not the
Trials by Age interaction (F(4,200) = 2.18, p<0.035). Further analysis was
conducted using t-tests to determine whether each age group had consistently
discriminated between AB/CD and EF/GH stimuli over the whole Test Stage.
This showed significant differences in the Young (t = 6.87, df = 28, p<0.001) and
YO (t = 2.24, df = 18, p<0.04), but not the OO group’s responses to AB/CD and
EF/GH stimuli. This can be interpreted as demonstrating that the OO had
suffered greater interference to AB+, CD+ contingencies as a result of Stage 2
exposure to AC-, BD- associations.
In order to establish the extent of any interference a measure was
calculated based on the differences in terms of AB and CD predictions between
the final trial of Stage 1 and average test trial predictions. Figure 8.16 (overleaf)
shows mean interference scores by age groups and illustrates that in this
experiment interference seemed to increase with age, although a One Way
ANOVA did not identify any significant differences between age groups.
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Figure 8.16: Interference by Age Group
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Table 8.26: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.16
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
.38 .25 .43 .22 .45 .33
Finally a multiple regression analysis using the enter method was
performed with interference as a dependent variable and Age, AH4 Total, DC,
MHV, YE, McQ, and S2 Time as potential predictors. Initial correlations
revealed that only AH4 Total scores were associated with interference (r = -0.28,
p<0.05) and that this variable was a significant but weak predictor of interference
(F(1,49) = 4.19, p<0.05, Adjusted R
2 = -0.06; Beta = -0.281, p<0.05).
8.3.6.2: Test Stage Responses AB/CD and AD/BC Contingencies
The next round of comparisons looks for similarities and differences
between participants’ responses to AB/CD relative to the novel AD/BC
compounds. This should give an indication of how much participants are
generalising between similar stimuli since all the constituent elements of the
AD/BC compounds had been associated with both Allergy and No Allergy
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outcomes during the experiment, but AB/CD compounds had only, as unique
configurations, been associated with Allergy outcomes.
The initial analysis was, again, by an Age (3) by Stimulus (2) by Trials
(5) ANOVA. Once more there was no main effect of Age but there were
significant effects of Stimulus (F(1,58) = 4.297, p<0.045) and Trials (F(4,232) = 5.68,
p<0.001) as well as an interaction between Stimulus and Age (F(2,232) = 5.904,
p<0.0055). The interaction between Stimulus and Age remained significant once
AH4 scores had been entered as a covariate (F(2,200) = 4.82, p<0.015. An
inspection of Figures 8.17.1 and 8.17.2 (overleaf) shows that participants were
relatively inconsistent in their responses to these stimuli over the course of the
experiment. Younger participants seemed to be less consistent in their responses
to AB and CD stimuli relative to AD and BC stimuli, however, although they
differentiated between stimulus types more than older groups.
Figure 8.17.1: Age by Blocks AB/CD
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Figure 8.17.2: Age by Blocks AD/BC Stimuli
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Table 8.27: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.17.1
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .45 .31 .39 .36 .50 .35
2 .64 .35 .50 .17 .38 .42
3 .74 .32 .39 .39 .46 .38
4 .69 .36 .55 .37 .50 .41
5 .64 .38 .37 .37 .62 .36
Table 8.28: Summary Statistics for Figure 8.17.2
Young Young Old Old Old
Block Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
1 .26 .37 .39 .36 .19 .25
2 .40 .43 .50 .37 .35 .32
3 .41 .36 .58 .30 .42 .40
4 .43 .39 .63 .33 .35 .47
5 .40 .41 .66 .24 .35 .43
Further t-tests sought to ascertain whether participants consistently
discriminated between these stimulus types over the whole test stage by
comparing average responses to AB/CD and AD/BC stimuli in each Age group.
This analysis showed that the Young group’s responses to these stimuli were
significantly different (t = 3.19, df = 28, p<0.005), as were the OO group’s (t =
2.77, df = 12, p<0.02), but not the YO group’s.
8.3.6.3: Compound Recognition Task
In this experiment participants were, once again, shown a list of
compound stimuli made up of elements they had encountered during the
experiment and asked to identify those that they had seen and those they had not
seen. Seen compounds were AB, CD, EF, GH, AD, and BC whereas unseen
compounds were AF, DG, BH, CE, EG, and FG. Scores for hits and false
recognition were calculated as in previous experiments.
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Analysis of Hits data by One Way ANOVA revealed a significant effect
of Age (F(2,58) = 6.75, p<0.0025) and Bonferroni post-hoc tests identified
significant differences between Young and YO participants (Mean Difference =
0.11, S.E. = 0.04, p<0.03) and between Young and OO participants (Mean
Difference = 0.15, S.E. = 0.05, p<0.0055), and that this age difference was
attenuated by AH4 as a covariate (F(2,51) = 2.14, p>0.05). An inspection of Figure
8.18 confirms that younger people were more accurate in identifying which
compounds they had seen and which they had not during the experiment.
Table 8.29: Summary Statistics for Figures 8.18 & 8.19
Young Young Old Old Old
Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation Mean
Std
Deviation
Hits .89 .11 .77 .15 .73 .18
False
Recognition
.27 .28 .57 .36 .76 .54
A One Way ANOVA performed on False Recognition data again showed
a significant effect of Age Group (F(2,58) = 8.704, p<0.001) that was rendered
non-significant once AH4 had been entered as a covariate (F(2,50)  = 2.32, p>0.05).
Figure 8.18: Hits by Age Group
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Figure 8.19: False Recognition by Age Group
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Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that the Young group were significantly more
accurate in their predictions than the YO (Mean Difference = 0.3, S.E. = 0.11,
p<0.025) and OO (Mean Difference = 0.49, S.E. = 0.12, p<0.001) groups but
there were no significant differences between the two older groups. Figure 8.19
(note the difference in scale) shows that younger participants suffered far less
false recognition.
8.4: Experiment 11 Discussion
Stage 1 results were unsurprising and merely point to an age related
decline in the ability to discriminate between compound stimuli in terms of
different outcomes. AH4 scores entered as a covariate attenuated age differences,
suggesting that they may be due to declines in general intelligence. In this
instance YE again proved to be a significant predictor of both FTA and OA,
suggesting that compound discrimination may be mediated by continuing
intellectual activity or socio-economic status.
Stage 2 results were more interesting and point, again, to an age related
vulnerability to pro-active interference since acquisition of AC-, BD-
contingencies suffered relative to IJ+, KL+ associations for older groups but not
for younger participants. Presumably this was due to perseveration through a
deficiency in FL mediated inhibitory processes, and consequent
overgeneralisation between stimuli, although all groups ultimately mastered the
discriminations. Once again AH4 Total seemed to be a factor in resisting
proactive interference since it predicted both OA and FTA for the AC-, BD-
contingencies, whereas Age itself was a significant predictor of OA.
Furthermore, AH4 scores entered as a covariate attenuated the main effects of
Age, Blocks, and Problem, reinforcing the conclusion that fluid intelligence is
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implicated more broadly in resisiting interference and the engagement of
configural learning processes. Conversely, the interaction of Age, Blocks, and
Problem was not rendered non significant by covariance with AH4 scores,
suggesting that some parts of the learning process, presumably basic associative
processes, may not be determined by general cognitive ability. In all the last
three experiments AH4 Total has been a predictor of accuracy in the re-valued
Stage 2 variables, so perhaps resistance to proactive interference in HCL
problems can be subsumed within a general fluid intelligence factor, even if
associative learning ability per se cannot. The fact that Age predicted OA but not
FTA in both problems may reflect the older groups’ relatively poor start in
learning the contingencies. For the IJ+, KL+ contingencies YE was a predictor,
suggesting that these were mastered in a similar way to the Stage 1
discriminations.
The Test Stage analyses indicate that older participants were also more
prone to retroactive interference since they did not preserve the discrimination
between AB+, CD+ and EF-, GH- stimuli as well as the Young group, as
indicated by the Stimulus by Age interaction. There were no age differences in
the extent to which Stage 1 AB+, CD+ contingencies had been interfered with
but the OO group did not significantly discriminate between these and the EF-,
GH- contingencies, implying that the over seventy fives are significantly prone
to interference. Given the evidence of previous experiments it may be that this
indicates an elemental approach to learning, although this comparison alone does
not rule out the use of a configural strategy. In this instance AH4 Total scores
were the only individual predictors of interference, again a common factor with
Experiment 9 and implying that the extent of interference may be due to a lack of
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cognitive flexibility and a declining ability to detect patterns in stimuli. Note that
this would be exactly the kind of flexibility necessary to reduce the amount of
associative strength generalised from other stimuli on the basis of perceptual
similarity. Overall, though, the other groups resisted retroactive interference to
an extent incompatible with basic elemental theories, suggesting either a unique-
cue or configural approach, and the OO’s inability to preserve the discrimination
suggests they may have used an elemental strategy to predict test stage
responses. This interpretation is reinforced by the observations that the Stimulus
by Age interaction for ABCD and EFGH problems was attenuated when AH4
was included as a covariate. That the Age by Trials interaction was not rendered
non significant by AH4 covariance suggests that some of the observed age
related differences may be simple forgetting, but that higher level cognitive
processes are required to preserve learning in the face of interference.
The assumption that the OO were using an elemental strategy to predict
responses to stimuli is challenged, however, by the observation that they
consistently discriminated between AB+, CD+ and the novel AD and BC stimuli.
This suggests that the OO are using configural assumptions to predict responses
to novel stimuli, and this may mean that they were unable to change their
strategies between remembering existing discriminations and extrapolating from
these to generate novel predictions. On closer inspection, however, they may
have been using summation. Given that test responses to AB and CD were
around chance levels (Mean = 0.49) for this group, indicating uncertainty, and
compounds AC and BD elicited no allergy predictions from this group a process
of summation would suggest that the predictions for compounds AD and BC
would fall somewhere in between those values, at around 0.25, not far from the
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observed mean of 0.33. This does, of course, indicate some use of configural
strategies and an ability to differentiate between different compounds composed
of the same elements, but in a rudimentary way, and it is clear that responses to
AB and CD are so close to chance levels they indicate guessing, rather than the
adoption of any strategy. This interpretation is consistent with the observation
that the Stimulus by Age remained significant after AH4 had been added as a
covariate: older groups seemed not to be using sophisticated configural learning
processes to extrapolate from existing learning and therefore did not need to
engage higher order processing to this end.
In contrast the Young group seemed able to change their configural
strategies to fit circumstance, and results indicate their ability to inhibit
generalisation based on perceptual similarity in order to preserve existing
learning and resist retroactive interference. In any event these data confirm the
suspicions of Shanks, Darby, and Charles (1998) that the default human learning
strategy is configural. In this case it was the YO whose responses indicated the
most overgeneralisation since they failed to discriminate between AB/CD and
AD/BC stimuli over the test stage, indicating that they may have been relying on
a unique-cue strategy to both preserve the distinction between AB/CD and
EF/GH contingencies and generate predictions for AD/BC stimuli. It is,
therefore, entirely possible that the overgeneralisation between stimuli observed
for older age groups may reflect an inability to change learning strategies to suit
the occasion. This lack of cognitive flexibility is certainly consistent with the
observation that fluid intelligence, as measured by AH4 scores, was a good
predictor of resistance to proactive interference in Experiments 9, 10, and 11, and
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a good predictor of resistance to retroactive interference in the present
experiment.
It could, further, be surmised that the interference effects may be the
result of declining executive abilities, and there are some suggestions that this
was the case in that older participants suffered more pro- and retro-active
interference than young participants and were unable to change their learning
strategy as appropriate. On the other hand the OO group’s inability to preserve
the discrimination between AB/CD and EF/GH contingencies may have been
due to simple forgetting or the use of the summation strategy described earlier. In
support of this interpretation there was progressive age related deterioration in
both compound recognition and interference to Stage 1 AB+ and CD+
contingencies. On the other hand age differences in Hits were rendered non
significant once AH4 covariance had been accounted for. It may be that simple
recognition was affected by general cognitive ability here since there were twice
as many compounds involved in the task as previous experiments, and strategic
retrieval processes were engaged. In addition, older groups were more vulnerable
to False Recognition, suggesting a more strategic processing deficit, and again
these were attenuated by AH4 covariance. Overall, as far as the present
investigation can tell, it seems plausible to assume that it is a combination of
overgeneralisation and simple forgetting that contributes to greater learning
interference as age increases. Chapter 9 will put the observations of the previous
three chapters into the context of the theoretical framework outlined in the
literature review.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Discussion
9.1: Summary of Results
The research reported here has examined age related changes in human
conditional learning (HCL), the extent and nature of pro- and retro-active
interference in learning and the effects of rule and feature based generalisation
on participants’ responses to stimuli. Experiments One to Five looked at positive
(PPP, e.g. A-, B-, AB+) and negative (NPP, e.g. C+, D+, CD-) patterning
problems, differences between element and compound learning, more and less
non-linear problems, and rule induction. These experiments also examined the
effects of problem complexity in terms of number of responses available, number
of exemplars or stimuli, and problem type. Experiments Six to Eight used
conditional (e.g. AB+, AC+, DB-, DC-) and biconditional (e.g. AB+, CD+, AC-,
BD-) problems to look further into the effects of problem linearity on age related
learning deficits. Beyond that, the three critical experiments described in Chapter
8 investigated the effects of rule induction and associative processes on pro- and
retro-active interference in the learning process in an attempt to discern whether
older people overgeneralised between stimuli and the reasons for this. All
experiments used background test results (see Chapter 5) to take account of
general factors that may influence cognitive ageing. The AH4 Total was used as
an index of fluid intelligence, the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHV) as a test of
crystallised intelligence, the MacQuarrie Test of Mechanical Ability (McQ)
measured sensori-motor ability, a Digit Cancellation (DC) task quantified
perceptual speed, and Years of Education (YE) was an indicator of socio-
economic status and the extent to which participants had used their cognitive
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abilities through their lifetime. These variables, along with Age itself, were
entered into initial correlational and subsequent multiple regression analyses with
Overall Accuracy (OA), Final Trial Accuracy (FTA), and in some instances,
interference, or change in contingency judgements. This chapter will first
summarise the results before going on to examine their relationships with the
theories discussed in Chapters 1 to 4 and making some suggestions for further
research.
9.1.1: Experiments 1 to 5; Negative and Positive Patterning Problems
Experiment 1 featured ten presentations of two NPPs and two PPPs with
four possible allergy outcomes as well as the possibility of a no allergy outcome
in response to food stimuli. Here there were overall deficits in speed of learning
NPPs relative to PPPs and compound stimuli relative to elemental stimuli. Older
participants also acquired the contingencies more slowly, although there were no
overall age differences. By the final trial the Young had learned both problems,
the Young Old (YO: 55-75) had learned the PPP and the Old Old (OO: 75+) had
learned neither problem. By this stage, there were no age differences in learning
elements but age related deficits were apparent with respect to compound
learning. The multiple regression analysis provided no single predictor of FTA
but YE was apparent as a predictor of OA.
Experiment 2 similarly featured ten presentations of two NPPs and two
PPPs with the sole manipulation of reducing the number of outcomes to two:
allergy or no allergy. This manipulation led to the observation of overall age
deficits in learning, particularly between Y and OO groups. Older participants
also learned more slowly, especially the NPP, although there were no differences
with regard to element and compound learning. By the final trial both Y and YO
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groups discriminated significantly between the opposing outcomes of elements
and compounds but the OO did not. Only a minority of participants in the
younger group successfully identified a rule of conjunction to help them predict
the outcomes whereas none of the older groups did. Those younger participants
who induced the rule scored better on the AH4 Total than the rest of their age
cohort and, in addition, better on the DC task than other participants, although
the latter observation may be due to age differences between the Rule Correct
(RC) and the Rule Incorrect (RI) groups. The RC group learned the
contingencies more quickly and were significantly more accurate by the final
trial, although not overall. The outcome of the multiple regression analysis was
that Age itself predicted both FTA and OA in this experiment.
Experiment 3 sought to give older participants more of a chance to induce
rules and consisted of fifteen presentations of one NPP and one PPP. Here the
overall age differences disappeared, replaced by an age related deficit in learning
the NPP. Indeed the OO group still did not learn the NPP overall, although both
other age groups did, and all age groups learned the PPP. There was an overall
deficit in learning compounds relative to elements but no significant age
differences in this regard. Rule induction was more widespread and there were
no significant age differences between RC and RI groups, although only one of
the OO group successfully reported the rule. Once again, the RC group scored
better on the AH4 Total and DC tasks, although the difference was bigger for the
former than the latter. The RC group also learned the contingencies more quickly
although there were no interactions between rule group and problem or stimulus.
The multiple regression analysis showed that Age itself was a significant
predictor of OA but not FTA.
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To look at whether one could regard presenting two different problems
concurrently as increasing complexity and to ascertain how much one could
reasonably expect an ageing population to learn, the two older age groups also
participated in Experiments 4 and 5. Both experiments presented stimuli and
responses fifteen times and Experiment 4 consisted of two concurrent NPPs
whereas Experiment 5 featured two concurrent PPPs. In Experiment 4, by
contrast with Experiment 3, both YO and OO groups learned two concurrent
NPPs successfully, underlining the relative ease with which two similar problems
presented concurrently were learned relative to two different problems, although
elements were better learned than compounds. This suggests that presenting
different problem types concurrently may be seen as increasing the ‘complexity’
of a task, relative to presenting two similar problems concurrently, particularly as
the memory demands of Experiment 4 were no greater than those demanded by
Experiment 3. Experiment 5 derived similar results in that age differences in
learning two concurrent PPPs were non-existent although participants learned the
contingencies associated with elements more easily than those associated with
compound stimuli.
Experiments 1 to 5, overall, showed that NPPs were more difficult to
learn than PPPs, contingencies associated with elements were easier to learn than
those associated with compounds, and that associative learning ability mediated
rule induction. Age related declines were observed in learning NPPs relative to
PPPs, in overall learning ability and, perhaps as a consequence, rule induction in
some instances. They also suggest there are several factors that may contribute to
an age by complexity effect in human conditional learning: number of outcomes,
number of stimuli, compound rather than elemental stimuli, whether a linear
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solution is possible or not, and presenting different problems concurrently. This
also suggests that simple forgetting cannot explain all the age related decline in
conditional learning performance since if this were the case there would be no
age differences in performance between Experiments 3, 4, and 5 as the memory
load in these experiments was identical.
 9.1.2: Experiments 6 to 8: Conditional and Biconditional Problems
Experiment 6 confronted participants with fifteen presentations of
concurrent conditional and biconditional problems. Participants learned the
linearly soluble conditional problem more quickly and significantly better than
the biconditional problem overall. The young group had acquired both
conditional and biconditional contingencies by the final trial, the YO only the
conditional discriminations and the OO had learned neither. The sole significant
predictor of FTA uncovered by the multiple regression analysis was, once again,
Age whereas none of the individual difference measures even correlated with
OA.
In order to ascertain whether older people’s problems with learning the
contingencies were due to the greater processing demands of solving more than
one problem concurrently Experiment 7 presented the older groups with a
biconditional problem and Experiment 8 a conditional discrimination. There
were no overall age effects in Experiment 7 but the OO group still had not
mastered the biconditional problem by the final trial. Both YO and OO groups
mastered the conditional discrimination in Experiment 8 and there were no age
effects.
These experiments more clearly demonstrated that older people are
particularly disadvantaged when tackling non-linear problems, although younger
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participants were similarly compromised by the biconditional relative to the
conditional problem. This provides further confirmation that non-linearity can be
viewed as increasing the complexity of a problem and that the use of configural
generalisation processes may require greater processing resources than elemental
strategies. The differences between the problems may, however, be exacerbated
by the fact that one only needs to learn contingencies for two elements to acquire
the conditional discrimination whereas there are no short cuts to learning the
biconditional discrimination.
9.1.3: Experiments 9 and 10; Rule Shift Experiments
In Experiment 9 participants were first given two concurrent PPPs to
learn in Stage 1. Following this one of the problems was re-valued in Stage 2 as a
NPP and another NPP was presented concurrently using novel stimuli. During
the Test Stage participants were given unreinforced exposure to Stage 1 stimuli.
Experiment 10 was a direct replication using identical stimuli, the only
difference being that the more difficult NPPs were presented during Stage 1 and
Stage 2 consisted of PPPs. Following both experiments, participants were asked
to complete a compound recognition task consisting of the three compounds they
had seen during the experiment and three novel compounds.
In Experiment 9, all age groups learned the two PPPs in Stage 1, although
there were overall age related deficits. Age and YE predicted OA whereas FTA
was predicted solely by YE. The Stage 2 results were more interesting in that age
related deficits were greater for the YO than the OO group and all groups learned
the re-valued NPP more slowly than the novel NPP. This suggests that the YO
were disadvantaged because they had learned the Stage 1 contingencies better
than the OO group and therefore persevered in their incorrect responses longer
274
whereas younger participants’ more flexible cognition allowed them to reverse
the contingencies more easily. Despite this, by the end of Stage 2 all groups were
significantly discriminating between elements and compounds in both problems.
For the re-valued NPP, predictors for OA were Age and AH4 Total whereas YE
predicted FTA. For the novel NPP AH4 Total predicted OA, but there were no
significant predictors of FTA. Test Stage responses were almost entirely
unexpected in that younger participants almost exclusively re-valued the Stage 1
contingencies unseen during Stage 2 to match the problem that had been re-
valued as a NPP and therefore suffered the greatest retroactive interference
whereas the YO suffered least. The differences between Y and YO responses
were significant overall. Multiple regression analysis showed that Age, AH4
Total, and YE predicted the extent of change to Stage 1 contingencies not seen
during Stage 2. The Young were also very consistent in their responses whereas
older participants were not, suggesting quicker extinction of stimulus-response
links or greater confusion for older people. There were also age related deficits in
compound recognition and false recognition between Y and OO groups.
The results from Experiment 10 were initially similar, although age
differences were slightly greater due to the greater difficulty of the NPPs and
significant between Y and OO. By the end of the stage, however, all groups were
discriminating between elements and compounds successfully. There were no
predictors of OA but Age, AH4 Total, and MHV predicted FTA. Stage 2 results
were more complex than in the previous experiment in that greater proactive
interference effects were apparent, and the young group’s responses were more
accurate than both older groups, especially for the re-valued problem and again
differences were greatest between Y and YO. Despite this all groups’ responses
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to elements and compounds were significantly different by the end of the stage.
For Stage 2 OA for the re-valued problem was predicted by AH4 Total and YE
whereas OA for the novel PPP was predicted by YE alone, and there were no
significant predictors for FTA in either problem. Test Stage responses were
profoundly different from the previous experiment despite the minimal
manipulation of swapping the order of the first two stages. Younger participants’
responses were less consistent than previously and some of them, at least,
discriminated between the two problems, unlike in the previous experiment. This
suggests that younger participants may have been using a variety of strategies,
both configural and rule based, in order to make predictions in the absence of
reinforcement. Overall levels of change to the Stage 1 contingencies were less
than before and although the Y and YO participants suffered most interference
there were no significant age differences in this regard. The extent of change to
Stage 1 CD problem contingencies was predicted by the amount of time
participants had spent completing Stage 2, although in this instance the young
had taken longest so conclusions about the impact of this observation are
difficult to make and are unlikely to reflect greater forgetting over time with age.
In this experiment there were age related differences in terms of false
recognition, but not in compound recognition.
Overall, these experiments have shown that the 55-75 age group may be
more prone to proactive interference because they learned the Stage 1
contingencies better than the OO but lacked the cognitive flexibility of the young
that allowed the latter to adapt quickly to the re-valued problem in Stage 2. It
seemed apparent that older participants were suffering greater proactive
interference consistent with elemental generalisation processes than younger
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participants, perhaps as a result of a failure of inhibitory processes in the former
group. There were also greater age differences when problem order reversed
from Hard to Easy (NPP to PPP) than from Easy to Hard (PPP to NPP),
consistent with observations in both discrimination learning experiments with
animals (e.g. Gluck & Myers, 1995, 2001) and humans (e.g. Suret et al. 2003)
and in problem solving (e.g. Novick et al. 1991). Test stage responses suggest
that when problems shift from Easy to Hard younger participants generalise
responses from Stage 2 to the unrevalued stimuli from Stage 1 during test but
that this effect does not extend to older people or when problems shift from Hard
to Easy. This implies that associative processes can only go so far in explaining
how humans respond during conditional learning experiments but that rule
induction is contingent on acquisition of contingencies through those associative
processes since younger participants learned contingencies better and were more
prone to rule based retroactive interference. Fundamentally, this implies that
basic associative learning processes underlie rule induction but that heuristic rule
use over-rules associative learning in the final analysis.
9.1.4: Associative Interference; Experiment 11
This experiment, again, consisted of three stages two of which presented
participants with reinforced compounds and one unreinforced test stage. Stage 1
contingencies were AB+, CD+, EF-, and GH-; Stage 2 contingencies were AC-,
BD-, IJ+, and KL+; and Test compounds were AB, CD, EF, GH from Stage 1
and two novel compounds AD and BC. Note that each stage is linearly soluble
within itself but that over the first two stages contingencies involving elements
A, B, C, and D constituted a biconditional problem. The question here is whether
we would observe the same kind of proactive interference between Stage 1 and 2
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and whether learning Stage 2 AC-, BD- contingencies would interfere with Stage
1 AB+, CD+ learning more than EF-, GH- and, furthermore, how would
participants generalise learnt responses to the novel test compounds AD and BC?
In Stage 1 the young group discriminated significantly more between
stimuli associated with an allergy and those associated with no allergy than both
the YO and OO groups although all groups’ discriminations were significant by
the end of the stage. In this part of the experiment, YE predicted both OA and
FTA.
During Stage 2 the Young were again significantly more accurate than
YO and OO groups. Participants overall were slower to learn the AC-, BD-
contingency but older volunteers were particularly compromised in this regard. It
is interesting to note that the OO were the slowest to adapt to the revaluation, by
contrast to the previous two experiments where it was the YO who experienced
the greatest proactive interference. This suggests that there may be a fundamental
difference between reversing a rule and reversing learned associations. Despite
this, all age groups were successfully discriminating between allergy and no
allergy compounds by the end of the stage. For the AC- and BD- stimuli Age and
AH4 Total were significant predictors of OA and AH4 Total predicted FTA. For
the IJ+, KL+ stimuli, on the other hand, Age itself predicted OA whereas YE
predicted FTA. The young group’s Stage 2 responses conformed to the
Predictions of Pearce’s (1994) configural model, whereas older participants’
learning suggested the use of elemental strategies.
Test Stage comparisons between AB/CD and EF/GH stimuli showed that
older people were less consistent in the way they responded and discriminated
less between responses to the two stimulus types. In particular, the OO group did
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not preserve the discrimination they had learned in Stage 1, suggesting an age
related vulnerability to retroactive interference and a greater tendency to use an
elemental strategy of summation. Although an age related trend was apparent in
the difference between Stage 1 final trial and average Test Stage responses to AB
and CD compounds this was not significant and the extent of this interference
was weakly predicted by AH4 Total scores. Younger participants preserved the
discrimination between AB/CD and EF/GH, as predicted by configural theories.
Analysis of responses to AD/BC stimuli showed there was an age related
deficit in the ability to differentiate between these and AB/CD stimuli, although
only the YO group failed to discriminate significantly between them. This
suggests that younger participants were likely to use a configural learning
strategy to extrapolate novel predictions from existing learning, whereas older
participants were, again, more likely to use elemental strategies. Analysis of the
compound recognition task showed that the younger group recognised
significantly more compounds and had significantly greater false recognition
than both older groups.
Overall, this final experiment showed again that older people are more
vulnerable to pro- and retro-active interference, although in this instance without
the influence of rules this disadvantage was monotonic rather than applying more
to those who learned initial contingencies better. It also showed that older people
were more likely to use an elemental strategy of summation to generalise
associative strength from one stimulus to another, whereas younger people
tended to use a configural approach and were able to inhibit the extent of
perceptual generalisation between stimuli if necessary.
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The remainder of this final chapter will be devoted to looking at the
implications of these findings for the theories of associative learning and
cognitive ageing discussed in the first four chapters. Firstly, consideration will be
given to the implication of these data for learning theories. Subsequently general
theories of ageing will be looked at, with particular attention being paid to the
processing speed (Salthouse, 1996), frontal lobe (West, 1996), and associative
deficit (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) theories. Lastly the question of whether older
people overgeneralise between stimuli and use elemental strategies more than
younger people and how the results fit in with the theories of learning discussed
in Chapters 1 and 2 will be deliberated.
9.2: Implications for Theories of Associative Learning
Whilst the focus of this thesis is on cognitive ageing and to begin to
develop an explanation for age related decline in human conditional learning
(HCL) ability some of the data have implications for associative learning theory
that are worth considering. The results are especially problematic for elemental
theories since they reinforce the assertion of Shanks, Charles, Darby and Azmi
(1998), and Shanks, Darby and Charles (1998) that younger participants
generally use configural strategies to learn HCL discriminations. The strongest
evidence for this was Experiment 11, where the test stage responses of young
participants were predictable by a slightly modified version of Pearce’s (1994)
configural model, but not by elemental models such as Rescorla’s (1973) unique
cue theory. Added to this was the replication, in Experiments 1-8, of
observations that younger participants were able to solve a number of non-linear
problems, although this learning was equally predictable by unique cue theories.
More recent elemental theories such as the LePelley (2004) and Wagner (2003)
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models simply either add factors that may affect the learning rate, such as
attention and salience in the former case, or state that stimuli may be encoded
configurally if they are from different modalities in the latter case. The present
data suggest that elemental models may not be entirely applicable to younger
participants’ responses during conditional learning experiments. Having said that
HCL does, as De Houwer and Beckers (2002) point out, sometimes require
elemental assumptions since empirical phenomena such as blocking and
summation still occur, these phenomena are, as seen in Chapter 2, equally
predictable by Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002) configural models of learning. There
is, therefore, nothing to contradict the assumption that generalisation processes in
younger people are configural, rather than elemental.
Older participants, on the other hand, seemed to take a more elemental
approach to contingency learning. Recall Experiment 1 demonstrated that the 55-
74 age group (YO) could learn PPPs but not NPPs, whereas the over 75s (OO)
learned neither. Experiment 2 reduced the number of possible outcomes to two
rather than 5 and the YO were able to learn the contingencies, but not the OO. In
Experiment 3 the OO could still not learn a NPP, although the YO could. This
suggests an increase in the use of simple elemental learning strategies with age,
and a commensurate decrease in the ability to use more sophisticated configural
learning approaches. It could, however, be argued that Experiment 4
demonstrated that even the OO could learn two concurrent NPPs, but this can be
solved by the simple application of a rule that states elements lead to an outcome,
whereas compounds do not. This is clearly a less sophisticated rule than the rule
of conjunction necessary for solution when a conflicting PPP is present and may
be within the ability of the oldest participants. This view is underlined by the
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observation that since the OO could not solve a biconditional problem when
presented alone in Experiment 7. On the face of it the relatively low number of
exemplars present in Experiment 7 should make it easier than Experiment 4, but
the difficulty is in the absence of a clear rule or strategy that may be less
demanding of cognitive resources than configural or unique cue approaches that
makes this problem so difficult. Certainly when this problem was combined with
a conditional problem during Experiment 6 a similar pattern of observations to
Experiment 1 emerged in that younger participants learned both conditional and
biconditional problems, the YO learned the linearly soluble conditional but not
the biconditional problem, and the OO learned neither. This, again, suggests a
progressive, age-related deterioration in the ability to use configural processing
in solving conditional learning problems.
The real problems for the validity of applying associative learning
theories to HCL come, however, from the rule reversal effects in Experiments 9
and 10. In the former experiment, those participants best at learning the problems
generalised the Stage 2 responses to stimuli unseen since Stage 1 at test. This
observation is wholly inexplicable by any form of associative learning theory
since both configural and elemental theories do not predict a change in
contingencies if the same or perceptually similar stimuli are not present.
Participants’ responses at test may, therefore, have more in common with
problem solving. Despite this, there is some support for Shanks and Darby’s
(1998) notion that people who acquire contingencies more quickly and
accurately are more likely to induce rules (see Experiments 2 and 3). This, in
conjunction with the observation that rule use was the best explanation of
younger participants’ test responses in Experiments 9 and 10, suggests that
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associative learning theory may be adequate to describe initial learning but that
once participants start, rightly or wrongly, to induce generalisable rules this
overshadows any associative learning that may have taken place. It may be that
there is some correspondence between HCL and problem solving since both
avenues of enquiry have demonstrated that learning an easy problem facilitates
the solution of a harder problem (HCL: Suret et al. 2003; Problem Solving:
Weisberg & Alba, 1981; Novick & Holyoak, 1991) and that generalisable, rule
based solutions are dependent on background learning (Shanks & Darby, 1998;
Novick & Sherman, 2003). Furthermore both seem to have the same fundamental
neural bases in the hippocampal and frontal regions of the brain (see Chapter 2).
Of course, this correspondence is entirely speculative at present and would need
much more research for any firm conclusions to be drawn but it may be an
interesting and fruitful avenue of investigation. These questions are, however,
not the central concern of the present research and we will now move on to what
are the fundamental questions to be addressed with regard to cognitive ageing.
9.3: Implications for Theories of Cognitive Ageing
The research presented here attempted to address a number of questions.
Firstly, and most simply, whether HCL is an age sensitive cognitive ability.
Beyond this, one could ask whether HCL ability is dissociable from other
cognitive and sensori-motor abilities and if participants’ responses conform to
the patterns expected by Processing Speed theory (Salthouse, 1996), Frontal
Lobe theory (West, 1996), or the Associative Deficit hypothesis (Naveh-
Benjamin, 2000).
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9.3.1: Is HCL Age Sensitive?
From the results of the preceding experiments, it is probably safe to
conclude that HCL ability is age sensitive and shows a decline with age. The
only experiments that showed no evidence of age related decline were
Experiment 5, which featured two concurrent PPPs, and Experiment 8, which
consisted of a single conditional problem. Note that in both these experiments
only YO and OO groups participated, and that age differences were apparent
when participants completed two concurrent PPPs in Stage 1 of Experiment 9.
One could also note that the only problems that did not suggest age related
differences were linearly, and therefore elementally, soluble. Again, this implies
that older participants were using an elemental approach to generalisation.
9.3.2: Is HCL Ability Dissociable From Other Age Sensitive Abilities?
One of the biggest questions in cognitive ageing is whether all age
sensitive abilities are subsumed by factors that are more general, such as fluid
intelligence or processing speed, or whether they are independent of one another.
The current research addressed this question by collecting background data (see
Chapter 5) on a number of measures designed to reflect general factors that have
been suggested to underlie all or much of general age related cognitive decline.
Variables included in these analyses were Age, AH4 Total (AH4), Years of
Education (YE), Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHV), MacQuarrie Test of
Mechanical Ability (McQ), Digit Cancellation (DC), and Stage 2 Time for
Experiments 9, 10, and 11. These measures were then entered into multiple
regression analyses if they correlated with Overall Accuracy (OA), Final Trial
Accuracy (FTA), or estimates of interference. The results of these multiple
regressions will now be used to assess the extent to which age itself or other
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factors contribute to HCL. Table 9.1 summarises the findings of this part of the
investigation. These observations may also help to address some of the theories
mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4. These include fluid intelligence explanations,
disuse theories, sensori-motor deficits, and processing speed theory.
 9.3.2.1: Age
There was some evidence to suggest that age itself was a predictor of
response accuracy in a number of experiments and that HCL may therefore be
dissociable from other abilities that exhibit an age related decline. Age was a
significant individual negative predictor of OA in Experiments 2, 3, 9 (Stage 1
and AB problem Stage 2) and 11 (Stage 2), and of FTA in Experiments 2, 6, and
10 (Stage 1). In this sense age seems to predict accuracy more within the
concurrent negative and positive patterning problems of Experiments 2 and 3 and
in the concurrent biconditional and conditional problems of Experiment 6 since
in all other instances other age related variables were also predictors. This
Table 9.1: Predictor Variables Identified by Multiple Regression for
Overall Accuracy (OA), Final Trial Accuracy (FTA), and Interference
Experiment OA FTA Interference
1 YE
2 Age Age
3 Age
6 Age
9 Stage 1 Age, YE YE
AB Age, AH4 YE9
Stage 2 EF AH4
9 Test Age, YE
10 Stage 1 Age, AH4, MHV
AB AH4, YE10
Stage 2 EF YE
10 Test Stage 2 Time
11 Stage 1 YE YE
AB/CD Age, AH4 AH411
Stage 2 IJ/KL Age YE
11 Test AH4
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indicates that the ability to complete two different problems simultaneously may
be particularly, and perhaps uniquely, sensitive to the ageing process. This
suggests that solving concurrent but different problems constitutes complexity,
and the observed age related difficulties may well be related to a decline in
underlying cognitive resources. Age also positively predicted the extent of
change to the CD problem between the end of Stage 1 and test in Experiment 9;
although this is almost certainly due to the fact that younger participants’
responses suffered the greatest retroactive interference through rule based
generalisation rather than being related to cognitive ageing as such. Not only
this, but age differences and interactions in some experiments were preserved
when AH4 scores were entered as a covariate (Experiment 1, Age by Blocks;
Experiment 2, Age, Age by Blocks; Experiment 3, Age by Problem; Experiment
9, Test stage, CD Change, Hits; Experiment 10, Stage 2 accuracy, Age by
Problem by Blocks, Test Stage Age by Problem; Experiment 11 Stage 2 Age by
Problem by Blocks, Test Stage ABCD vs EFGH Age by Trials, ABCD vs ADBC
Age by Stimulus). Again, this suggests that some parts of the observed age
differences in conditional learning ability may be independent of general
cognitive ability and consequently run contrary to the ‘dull hypothesis’. One
explanation may be that age differences independent of general intelligence
reflects very basic learning processes that do not require higher order processing.
Certainly, given that the associative learning explanation of conditional learning
relies on an analogy with animal learning it makes sense to suppose that the
processes involved in feature, although not necessarily rule, based generalisation
may be very basic indeed. There is, however, an alternative possibility: perhaps
the problems were simply too abstract for older people in that they relied on the
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ability to imagine the hypothetical consequences of the presence of imagined
foods or words on an abstract reality. Whilst this may sound like the kind of
explanation that would be subsumed within a fluid intelligence explanation this
may not necessarily be the case. Stuart-Hamilton (1994, pps. 59-61) raises the
possibility that older people may be worse at Piagetian tasks than younger
people, implying that abstract thinking abilities may decline with age. Again, it
would be easy to dismiss this as merely reflecting a change in general intellectual
ability, but two more recent studies suggest that some abilities and orientations
related to the solution of Piagetian tasks are independent of general intelligence.
Firstly, Stuart-Hamilton and McDonald (2001) gave participants a set of
Piagetian concrete operational tasks and found that these abilities, rather than
fluid or crystallised intelligence or age itself, predicted a measure of need for
cognition in a sample of older adults. Whilst it is almost certainly true that  need
for cognition is probably higher in those who volunteer to take part in cognitive
ageing studies this suggests that what individual differences  there are in this
respect are mediated by cognitive skills unrelated to more general intellectual
ability. In a similar vein McDonald and Stuart-Hamilton (2003) found that older
participants’ tendency to make egocentric responses in a replication of Piaget and
Inhelder’s (1956) ‘Three Mountains Task’ was predicted by age, rather than fluid
or crytallised intelligence or personality. This suggests that there are some
aspects of abstract thinking and problem solving that are independent of
mainstream explanations of cognitive ageing. It is certainly possible that older
people’s poor performance may be undermined by a lack of abstract thinking
abilities in several ways: firstly just by virtue of an age related decline in such
abilities, and secondly by a decline in motivation toward complex problem
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solving, or need for cognition. Given the lack of research in this area there is
certainly a case for looking at some age related decline afresh with a view to
confirming or denying the influence of abstract thought abilities and its
relationship with task motivation on the results of cognitive ageing studies.
9.3.2.2: Crystallised and Fluid Intelligence
Fluid Intelligence, or the ability to think flexibly about novel problems,
was evaluated with the AH4 Group Test of General Intelligence (AH4: Heim,
1968) whereas Crystallised Intelligence, or knowledge, was assessed with the
Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHV: Raven, 1982). This reflects the distinction
between fluid and crystallised intelligence made by Cattell (1963; Horn &
Cattell, 1967; Horn, 1989; Horn et al. 2000) in that the former decreases with age
whereas the latter is either stable or increases with age and both are well
standardised tests established as appropriate measures of the two constructs (c.f.
Rabbitt, 1993; Rabbitt et al. 2004).
MHV scores proved, unsurprisingly, poor overall predictors of accuracy.
The observation that MHV was a negative predictor of FTA in Experiment 10,
Stage 1 is explicable when one considers that Age, too, bore a similar
relationship with FTA and that MHV scores are also age related. It is, therefore,
possible that in this instance age itself was the mediating factor rather than MHV
scores per se.
AH4 Total scores did not, however, feature as predictors in the single
stage experiments, although their inclusion as covariates did diminish the
relationship of age to some aspects of learning. In particular more demanding
learning involving compounds and nonlinear problems produced results that
suggested age related deficits in these areas were due to declines in general
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cognitive abilities. More interestingly, AH4 scores predicted Stage 2 overall
accuracies for re-valued stimuli in Experiments 9, 10, and 11 (albeit in
conjunction with Age, YE, and Age respectively), and FTA for the AB/CD
stimuli in Stage 2 of Experiment 11 as well as the extent of interference in
Experiment 11’s Test Stage and FTA in Experiment 10, Stage 1 (concurrent
NPPs). It would make sense to suppose that this reflects participants’
vulnerability to proactive interference and their use of elemental strategies since
these effects are largely confined to re-valued stimuli in Stage 2 of all multiple
stage experiments. This interpretation is supported when AH4 was added to
analyses as a covariate: this factor accounted for age differences in Stage 2 of
Experiment 9, where learning shifted to a more difficult NPP but was less
influential in Experiment 10, where learning shifted to the easier and linearly
soluble PPP. Importantly, though, it also predicted the extent of retroactive
interference at test in Experiment 11 and when added as a covariate attenuated
age related differences in resistance to pro and retro active interference. This is
understandable on consideration of what the AH4 actually assesses. The test
itself really involves the detection of patterns and regularities in numbers, words,
and shapes through mental manipulation, series completion, and analogical
reasoning. It may be, therefore, that an ability to detect and act on environmental
regularities may underlie older participants’ relative difficulties with any change
in contingencies and tendency to proactive interference in particular, but also to
retroactive interference in Experiment 11. This indicates that fluid intelligence as
a concept has some credibility, although this cannot explain why fluid
intelligence itself should decline with age. Perhaps this relates to frontally
mediated perseverative errors in older people, as, for instance, in the Wisconsin
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Card Sorting Test (e.g. Dempster et al. 1999) or focus switching in working
memory tasks (Verhaeghen et al. 2002, 2005), and would therefore support
West’s (1996) Frontal Lobe theory of cognitive ageing. It may also suggest that
fluid intelligence abilities may underlie the inhibition of perceptual
generalisation in order to prevent interference to previously learnt contingencies.
The observations that age differences in false recognition were removed by
inclusion of AH4 as a covariate also suggests that general intelligence can
explain a large proportion of learning deficits. Perhaps the ‘dull hypothesis’ may
not be quite as dull as has been suggested.
9.3.2.3: Disuse Theories
Recall from Chapter 5 that everyday activities were excluded from the
experimental analyses since the Everyday Activities Questionnaire (Pushkar et
al. 1997) scores bore no relation to background cognitive measures. In the
absence of these measures Years of Education may be the best reflection of
disuse in the present analysis. This factor is assumed to reflect lifelong cognitive
activity since better-educated people tend to be employed in more cognitively
demanding jobs. Note, however, that although this makes sense this conjunction
of education and career is also associated with higher socio-economic status
which may also be a factor militating against age related cognitive decline
(Antonucci, 2001; but see Kliegal et al. 2004). Years of Education were
predictive of OA in Experiment 1, Stage 1 of Experiments 9 and 11, and for both
AB and EF problems in Experiment 10, Stage 2. It also predicted FTA in
Experiment 9 Stage 1 and for the AB problem in Stage 2, as well as for
Experiment 11 Stage 1 and the IJ and KL stimuli in Stage 2 and, furthermore,
predicted the extent of change to Stage 1 CD discriminations in the Test Stage of
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Experiment 9. As with AH4 scores this pattern of results suggests that YE is a
better predictor in multiple stage experiments, and there is always the possibility
that since intelligence tests such as the AH4 were designed to predict academic
performance that YE and AH4 attainment may be related. There are, however,
real differences in the pattern of results since YE was a predictor of Stage 1 OA
and FTA in Experiments 9 and 11, which were both linearly soluble, and in OA
for Experiment 1. By way of contrast AH4 scores were more predictive of
accuracy when stimuli had been re-valued and may therefore bear a greater
relationship to executive abilities than YE. Even when YE predicted Stage 2
accuracy in Experiment 10 this was not confined to the re-valued stimuli, and
indeed in Experiment 11, Stage 2, YE predicted accuracy for responses to the
novel IJ and KL stimuli. Conclusions are therefore difficult to draw. One could
say that YE predicted participants’ accuracy in relatively simple problems since
it was a significant predictor of accuracy in Stage 1 of Experiments 9 and 11 but
this could not explain why it predicted OA in Experiment 1. One explanation
could be that younger participants had, on average, more years of education than
the older groups and the observed differences reflect this. This makes sense but
age itself should be, logically, a co-predictor if this was the case but only OA for
Experiment 9, Stage 1 shows age and YE to predict the same thing. Clearly YE
seems to be related to response accuracy in some way but it is difficult to see
exactly how from the data available and more research needs to be done to
illuminate this relationship.
9.3.2.4: Sensori-Motor Deficits
Sensori-motor abilities were assessed with the MacQuarrie Test of
Mechanical Ability (see Chapter 5). There was no evidence that this factor
291
predicted learning ability. It can be concluded, therefore, that sensori-motor
deficits have little to do with HCL ability in the present context.
9.3.2.5: Processing Speed Theory
There is almost no evidence that performance on the DC task predicted
learning ability at all. DC performance significantly correlated with OA or FTA
in a number of experiments, and constituted part of significant multiple
regression models on those occasions. Despite that, DC never emerged as an
individually significant predictor of learning accuracy or interference. This
suggests that perceptual speed had little to do with HCL ability. Having said that
one must bear in mind that the current research relied on a single measure of
processing speed, whereas Salthouse (1996; 2000) and other researchers tend to
use batteries of tests designed to operationalise the construct, although exactly
what ‘processing speed’ is and exactly what these test batteries measure is open
to question (see Parkin & Java, 1999, 2000). One cannot completely rule out the
processing speed theory merely because DC cannot predict HCL, but the present
evidence suggests that it cannot explain the current data.
So far, a number of theories have been assessed using the background
measures obtained from participants that were detailed in Chapter 5. These
included whether HCL ability was age sensitive and whether it was dissociable
from other cognitive abilities. Furthermore, individual difference measures were
combined with experimental data to assess the extent to which HCL could be
predicted by other abilities that commonly decline with age. This included the
relative contribution of fluid and crystallised intelligence, disuse theories,
sensori-motor deficits, and processing speed. What it neglected was the relative
contributions of frontal lobe theory and the associative deficit hypothesis. These
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were not assessed directly since the main aim of the research was to establish a
body of data on age related deficits in HCL in the absence of any other. The
contribution of frontal and medial temporal lobe areas of the brain to learning
and memory (see Chapter 2) and the nature of their age related decline (see
Chapter 4) is well documented, so it should be possible to assess the theories by
examining the pattern of age related deficits apparent in the experiments. The
next section, therefore, will examine both of these perspectives in relation to
experimental data.
9.4.1: The Frontal Lobe Theory of Cognitive Ageing
Recall from Chapters 2 and 4 that frontal areas of the brain seem
particularly prone to the effects of ageing (e.g. Woodruff-Pak, 1997; Raz, 2000;
Shan et al. 2005). Frontal lobe (FL) areas are generally associated with executive
control of cognitive processes, planning, decision-making, attention, and using
experience to guide future behaviour (e.g. Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Bechara et
al. 2000). Other cognitive deficits associated with FL damage include a
vulnerability to perseverative errors (e.g. Gunning-Dixon et al. 2003),
differentiating between stimuli with different outcomes and task relevant and
task irrelevant stimuli (e.g. Dimitrov et al. 1999), effortful encoding, and
retrieval processes (e.g. Tulving, 2002), reversal learning (e.g. Kringelbach et al.
2003), learning about the reward value of stimuli (e.g. Rolls, 2000; 2004), and
inhibiting prepotent responses (e.g. Damasio, 1994; Milham et al. 2002). Recall,
from Chapter 4, that this pattern of deficits is apparent in older people and that
West’s (1996) FL theory of cognitive ageing suggests that it is these deficits that
underlie most, if not all, of the observed age related cognitive decline.
Remember, too, from Chapter 2 that the work of Rolls (2000, 2004; Francis et al.
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1999) suggests that FL areas are vital for the formation of stimulus-response
links and the conscious differentiation of stimuli with different outcomes.
Predictions that may be derived from this theory relevant to the FL theory of
cognitive ageing are that older participants should exhibit deficits in stimulus
response learning and that they should overgeneralise between stimuli because
they lack the cognitive resources necessary to initiate configural learning
processes that appear necessary for the solution of non-linear problems and
resistance to feature based interference. Furthermore, because older participants
learn more slowly they should have difficulty inducing rules (cf. Shanks &
Darby, 1998) and should recover more slowly from the proactive interference
resulting from contingency reversals, persevering with previously valid
contingencies longer than younger participants. One should also see age deficits
increase as processing load or complexity increases since more effortful forms of
processing appear to be more affected by increasing age and FL deficits.
There is little to contradict these predictions in the research reported here.
Certainly, in all but the least complex of the experiments (Experiments 4, 5, and
8) there were observed age deficits in contingency learning. This suggests that
only when cognitive effort was increased did the age related deficits become
apparent. Again, this is consistent with FL theory but also with the ‘age by
complexity’ effect (see Chapter 3), although it is apparent that the two may be
related or even synonymous given the FL deficits associated with effortful
processing (e.g. Tulving, 2002).
Furthermore, as complexity increased, as defined by the number of
different problems or outcomes or linear insolubility of the problems, so did age
differences. There is little doubt that older participants overgeneralised between
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stimuli because of their poor performance in biconditional relative to conditional
problems and NPPs relative to PPPs. This implies that non-linear problems may
engage more processing resources and cognitive effort than linear problems and
those deficits may therefore be because of FL atrophy. An alternative, and less
effortful strategy to adopt may be to apply a rule of summation that would render
non-linear problems insoluble but would be consistent with older people’s
reliance on stereotypical, schematic responses that reduce processing load
(Mather et al. 2003). This use of summation as a strategy resulting in
overgeneralisation is further evidenced by test stage responses in Experiment 11:
older participants tended to be more subject to retroactive interference and
confused about which stimuli led to which responses. Younger participants, on
the other hand, made responses more consistent with configural generalisation
processes. Older people also differentiated less between responses to stimuli seen
in Stage 1 (AB, CD) and novel stimuli made up of the same elements (AD, BC).
Although younger participants seemed to overgeneralise more in Experiment 9
this was almost certainly due to their having learned an heuristic during Stage 2
that was applied to all test stimuli, and it is arguable that simply inducing and
applying a generalisable rule may utilise effortful processing resources.
It was also certainly the case that older participants recovered from
proactive interference more slowly than younger people did. This was
consistently observed through the three critical experiments (9, 10, and 11),
although this effect was complicated because in Experiments 9 and 10 the YO
group suffered the greatest proactive interference. Presumably, this was because
they had learned the Stage 1 contingencies more than the OO and may therefore
have been more prone to induce a partial rule that applied to that stage only and
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consequently more likely to carry on applying that knowledge, whether gained
through associative learning or rule induction, because of a predisposition toward
FL mediated perseverative errors. This is likely because rule induction itself
seems to be age sensitive, if only because of older participants’ poorer learning.
Not only that, but AH4 Total scores predicted learning accuracy consistently for
Stage 2 re-valued problems, suggesting that more fluid, adaptive, reflective
processes were required for reversal learning than any other form of learning. 
Another point to consider is that Age as a factor was also a good
predictor of accuracy in many of the experiments. It is possible that the capacity
of age to predict learning may be subsumed by neuropsychological factors not
accounted for in the present research, which has concentrated on collecting
experimental data and in discounting other more established theories, such as
Salthouse’s processing speed theory, or the influence of sensori-motor abilities.
From the results of the present investigations, however, it is apparent that more
research involving extensive neuropsychological testing or in vivo scanning is
justified.
It would also be useful to look in more depth at specific process deficits
that may underlie older people’s tendency to overgeneralise between stimuli. As
discussed previously it is possible to explain overgeneralisation in terms of
inhibitory failure (c.f. Hasher and Zacks, 1988; Milham et al. 2002) since the
preservation of learned discriminations surely requires the inhibition of
subsequently learned responses, and avoiding proactive interference almost
certainly means suppressing learnt responses to previously seen and perceptually
similar stimuli. This explanation gains credence since the assumption that
younger participants can inhibit the extent of generalisation of associative
296
strength from perceptually similar stimuli led to accurate predictions for Pearce’s
(1994) configural model in terms of younger participants’ responses in
Experiments 6 and 11.
There is, however an equally plausible explanation for these observations
in terms of source monitoring (e.g. Johnson et al. 1993; Hedden and Park, 2003;
Simons et al. 2004). It is possible that predicting accurate responses to stimuli
relies on memory for the context in which contingencies were originally learnt.
For instance, in Experiment 11 it may be that younger people preserved the
discrimination between AB, CD and EF, GH stimuli at test since they recognised
the context in which they were presented as being the same as Stage 1 of the
experiment whereas older participants did not. It would, therefore, be necessary
to look at the relative contributions of inhibitory and source monitoring processes
on resisting interference in contingency learning. This is particularly the case
since although the data cannot rule out FL theory and gives us reason to conclude
that this is very probably a factor there is no direct evidence for it. Furthermore
stimulus-stimulus associations may be adversely affected by age and it is
difficult to partial out this possibility at present. The next section, therefore, will
look at the evidence for the associative deficit hypothesis.
9.4.2: The Associative Deficit Hypothesis
Recall, from Chapter 2, that the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and in
particular the hippocampal region has been implicated in creating integrated
multimodal episodic memories that are ultimately stored in cortical areas (e.g.
Scoville & Milner, 1957; Marr, 1970, 1971; Squire et al. 1985; Zola-Morgan et
al. 1986). In terms of associative learning the formation of a conditioned
response is unaffected by hippocampal region damage (e.g. Gabrielli et al. 1995),
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as is simple category learning (Knowlton et al. 1994). Theorists such as Gluck
and Myers (1993; 2001) and Rudy and Sutherland (1995), however, suggest that
this region serves the purpose of creating internal representations of complex, or
compound, stimuli that can be differentiated from the elements that compose
them, and there is much to suggest this is generally accurate (see Chapter 2). At
the very least problems with this region should result in mnemonic deficits for
compounds or context, or possibly result in learning that conformed to the
predictions of elemental theories such as the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model
since simple stimulus-response learning may not be impaired. There is evidence
that the MTL and hippocampal region is subject to age related decline (See
Chapter 4, e.g. Raz, 2000; Woodruff-Pak, 1997), as are acetylcholine levels in
the region (e.g. Terry et al. 2003) that may mediate storage and recall functions
(Gluck et al. 1996).  The suggestion that learning about stimulus-stimulus
associations is contingent on medial temporal lobe areas is consistent with
Naveh-Benjamin’s (2000; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2002 Naveh-Benjamin et al.
2003, Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2004) associative deficit hypothesis of cognitive
ageing. This suggests that the age related decline in MTL mediated associative
processes may explain age related deficits in memory. This hypothesis was tested
in two areas of the preceding experiments: compound versus element learning
and compound recognition tasks.
There were significant effects of Stimulus in Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 5
which showed that, for all age groups, contingencies associated with elements
were easier to learn than those associated with compounds. There were, however,
no interactions between Age and Stimulus, suggesting that older people’s
compound learning was not differentially affected by the ageing process relative
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to younger people’s compound learning deficits. On the other hand, there was the
observation in Experiment 1 of significant final trial differences between Y and
OO groups in terms of compound, but not element, learning. This observation,
however, was not replicated in the other experiments. Overall, therefore, this is at
odds with an associative deficit hypothesis that predicts a greater decrement for
learning compounds than elements for older people relative to the difference
between younger people’s element and compound learning. There is, however,
an alternative explanation for why the expected differences were not observed.
Recall that, according to Gluck and Myers (1993; 2001) the process of predictive
differentiation involves creating representations of compounds discrete from the
elements that compose them only if feedback from cortical areas indicates that
they lead to different outcomes. In this context one could argue that FL deficits
in acquiring stimulus-response contingencies could be obscuring any potential
associative deficits. It is however, equally, if not more plausible to suggest that
learning about compounds per se may involve higher-level processes such as
inhibition or source monitoring when their outcomes conflict with the outcomes
of the elements of which they are composed or with the outcomes of similar
compounds, as they did in the experiments reported here. Therefore the
observation that element learning is easier than compound learning does not
necessarily imply a MTL deficit, and Gluck’s model, as observed in Chapter 2,
may be overestimating the role of MTL regions and underestimating the role of
FL regions in learning.
In terms of compound recognition, on the other hand, the evidence
suggests that age related associative deficits might be apparent. In both
Experiments 9 and 11 older participants recognised fewer of the test compounds
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than younger participants did. In Experiments 10 and 11 older participants
suffered more false recognition in that they incorrectly identified significantly
more compounds as having been seen, after controlling for compound memory,
during the experiment when they had not appeared. This provides limited support
for the associative deficit hypothesis in the context of HCL, although it is equally
clear that this theory alone could not provide a convincing explanation for the
pattern of age related differences in HCL ability, particularly since LaVoie et al.
(2006) found that FL deficits were associated with false recognition. It seems
likely that, as Band et al. (2002) suggested, cognitive decline in general, even in
relatively simple contingency learning, is a consequence of physical decline in
more than one brain region. The question is of relative contribution, and the
present research suggests that the processes underlying HCL are more likely to
depend on FL regions, although MTL regions may contribute to compound
recognition. As a consequence there is, again, every justification to proceed with
full scale neuropsychological testing or in vivo scanning studies in order to gain
a better understanding of the relative contributions of FL and MTL areas to
human conditional learning.
9.5: Summary of Conclusions
So, what has been learned from the present research about the way
humans tackle contingency learning problems and the effect of ageing on this
ability? In order to address this question it would be expedient to split it into two
parts. Firstly, what are the implications for the applicability of theories of
associative learning to Human Conditional Learning? Secondly, what are the
consequences of ageing on HCL ability and how do the patterns of decline
apparent in the present experiments fit in with existing theory?
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In answer to the first question it is apparent that associative learning
theories can predict some, but not all, HCL ability. In common with animal
learning theories, there are some empirical observations best explained using
elemental theories, and some best explained using configural theories. Both
elemental and configural approaches have already been tested by Shanks,
Charles, Darby, and Azmi (1998) and Shanks, Darby, and Charles (1998) and
been found unable to predict the extent of resistance to retroactive interference in
HCL under some circumstances, although configural theories best predicted
responses in Shanks et al.’s studies.
The present research does nothing to disconfirm those conclusions, the
test stage results of Experiments 9, and 10 being inexplicable by elemental or
configural theories since participants seemed to have been relying on rule, rather
than feature based generalisation. The observations of rule based, rather than
feature based, generalisation reported in Shanks and Darby (1998), however,
seem to have been largely ignored in the associative learning literature, perhaps
because of the profound difficulties they raise for the application of associative
learning theories to HCL. Recall that they suggest that rule induction
overshadows associative learning when it occurs, although rule induction itself is
contingent on what has been learned about stimulus response contingencies in
that faster, more accurate learning seems to predict rule induction. The present
series of studies merely confirms this suspicion, since rule correct groups in all
experiments, where it was tested, learned contingencies more quickly and
accurately than rule incorrect groups.
Furthermore, Experiments 9 and 10 demonstrate that problem order has a
profound effect on HCL judgements to an extent entirely unpredictable by
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associative learning theories and, indeed, it may be that once rule induction has
occurred responses may be better predicted by appealing to the problem solving
literature. Despite this, however, it is clear that the initial acquisition of
contingencies may still be best predicted by associative learning theories. The
predictions of Pearce’s (1987, 1994, 2002) configural learning theory accurately
predicted younger participants’ responses in experiments that did not offer the
opportunity of rule-based generalisation, especially Experiments 6 and 11. One
could, therefore, conclude that associative learning theory still has a place in
explaining HCL ability but researchers should be aware that this approach may
be limited if the possibility of rule induction and analogical transfer of solutions
exists.
In terms of the second set of issues around cognitive ageing that
constituted the major reason for the present research it seems that a paper and
pencil version of the food-allergy paradigm is a valid methodology for this area
of investigation since participants of all ages could acquire stimulus-response
contingencies. It was equally apparent that the task is sensitive to cognitive
ageing in that an age related deficit in learning ability was evident, and the
results suggest a number of explanations for this decline and appear to
disconfirm some potential explanations as well.
Firstly, the seemingly somewhat archaic fluid intelligence explanation
seemed to predict some HCL abilities well through the observation that AH4
scores predicted accuracy in some circumstances. This observation was
particularly consistent in reversal learning in Experiments 9, 10, and 11, where
Stage 1 contingencies were re-valued in Stage 2. Given that FL theory would
predict a greater vulnerability to proactive interference due to difficulties with
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reversal learning due to perseverative errors and a compromised ability to inhibit
previously learned responses it may be that the abilities tested in the AH4 might
be mediated by FL declines. Equally AH4 scores alone predicted resistance to
retroactive interference in Experiment 11, again this eventuality would be
predicted by FL theories in terms of either inhibitory or source monitoring
deficits, and one might suppose that there was a relationship between what is
termed frontal lobe or executive function and fluid intelligence.
Although this suggestion may seem purely speculative, it is not without
foundation. Duncan (2005; 1995; Duncan, Burgess, & Emslie, 1995) has found
that measures of fluid intelligence such as Cattell and Cattell’s (1960) culture fair
intelligence test are able to predict frontal lobe functions as accurately as
neuropsychological tests. In this view, the terms ‘executive’ or ‘frontal’
functions seem synonymous with fluid intelligence and the observations made
above would indeed suggest that resistance to pro- and retro-active interference
in HCL is mediated by executive or frontal abilities.
On the other hand, other researchers are more cautious in interpreting
these kinds of observations. Rabbitt, Lowe, and Shilling (2001), for instance (see
also Rabbitt & Lowe, 2000) argue that correlations between scores on the
Culture Fair Intelligence Test and neuropsychological tests of executive function
reflect the fact that fluid intelligence tests do indeed reflect a general intellectual
ability and that therefore these correlations should not be surprising. In this
conception, therefore, executive abilities are part of a subset of abilities
subsumed by general fluid intelligence. Note, however, that Rabbitt (2005) has
softened his stance in the light of fMRI evidence from Duncan and Owen (2000)
suggesting that frontal areas were preferentially activated by fluid intelligence
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tasks. If this is, indeed, the case then the observation that pro- and retro-active
interference are mediated by fluid intelligence constitutes reasonably strong
evidence that this age sensitive ability is contingent on the integrity of the frontal
lobes.
There was, in addition, limited evidence from the compound recognition
tasks that memory for compounds was subject to an age related decline, giving
some restricted support to an associative deficit hypothesis.
9.6: Directions for Further Research
As with the vast majority of research, the present series of experiments
raises more questions than it answers. Although the present research focussed on
cognitive ageing the observations made with regard to the effects of rule
induction and the parallels between problem solving and HCL in connection with
Easy-Hard transfer should not be ignored. Certainly, there has been no effort to
integrate the findings of Shanks and Darby (1998) into associative learning
theories since their publication and the present research reinforces their findings.
There is, therefore, a clear gap to be filled in determining the extent to which
associative processes underlie causal learning. Beyond this the elemental versus
configural debate rumbles on in the literature (see Rescorla, 2003, Wagner, 2003,
and LePelley, 2004 for recent examples), and it has been seen that younger
adults’ performance in HCL tasks may be best predicted by configural models of
learning whereas older people’s responses are more elemental in nature. This,
naturally, leads to the question of generalisation and suggests researchers’ efforts
might be usefully employed in the task of establishing precisely how older adults
generalise between stimuli and explore age differences in this regard. Some of
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this work has already been carried out in the domains of time perception (e.g.
Wearden et al. 1997; McCormack et al. 1999) and conceptual generalisation (e.g.
LaVoie et al. 2006), although not all modalities or stimulus types may be subject
to increasing overgeneralisation during later life so there is a justification for
extending this work and exploring potential fundamental cognitive abilities that
may underlie and predict generalisation processes.
In terms of cognitive ageing there is a clear justification for carrying out
further research into HCL ability as it is clearly an area that is subject to
cognitive decline in old age. There is evidence that implies that HCL ability may
be related to FL and MTL mediated abilities and there is therefore a need to carry
out more research that includes comprehensive batteries of neuropsychological
tests. This would enable us to assess the relative contribution of these areas to
associative learning in general and in predicting the extent of age related decline
in particular. Of course, it would clearly be preferable to take an in vivo scanning
approach but this would be contingent on access to these kinds of facilities. The
collection of more comprehensive background data on participants would also
enable us to gauge more accurately the extent to which HCL ability in general,
and generalisation in particular, is dissociable from other age vulnerable
cognitive abilities.
One could also gather more evidence that older adults tend to use
elemental strategies to learn contingencies and generalise from them, rather than
configural strategies younger participants seem to favour. Since this implies that
configural learning requires more processing resources this opens up another
avenue of enquiry.
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In addition, one could address the questions of whether processing speed
is unrelated to HCL ability, and what exactly it is about years of education and
AH4 ability that makes them able to predict different aspects of the learning
tasks. In the latter case, especially, there is a real question mark over whether
fluid intelligence is, in fact, dissociable from frontal or executive abilities. Future
research could therefore analyse the relationships between fluid intelligence,
neuropsychological test scores, and HCL ability in order to reconcile these
observations. Given that there seem to be aspects of conditional learning that are
independent of fluid intelligence it would also be necessary to explore these
areas. It may be, as discussed earlier, that these unexplained aspects are
fundamental associative learning processes or they may be better explained by a
decrement in abstract thinking skills that are independent of fluid intelligence, as
demonstrated in studies of age related decline in Piagetian tasks (e.g. McDonald
& Stuart-Hamilton, 2003).Overall, the present research has successfully opened
up another area of enquiry to those interested in cognitive ageing and has
suggested ways in which the current findings can be incorporated into future
research.
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